

# Attitude of Socialists Towards India's Foreign Policy

S. M. Mohiuddin Subhani



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**Dedicated  
to the memory of  
my grandfather  
Dr. M.A. Subhan**

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I alone am, however, accountable for all the lapses that must have occurred in the study.



## Abbreviations

AICC	All-India Congress Committee
CSP	Congress Socialist Party
CPI	Communist Party of India
CIA	Central Intelligence of America
INC	Indian National Congress
ICWA	Indian Council of World Affairs
KMPP	Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party
n.	Footnote
NNRC	Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission
PRC	People's Republic of China
SPI	Socialist Party of India
ISP	Indian Socialist Party

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## Introduction

It was in the hope of delineating the attitude of the Praja Socialist Party towards India's foreign policy that this study was taken up. It was a Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the Bihar University in December 1970. The author has recast that dissertation to cover the attitude of the party as it got unfolded in relation to some latest major developments and to give it the form of a book.

The attitude of any major national political party of the opposition in a non-Western parliamentary democracy like India's towards any major aspect of the national policy as pursued by the party in power has its own significance. So has the attitude of the PSP towards India's foreign policy. The literature that is available on the subject views it neither as an object of exclusive and specific concern nor anything else than the sum total of the well-pronounced foreign policy stands of the party. A scientific attempt at finding out the ingredients of the attitude, tracing its behavioural trajectory and assessing its impact on the official lines of action continued to be called for. Therein lay the justification for this study being taken up.

Beside serving that primary purpose, the study may have some further use inasmuch as it also brings to light such foreign policy angles of the PSP as, in spite of being significant, have failed to carry conviction with the Government, but may evince further scrutiny from the point of view of their desirability and tenability. The lines of investigation followed in it may help reading attitude of other political entities towards foreign, or other policies and issues. It may as well be of some use in comparing the attitudes of various political parties. In

respect of India's foreign policy, it may induce a further inquiry as to the prospects of an all-party area of agreement. Finally, it may be viewed as pointing to a track along which the behavioural spirit of opposition parties in the parliamentary democracies of developing societies may be reckoned and appreciated.

The party in question in this study has a history of about thirty-eight years notable both for the intellectual calibre of its leadership and its parliamentary-democratic sensibility. But its history also makes it clear as to why it could not grow to the strength that it once aspired for and was generally expected to achieve in Indian politics. Its continued ideological kinship with some leading socialist-minded figures of the Indian National Congress, of which it remained a wing for the first fourteen years of its career, hindered rather than helped its growth. It came out of the INC in the spring of 1948 as the Socialist Party of India nursing an ambition to present itself to the nation as an alternative political party capable of replacing the Congress in government. When, in the first general elections, it fell far short of achieving that kind of ambition, it sought a stronger and wider political and electoral base by re-forming itself as the Praja Socialist Party in merger with the nascent Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party, a break-away faction of the INC. Getting re-formed was a factor of the truncation that it faced subsequently when a bulk of it, led by Ram Manohar Lohia and others, formed the break-away Socialist Party. Later, the old ideological kinship with some Congress leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru impelled some of its old pioneers like Asoka Mehta and others to desert it and join the INC with their followers, causing a second truncation.

Later still, it underwent a very short-lived merger with the Socialist Party to form the Sanyukta Socialist Party and, though it re-emerged as the PSP getting out of the SSP, suffered a third truncation in that process. It has, once again, undergone a merger with some other major socialist parties to form the Socialist Party formed on 9 August 1971. Thus, during the last twenty-three years, unsteadiness has been chronic to it. It appears that the party has been inherently weak owing to middle-class, middling-ideological and intellectual bases. Where-

as, on the one hand, its intellectual base has largely enabled it to play a shiningly patriotic role in the freedom movement as well as in free India's democracy, it has, on the other, continued to hinder it in gaining strength organisationally and with the electorate. The party never became formidably strong and, of late, has been losing the strength it had acquired initially in the wake of India's independence. Notwithstanding its weaknesses and decline, it has wielded much more influence and received a much greater attention from the Government and the public than its actual strength would make it deserve. The main reason for that, the hypothesis giving start to the study was, has been lying in the nature and quality of its attitude reflected at its best in relation to foreign policy.

With the above understanding, this study needed at its outset a scientific approach for reading that attitude. A clue for the same lay in H.J. Eysenck's *The Psychology of Politics* (London, Second Impression, 1957, pp. 12-13) wherein he banks on G.W. Allport's definition of attitude as "a mental and neutral state of readiness organised through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related" and explains further that, not being such as may be observed directly, it has to be deduced. Insofar as the present study was concerned, the problem was that of adapting that definition to reading the attitude not of individuals but of a political party, an organised entity consisting, of course, of individuals, in relation to a specific object, i.e., the foreign policy of the country. Eysenck was also helpful in breaking up the elements of attitude as perceptions, dispositions to react, behavioural trends, environmental and motivational factors and relations to attitude towards other objects. He was of help also in characterising the attitude of a political party of the opposition in the context of a foreign policy as an issue in parliamentary politics.

The context of foreign policy implied the attitude being studied in relation to the various dimensions of India's foreign policy with reference both to its pre-independence antecedents and post-independence lineaments. The antecedents related to the trends of the outlook of the Indian national movement for world politics in terms of the stages of change in the perceptions

of the PSP as well as in the circumstances bearing on them. The lineaments related to the basic principles and aspects of free India's foreign policy as well as the main sectors of its external relations.

With the given hypothesis and above considerations, the questions that the study had to face were as to how the PSP was disposed to react to free India's foreign policy after having chosen to function independently of the ruling party, with what perceptions and behavioural traits as a result of the experiences acquired inside it in various stages and with what degree of impact on the foreign policy outlook of the national movement.

How far did the party agree with the Government in regard to the basic principles and aspects of foreign policy, e.g., non-alignment, anti-colonialism and anti-racialism, foreign aid and defence, and with what perception of its own? What improvements did it suggest in their respect and how did it behave while agreeing or disagreeing, with what impact on the Government?

How much did the party approve or disapprove of India's relations with the West, the Soviet bloc, China, Pakistan, and the neighbouring regions and with what perceptions and suggestions for improvements? How did it behave in relation to the various aspects and stages of such relations and with what impact on the official policies and stands?

Further questions that the study had to meet were related to locating the shifts, if any, in the attitude of the party towards various issues and seeing if, on occasions, its opinion was divided also. While summing up the answers found to the above questions, a task that finally obtained was that of characterising the attitude in terms of cohesiveness, consistency versus inconsistency, as also of rigidity versus flexibility, and of ascertaining the quality of its underlying perception and disposition as well as of the behaviour that followed from it.

As may be clear from what has been stated above, this is a study in attitude. But the attitude studied is that of a political party towards a political matter concerning it competitively in national politics. The study, therefore, has not much to do with psychology from which it only coarsely seeks help

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for a scientific definition of attitude, a break up of its ingredients and criteria for determining its characteristics along with the quality of its ingredients. Its burden is observation which is normal to Political Science. The study may be viewed as behavioural, but only in a broad sense, for it is devoid of any finesse of quantification. Its quest is rather qualitative. It does involve, but only the way, the history of the PSP as well as that of India's foreign policy and cannot have any serious claim to being a historical study. The field of observation being a foreign policy, it may be viewed as a study in International Politics. But, in all fairness, there, too, it is a study only in how a particular organised political group has been viewing the making and conducting of a particular foreign policy. That has been done by surveying first the antecedents of the attitude of the PSP in its formative background and then by scrutinising its lineaments in relation to the basic principles and aspects of India's foreign policy and the main sectors of its external relations. The main concern of the study, however, is the attitude from the spring of March 1948, when the party became independent of the Congress practically to the date. The antecedents from 1934 to 1948 were covered only for a proper perusal of the attitude subsequently obtaining.

The foregoing review may reveal that this study was needed for a scientific, systematic, comprehensive and exclusive treatment of the subject. In meeting the requirement, the study has gone in for taking a scientific view by seeking a scientific definition of attitude, breaking up its ingredients and earmarking the criteria for determining its characteristics as well as the quality of its ingredients. It has linked the reading of the attitude of the PSP towards free India's foreign policy with that of its antecedents of the formative phase when the foreign policy outlook of the Indian national movement was shaping itself. The attitude itself has been observed along two distinct lines : first in relation to the basic principles and aspects of the foreign policy and, secondly, in relation to each principal sector of the country's external relations. The first line is based on the examination of the attitude of the party in relation to the concepts underlying the basic principles and aspects of the foreign policy along with their applied sides. The second line

is based on the examination of the attitude in regard respectively to India's general relations with the two power blocs and bilateral relations with the leading powers of each of them over issues of general as well as bilateral importance, to its relations with its two hostile neighbours over issues of general, regional and bilateral importance, and, finally, to its relations and points of vital concern in the neighbouring regions. Determining the characteristics of the attitude, locating its ingredients, assessing their quality and gauging the impact on the foreign policy have, all, been kept in view while pursuing the observation along the two lines stated above. Observation along the two lines has been carried in terms of agreement or disagreement shown by the party and of cooperation, moderation or agitation that it resorted to. The narrative, as such, is running in every chapter. But care has been taken that the points of official policy, agreed or disagreed upon or found wanting one way or the other by the party, come up clearly. These are the aspects of the analytical approach of the study. Though the study was not to be historical, a historical approach became necessary in order to deal with the antecedents of the attitude as well as to examine it in relation to the official assessments, phasewise, of the intentions of India's hostile neighbours. Likewise, though the study was not intended as being psychological, reading the attitude made a psychological approach necessary.

All official foreign policy and party documents that were relevant and became available, all relevant issues of the *Janata*, an organ of the PSP, all relevant writings of the leaders and members of the party published and available, news reports, editorials and feature articles of news, dailies and periodicals and academic publications concerning the subject in one way or the other have been used as source materials and have been enlisted in the bibliography.

Besides chapter 11 which sums up and concludes the study, it contains ten other chapters. Chapter 1 on "Background" deals with the antecedents of the attitude of the PSP towards India's foreign policy; Chapter 2 with the attitude towards "Non-alignment" and Chapter 3 with that towards "Anti-colonialism and Anti-racialism" as the basic principles of the policy; Chapter 4 with that towards "Foreign Aid" and

Chapter 5 towards "Defence" as its basic aspects ; and Chapter 6 with that towards India's Relations with the West", Chapter 7 towards "Relations with the Soviet Bloc", Chapter 8 towards "Relations with China", Chapter 9 towards "Relations with Pakistan" and Chapter 10 towards "Other Important Regional Issues and Relations".

S. M. M. S.

## The Background

The present Praja Socialist Party of India had its beginning as the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) formed in May 1934, a radical wing of the Indian National Congress. The party, at its Cawnpore Convention in February-March 1947, dropped the word "Congress" from its nomenclature and in March 1948 became independent of the Congress. In June 1952, after a merger with the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party, this Socialist Party emerged as the Praja Socialist Party (PSP). In July-August 1955, a small faction of it, led by Dr. Rammanohar Lohia, broke away as a separate Socialist Party. In June 1964, the Praja Socialist Party and Socialist Party merged together to form the Samyukta Socialist Party. The merger ended in January 1965 and the Praja Socialist Party retained its separate, but truncated, existence. In August 1971, it re-merged with the SSP and the Indian Socialist Party (ISP) to form the Socialist Party.

### PHASES

The attitude of this Party towards India's foreign policy may have to be studied in eight phases. In the starting phase, from May 1934 to April 1938, the party came out with its own views on important international issues and trends. The second was the phase of aversion for communists from May 1938 to August 1946. This was followed by a third phase from September 1946 to February 1948, in which the Interim Government was formed in India and the party, continuing inside the Congress, developed its attitude towards India's independence and its foreign policy. These three may be

viewed as essentially the background phases of the attitude of the party because, by that time there was no break with the Congress and India's national foreign policy had just commenced. Then came the fourth phase, from March 1948 to August 1952, in which there was a final break with the Congress and its foreign policy. In the fifth phase, from September 1952 to July 1955, the PSP cooperated with the Government in respect of foreign policy with certain reservations. The period from August 1955 to June 1964 may be seen as the phase of steady cooperation with the official foreign policy, except on certain issues where the approach of the party was extremely critical. The seventh was a phase of short transition from July 1964 to January 1965 wherein, during the short-lived merger, the Samyukta Socialist Party reflected a new vigour in the approach to the question of India's external relations and security. The last may be viewed as the current phase of its revived existence, from January 1965 onwards, wherein the party has been flamboyant in its critical stance towards the handling of several foreign policy issues by the Government<sup>1</sup>.

### THE START (MAY 1934—APRIL 1938)

The emergence of the Congress Socialist Party in May 1934 was the cumulative effect of three major events—the organisation of the Bihar Socialist Party in 1931, discussions among the socialist-minded Congressmen in the Nasik Central Prison in 1932-33 and their Poona Conference in July 1933. The formation of this wing of the Congress essentially resulted from the economic struggle of the workers, failure of the Civil Disobedience Movement and the Congress attitude towards imperialists and fascists. The party started with the objective of "complete independence in the sense of separation from the British Empire".<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In August 1971, the Party re-emerged with some other Socialist parties and that takes it to yet another phase. A major characterization of that phase will be pre-mature.

<sup>2</sup> *All India Congress Socialist Party, Constitution, Programme and Resolution of the First Conference of Party and Report of the Organising Secretary* (Bombay, 1934), p. 5.

In this phase the CSP sought to commit the Congress in October 1934 to a war-resistance policy, and disagreed with it in regard to its attitude towards Britain, other imperialist powers and fascists. On some of the issues of international politics, it put forward new visions, new concepts and new interpretations. On some of the questions, it agreed with the Congress while on some others it disagreed.

### War Danger

Alarming the national movement against the danger of the Second World War was the most important trend of the CSP thought on foreign policy in this phase. On various occasions the CSP voiced a vehement opposition to India's participation in any war involving Britain and urged the Congress to resist the using of India's men, money and resources for such a war, to utilize such crisis for securing Swaraj and to decide unequivocally against any war preparations that the British Government in India might make<sup>3</sup>.

### British Imperialism, Fascism and Nazism

The other trend in this phase was that of opposition to British Imperialism, Fascism and Nazism. In October 1934 the Bombay Conference of All India CSP passed a resolution to this effect<sup>4</sup>. Subsequently, the Second Annual Conference at Meerut passed a resolution against the British Imperialists, Fascists and Nazi Germany. It condemned the aggression being waged by the fascist dictator of Italy against Ethiopia and considered

<sup>3</sup> The occasions were All India Congress Socialist Conference held at Bombay in October 1934, the subsequent Meerut Conference in December 1935, the Sind Congress Socialist Conference held at Karachi in 1936, the third CSP annual Faizpur Conference of December 1936 and the fourth CSP annual Conference at Lahore held in April 1938. See Narendra Nath Mitra, ed. *The Indian Annual Register*, Vol. 2 (Calcutta, July-December 1934), p. 296; *All India Congress Socialist Party Second Annual Conference* (Bombay, All India Congress Socialist Party, 1936), p. 15; *Sind Congress Socialist Conference, Presidential Address of M. R. Masani at the First Sind C. S. Conference held at Karachi on 18th and 19th July 1936* (Karachi, Congress Socialist Party, 1936) pp. 35-38; *Congress Socialist* (Bombay) 2 (9 January 1937), p. 25; *Congress Socialist*, 3 (23 April 1938), p. 293.

<sup>4</sup> *The Indian Annual Register*, n. 2.

Ethiopia's fight "as a part of the fight of the exploited people."<sup>5</sup> At the Lahore Socialist Conference in April 1938, in keeping with its previous policy, the CSP condemned both fascist and imperialist powers, and declared Britain's foreign policy as pro-fascist, for it was encouraging the reactionary forces of war and suppressing the freedom movement among the African peoples and in Palestine.<sup>6</sup>

These Socialist resolutions had their impact on the Indian National Congress (INC) in extending its sympathies to Abyssinia<sup>7</sup>, Spain<sup>8</sup>, China and Palestine.<sup>9</sup>

### The Soviet Union

In this phase the CSP admired the Soviet Union, its socialist structure of economy and society and its foreign policy which was opposed to Imperialism, Fascism and Nazism. At the Faizpur Annual Conference of December 1936, a resolution expressed the solidarity of the Indian people with the free people of the USSR.<sup>10</sup> The Lahore Annual Conference considered the USSR as "the only major power working for world freedom and peace", and "against the fascists and imperialists"<sup>11</sup>. The Socialists considered it their bounden duty to help the Soviet democracy and treat as enemy any power that encouraged aggressive designs against it.<sup>12</sup> The Soviet Union was viewed as a challenge to the capitalist world

<sup>5</sup>Resolutions of the Meerut Conference, *Congress Socialist*, 1 (1 February 1936), pp. 19-20.

<sup>6</sup>Resolutions of the Lahore Conference, *Congress Socialist*, 3 (23 April 1938), pp. 293-4.

<sup>7</sup>*Report of the Forty-ninth Indian National Congress* (Allahabad), pp. 47-48.

<sup>8</sup>D. Chakravarty and C. Battacharya, Compiled, *Congress in Evolution* (Part II) (Calcutta, 1953), p. 9.

<sup>9</sup>Nehru's Foreword, Rammanohar Lohia, *Indian Foreign Policy* (Allahabad, 1938), pp. 10-12.

<sup>10</sup>Resolutions of the Faizpur Conference, *Congress Socialist*, 2 (9 January 1937), p. 25.

<sup>11</sup>Resolutions of the Lahore Congress Socialist Party Conference held on 12th, 13th and 14th April 1938, *Congress Socialist*, 4(23 April 1938), p. 293.

<sup>12</sup>Narendra Deva, 'Problem of Socialist Unity, *Congress Socialist*, 3 (9 April 1938), p. 268.

and as the only great power discarding imperialism.<sup>13</sup> The Indian National Congress was influenced by the Socialists' attitude. It also hailed "a new order" and "a new civilization" seen in the Soviet Union<sup>14</sup>, and viewed it as a bulwark against Imperialism<sup>15</sup>, Fascism, Nazism and Militarism.<sup>16</sup>

### Solidarity with the Colonial People

Another trend of this phase was the CSP spirit of solidarity with the colonial people and the freedom fighters of the world. The Socialists championed the cause of the people of Abyssinia, Spain<sup>17</sup>, China<sup>18</sup>, Palestine and Egypt.<sup>19</sup> They offered their support to all the national democratic forces in the colonial world struggling for their emancipation from colonial domination.<sup>20</sup> At the Lahore Conference, a resolution was passed extending sympathy to the forces of freedom among the African peoples.<sup>21</sup> On this issue the Socialists had the full agreement with the Congress. Resolutions were passed by the INC also in support of Abyssinia,<sup>22</sup> Palestine,<sup>23</sup> and Spain.<sup>24</sup>

### Japanese Imperialism

A characteristic trend of this phase was the feeling of antagonism against Japanese Imperialism. Japan's ambition for overlordship of the East and its aggressive policies were

<sup>13</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, "International Bal", *Congress Socialist*, 3 (5 March 1938), pp. 168-169.

<sup>14</sup>*Report of the Forty-ninth Indian National Congress*, n. 6, p. 20.

<sup>15</sup>Lohia, n. 8, p. 16.

<sup>16</sup>Nehru, *China, Spain and the War* (Allahabad and London, 1940), pp. 132-133.

<sup>17</sup>*Meerut Resolutions*, n. 4, and *All India Congress Socialist Party, Second Annual Conference*, n. 2.

<sup>18</sup>N.N. Mitra, ed. *Indian Annual Register I* (1938, Calcutta), p. 393.

<sup>19</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, "The Collapse of International Morality", *Congress Socialist*, 3(26 February 1938), pp. 147-8.

<sup>20</sup>Lohia, n. 8, p. 16.

<sup>21</sup>*Lahore Conference Resolutions*, n. 10.

<sup>22</sup>*Report of the Forty-ninth Indian National Congress* (Allahabad), p. 24.

<sup>23</sup>*Report of the Fifty-First Indian National Congress* (Ahmedabad), p. 199.

<sup>24</sup>*Congress in Evolution*, n. 7, p. 9.



condemned.<sup>25</sup> Since its seize of Manchuria in 1931, the Socialists apprehended Japan as exceptionally aggressive, having the ambition to invade China and the Soviet Union.<sup>26</sup> A full support was given to the people of China against Japan at the Lahore Conference in 1938.<sup>27</sup> The Socialists were in full accord with the AICC Resolutions on those issues passed in 1937<sup>28</sup> and in 1938.<sup>29</sup>

## AVERSION FOR COMMUNISTS

(APRIL 1938—AUGUST 1946)

This phase commenced with the Lahore Conference of April 1938 and continued up to the formation of the Interim Government of India in September 1946. The phase was significant inasmuch as the Indian Socialists developed a feeling against the Communists' attitude towards international issues. Since 1934, the Communists and Socialists of India had been maintaining the same attitude towards the question of war and foreign policy. But by April 1938, the *Congress Socialist* carried an article by Dr. Rammanohar Lohia, entitled "The Dilemma of an Anti-Imperialist."<sup>30</sup> The article was critical of the position on war and foreign policies pursued by European Communists. They supported their respective nations and Governments against colonial agitation on grounds of "Collective Security" and "anti-Fascism." This represented the beginning of awareness that a belief in Socialism was not a guarantee of anti-war and anti-imperialist attitude. The subsequent Socialist attitude towards Communists and the Soviet Union had its initial formation in this phase.

<sup>25</sup>Lohia, "Jawaharlal Must Answer", *Congress Socialist*, 3(30 April 1938), pp. 315-16.

<sup>26</sup>Kamaladevi, "Invasion of Inner Mangolia", *Congress Socialist*, 2(28 August 1937), p. 16.

<sup>27</sup>N.N. Mitra, n. 17.

<sup>28</sup>*The Indian National Congress, 1936-37* (Allahabad : All India Congress Committee, n. 1), p. 15.

<sup>29</sup>See n. 22, p. 198.

<sup>30</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, "The Dilemma of An Anti-Imperialism" *Congress Socialist*, 3(2 April 1938), pp. 247-48.

## Pro-Russian Stand of the CPI and People's War

Yet another characteristic trend of this phase was the Socialist opposition to the pro-Russian bent of the CPI mind. Since 1934 the Communists were inside the CSP having the same views as those of the Socialists on question of war. It was as early as in 1937, at the Delhi Socialist Executive meeting, that a decision was taken to expel those Communists who were engaged in "fractional work".<sup>31</sup> In 1938 M.R. Masani criticised Soviet Russia's foreign policy and its dictatorship and contrasted it with democratic socialism.<sup>32</sup>

Since the publication of Lohia's article<sup>33</sup>, the party had started shedding its illusions concerning an identity of interest between the Soviet Union and the nationalist movements of the dependent countries. The difference between the anti-war position of the Socialists and that of the Communists began revealing itself in 1939-40 when the Communists, while yet with the CSP, published a booklet entitled *A Congress Socialist Look at World Politics*. It purported to prove that war was not inevitable if the peace-loving democracies allied themselves in a collective security pact with the Soviet Union. The implication was that if such an event took place there would be no need to resist Britain. The Socialists criticised the Communist concepts of Collective Security, non-aggression pact and the non-inevitability of war as nonsensical. The Socialists subsequently became sympathetic towards Russia<sup>34</sup> after it was attacked by Germany in 1941. The German attack on Russia changed the understanding of the character of war among the

<sup>31</sup>The Party Executive claimed to come into possession of information that M.N. Roy had issued instructions to disrupt and break up the CSP. See *The CSP, the Reeds and Roy: Statement of the C.S.P. Executive* (Bombay, All India Congress Socialist Party, 1937), p. 5.

<sup>32</sup>M. R. Masani had published a document entitled—"Communist Plot against the C.S.P.", which described in detail the plan of action the Communists were following in order to capture the CSP. See M. R. Masani, *The Communist Party of India* (London, 1954), pp. 69-70; also All India Congress Socialist Party, *Chairman's Address at Fourth Annual Conference 1938* (Bombay), State People Press, 1938, pp. 1-3.

<sup>33</sup>See n. 29.

<sup>34</sup>M.G. Purdy, "Is War Inevitable", *Congress Socialist*, 4(4 June 1939) p. 3.

Communists all over the world. In India they gave wholehearted support to British war efforts. The CPI accepted the slogan of "People's War" against fascism which was a menace to "the Soviet fatherland". The Socialists' attitude towards the British Government and its imperialist war aims, however, remained unchanged. They held that "there could be no change in their policy until a people's Government comes to power" in India.<sup>35</sup> They, along with other Congressmen, were sceptical as to how the Soviet Union could help India at the time. They considered it their revolutionary duty to expose the Communists who were "exploiting the proletariat's sympathy for the Soviet Union by enlisting their support for the bourgeois Governments of the allied nations."<sup>36</sup> The CPI was condemned for its pro-Russian stand during 1942-45 and so was its slogan of "People's War".

### Third Force

A very important trend of the CSP international outlook of this phase appeared in 1938. Some of the socialists perceived a bi-polar trend in world politics—the emergence of the fascist Axis on the one hand and imperialist Allied powers on the other, and, as such, they advocated the idea of a 'third force' of democratic, nationalist and socialist countries.

Lohia, while advocating this new concept, distinguished between the democratic force and the anti-democratic forces. He bracketed Britain, France and the United States with the fascists. He theorized the basis of resistance to war by advocating an uncompromising nationalism, working with non-violence, to create a 'third force' of democratic nationalist and Socialist countries. He condemned the fascist and the imperialist powers alike.<sup>37</sup>

This perception of a 'third force', modified subsequently, appears to have largely borne on independent India's formulation of non-alignment.

<sup>35</sup>Acharya Narendra Deva, *Socialism and National Revolution*, (Bombay, 1946), p. 152.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.* p. 154.

<sup>37</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, n. 8, pp. 15-16.

## War Efforts

Further, it was in this phase that almost all the Socialists gave a militant opposition to the British war efforts in India. The Tripuri Congress of March 1939 passed a resolution sponsored and supported by the CSP which envisaged preparation for national civil disobedience movement and asserted the urgent necessity for India to "direct her own foreign policy as an independent nation, thereby keeping aloof from both imperialism and fascism".<sup>38</sup> But the Tripuri Congress did not reiterate its previous anti-war declaration. The Congress stand on the war was controversial. In an article in the party organ, *Congress Socialist*, Lohia analysed his views and answered the arguments circulated in the Tripuri Congress for abandoning the anti-war position. He advocated that while fascism was an evil, the imperialist rule in India was not a lesser evil.<sup>39</sup> He also complained against the lack of a Congress plan for anti-war activities.<sup>40</sup> When the AICC met in October 1939, the Socialists, guided by Lohia's views, presented an amendment to the Congress resolution on war. In arguing for the amendment, Jayaprakash Narayan favoured the official resolution in a general way, but maintained that there was no reason for the Congress to wait for what Britain's attitude would be in future. Nehru opposed this Socialist amendment. The amendment was lost by 181 to 62. In one of the 1940 AICC meetings, the Socialists brought forward a resolution on 'India and War Crisis'. But in the interest of the unity in the Congress, this resolution was dropped. Later on, it became obvious that the Congress policy to join war efforts was completely divided. The majority of the "Right-wing" leaders including Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru decided to arrive at a compromise with Britain and deliberately held off a resistance movement against Britain for the time being; Mahatma Gandhi openly confessed this when

<sup>38</sup>N.N. Mitra, *Indian Annual Register* I (1939), pp. 341-342.

<sup>39</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, "War Resister", *Congress Socialist*, 4 (2 April 1939), pp. 6-7.

<sup>40</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, "Not an Open Question", *Congress Socialist*, 4 (9 April 1939), pp. 1-2.

charged by the Subhasists.<sup>41</sup> Responding to this the National Executive of CSP met and issued a statement of opposition which called upon the Congressmen to "raise their voices against the decision and try to secure its reversal".<sup>42</sup>

By 1941, Jayaprakash Narayan and about ninety per cent of the CSP members were in jail and, at that time, the Socialists considered Mahatma Gandhi's policy of Civil Disobedience as very unsatisfactory. Jayaprakash Narayan and other Socialists did not accept Mahatma Gandhi's constructive programme as the only possible weapon or, indeed, even as an effective weapon in the freedom struggle. They were convinced of the correctness of their belief in militant action.<sup>43</sup> They went ahead with their campaign against the war efforts of the Viceroy's Government of India.

### Pro-Allied Collaborationist Attitude of the Congress

Another trend of this phase was the Socialist opposition to Pro-Allied, Pro-British Collaborationist attitude of the Congress. In January 1942, the AICC passed a resolution which opened the door for negotiation with the Britishers and reaffirmed the Bombay resolution of 1940.<sup>44</sup> This was the first attempt of the Congress for collaboration with the Britishers. In May 1942, the AICC followed Mahatma Gandhi's lead and passed a resolution demanding immediate freedom on a complete basis without any reservation for any "partial measure" of British authority and control in India. Non-violent non-cooperation was urged to meet the threatened Japanese invasion, but active cooperation with the British war efforts was not contemplated. A policy of limited cooperation was followed which was distinctly a middle-of-the road position designed to unite the Congress and the country against making a choice of joining either side in the war. In the Working Committee, lines were drawn over Mahatma

<sup>41</sup>Gandhi to Bose, N.N. Mitra, *Indian Annual Register* 1 (Calcutta, 1940), p. 31.

<sup>42</sup>*Ibid.*, 2(1941), pp. 30-31.

<sup>43</sup>Pattabhi, B. Sitaramaya, *History of the Indian National Congress*, Vol. 2, (Bombay, 1946), p. 180.

<sup>44</sup>N.N. Mitra, *Indian Annual Register*, 1(1942), p. 274.

Gandhi's original draft between those who would openly aid Britain and those who wanted to launch a struggle. Nehru identified himself with the former and the Socialists with the latter. It was this "neurotic Pro-British and Pro-Allied attitude" of Nehru which was, later on, criticised by Lohia<sup>45</sup> Speaking for the Socialists, Achyut Patwardhan considered cooperation with Britain as an invitation to Japanese invasion. He reflected the Socialist attitude towards the imperialist war, taking no sides with either Japan or Britain.<sup>46</sup>

Meeting in July 1942, the Working Committee of the AICC passed a resolution reiterating that the Congress had no desire to embarrass British and other Allied war efforts and agreeing to the stationing of Allied troops in India "in order to ward off and resist the Japanese or other aggression and to protect and help China".<sup>47</sup> This was at variance with the Socialists' position of neutrality and of letting a free India decide whether it would become involved in war or not. But the last provision of this resolution contained, for the first time, the threat of direct action which was in consonance with the Socialist desires. The Socialists supported the AICC decision for civil disobedience in case the final appeal failed. When the AICC passed the famous 'Quit India' resolution, most of the Socialists were under detention. Yet the rest of them enthusiastically supported it. It was only the Communists who were vigorous supporters of the war and engaged themselves in espionage for the Government of India as accused by the Socialists and other nationalists.<sup>48</sup> Jayaprakash Narayan, after his escape from the Hazaribagh Central Prison, considered the violent August Movement as leading to the complete overthrow of imperialism. He was critical of all compromising alliances. He named Britain "as an aggressive power" and considered it completely justified to repel "British

<sup>45</sup>Lohia, *Guilty Men of India's Partition*, (Allahabad, 1960), p. 14.

<sup>46</sup>See the Government of India report of the Home Ministry entitled "Congress Responsibility for Disturbances 1942-43" in N.N. Mitra's *Indian Annual Register*, 2(1942), pp. 200-204.

<sup>47</sup>Sitaramayya, n. 42, Vol. 2, pp. 340-42 ; See also Bimla Prasad, *The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy* (Calcutta, 1960), p. 197.

<sup>48</sup>M.R. Masani, n. 31, pp. 82-84.

aggression with arms".<sup>49</sup>

## INDEPENDENCE (SEPTEMBER 1946—MARCH 1948)

This was the last phase of the CSP inside the Congress. The phase started with the formation of the Interim Government in India and continued till the Nasik Conference of the Socialists in March 1948. The characteristic trend of this phase lay in that the CSP had presented its own stand as opposed to that of the Congress on the questions of the transfer of power, partition of the country and the foreign policy which free India should adopt. The decision taken by the Congress to enter the Interim Government and to participate in the Constituent Assembly was condemned by the Congress Socialist Party. It was against the idea of a negotiated settlement with Britain on the question of freedom. The Socialists were, therefore, in favour of a fully elected sovereign Constituent Assembly.<sup>50</sup> The party restricted its members both from entering the Constituent Assembly and from participating in the Interim Government. Its leaders totally opposed the British Prime Minister's Declaration of 20 February 1947 which was modelled on the Cabinet Mission decision of May 1946. With the declaration of the Mountbatten Plan of 3 June 1947, the National Executive of the Socialist Party met on 10 June 1947, disapproved of the plan, expressed its firm faith in the unity of India and rejected the proposal for the division of the country.

Another trend of this phase lay in that the Socialists gave a guideline towards India's future foreign policy. The National Executive of the CSP during its four-days session in Delhi in September 1946, laid down that the Interim Government should take such action as would aid Asians and Africans to establish themselves as free nations. The 'Policy Statement' of the party on international affairs clearly expressed the concepts of active neutrality, third bloc of uncommitted nations, preference for the World Government, and opposition

<sup>49</sup>Jayarakash Narayan, *To All Fighters For Freedom*, Letter No. 1, (Lucknow, 1946), pp. 9-10.

<sup>50</sup>Jayaprakash Narayan, *Towards Struggle*, Yusuf Maheraly, ed., (Bombay, 1946), p. 224.

to colonialism and racialism. It also cautioned India against the expansionist trend of the USSR.

In this phase, the party reflected five main trends which bore on free India's foreign policy.

### Independence and Stand on Pakistan

The Socialists, from the very beginning, had repudiated the 'Two-Nation Theory' of the Muslim League. They were of the opinion that the root of the communal conflict lay in the economic backwardness of the Muslim masses. They believed that with the unity between the two communities on economic interest a lasting unity would be achieved. The CSP was opposed to the decision of the Cabinet Mission Plan of May 1946. It called upon the two communities for maintaining national unity. With the announcement of the British Prime Minister's Declaration of 20 February 1947, its leader, Acharya Narendra Deva, considered Attlee's statement on India "as going back upon the decision of the Cabinet Mission taken in May 1946". He condemned the intention of the Britishers who were going to realize Mr. Jinnah's slogan of "divide and quit<sup>51</sup>."

Further, the National Executive of the Socialist Party, meeting on 10 June 1947, disapproved of the Mountbatten Plan of 3 June 1947 and passed a resolution which stated "In fact the division of the country can at no stage be final and must never be accepted as such."<sup>52</sup> It expressed its firm faith in the unity and integrity of India. In July 1947, Prem Bhasin, a leading member of the party, in one of his articles, analysed the sinister motives of Britain behind the artificial division of the country and stated "The choice before the Socialists is very clear and compelling. Fighting against chauvinism is fighting for socialism and ultimate reunion of Pakistan and India."<sup>53</sup>

After the declaration of independence and partition of the country, the National Executive of the Socialist Party (October

<sup>51</sup>*Indian Annual Register*, 1 (January-June 1947), p. 39.

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 259-260.

<sup>53</sup>Prem Bhasin, "Choice Before Socialist", *Janata*. (New Delhi) 27 July 1947, p. 6.



1947) cherished a friendship between the two Dominions. It, at the same time, considered Pakistan "guilty of wilful neglect of its duty towards her minorities", and focussed its responsibility for an everlasting friendship.<sup>54</sup> This may be considered as the phase of germination of the attitude of the Socialist Party towards India-Pakistan relations.

### Active Neutrality, Third Bloc or Third Camp

With the establishment of the Interim Government, the National Executive of the CSP resolved that India should adopt a neutral attitude towards warring powers by withdrawing its troops from Indonesia and Iraq which were being used by the British.<sup>55</sup> With the declaration of Independence the Socialists advocated their own policy of active neutrality in view of the bi-polarisation of world politics behind the two powerful blocs—the Anglo-American Bloc and the Russian Bloc. They championed the cause of new emerging nations of Asia and suggested that India should seek to extend the sphere of neutrality by bringing in together those nations which wanted to keep aloof from the conflict of power blocs and thus to form a 'third bloc' or 'third camp'.<sup>56</sup> They further declared that "India should not do anything that is likely to increase the influence of either of these blocs but strive to create a third camp of active neutrality as far as possible."<sup>57</sup>

This may be viewed as the firm crystallization of the independent Socialist attitude towards the shaping of India's policy of world peace and non-alignment.

### Caution against the USSR

In this phase, the CSP alarmed the makers of the Indian foreign policy against the expansionist trend of the USSR. With the formation of the Interim Government, the party organ, *Janata*, drew the attention of the provisional Government towards the protection of the Middle East from the Russian influence and urged the Soviet Government to leave

<sup>54</sup>*Resolutions : Socialist Party, 1947* (Bombay, 1947), pp. 34-36.

<sup>55</sup>C.S.P. Resolution, *Janata*, 22 September 1946, p. 6

<sup>56</sup>*Policy Statement, Socialist Party* (Bombay, 1947), p. 34.

<sup>57</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 36.

the soil of Iran.<sup>58</sup> Lohia, a leading member of the party, cautioned against Soviet expansion and stated : "Never can a world idea mature into reality, if it is linked up with the fortune of a single country".<sup>59</sup> He thought that the Communist notion of achieving a World Government and Russian expansionism had acquired an interchangeable meaning. The policy statement of the party subsequently clarified its stand and declared that the Socialist Party had no hostility towards Russia. The Communists, however, denounced the Socialist Party as anti-Russia. The party, however, firmly believed that free India in its own interest must live on the friendliest possible terms with Russia.<sup>60</sup> But it reminded the Government of the past activities of the Communists in India and abroad.

### World Government rather than UN

The Socialists, for the first time, advocated the cause of a World Government rather than the United Nations. They thought that national barriers must be broken and there should be a larger grouping of nations. A force of the oppressed peoples of the world, based on common loyalty, had to be created not for aggressive purposes, but to resist expansionism directed against Asia, Africa and other areas of the world. Not merely full employment, but equally productive employment, was the key to a world state. The policy statement of the party clearly stated : "The constituent parts of the world must first reach equally in power and then in prosperity and so shall be set on the road to world Government".<sup>61</sup> This Socialist ideal of international organisation was clearly opposed to the Congress commitment to the United Nations ideal.

<sup>58</sup>Editorial News, "The Week in India", *Janata*, 1 September 1946, p. 1.

<sup>59</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, "India and the International Situation : The Socialist Approach", *Janata*, 23 March 1947, p. 7.

<sup>60</sup>Socialist Party, "Policy Statement", *Janata*, 28 December 1947, pp. 5-11.

<sup>61</sup>*Policy Statement, Socialist Party*, (Bombay, First Published in 1947 Second Edition 1949), p. 40.

**Colonialism and Racialism****(Indonesia, Palestine, Goa and South Africa)**

Further, the CSP stood for the freedom of the colonial people in Asia and Africa and opposed the practice of racial discrimination adopted by South Africa. At the very outset, the National Executive of the party, during its four-day session in Delhi from 16 to 20 September 1946, asked the Interim Government to take such action as would aid Asian and African peoples to establish themselves as free nations. It suggested the Government to withdraw the Indian troops from Indonesia who were being kept at the disposal of the Dutch. It further requested the Government to recognise the Republican Government under Dr. Sukarno as the rightful Government of Indonesia. A resolution was also passed in support of the freedom struggle in Goa and it called for the intervention of the Interim Government on this question.<sup>62</sup>

On the question of Palestine, the party supported the attitude adopted by the Interim Government and vehemently opposed the Anglo-American efforts to turn the Arab majority of the small country into a minority by dumping into it foreign Jew.<sup>63</sup> On the question of the issue of Indians in South Africa and the racial policy adopted by General Smuts and others, the *Janata* was alert from the very beginning. It extended warm congratulations to Mrs. Vjaya Lakshmi Pandit for the brilliant conduct of the Indian case against South Africa before the United Nations.<sup>64</sup> The party fully appreciated the stand taken by the Interim Government on this issue.

The attitude formed by the Socialists towards colonialism, imperialism and racialism in this phase remained almost the same even after they left the Congress and became an independent Socialist Party.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>62</sup>C.S.P. Resolution, *Janata*, 2 September 1946, p. 6

<sup>63</sup>M. Harris, "Impressions of Asian Relations Conference", *Janata*, 6 April 1947, pp. 1-2.

<sup>64</sup>Editorial, *Janata*, 15 December 1946, p. 1.

<sup>65</sup>See *Report of the Eighth National Conference held at Madras, July, 1930*, pp. 81-83.

## BREAK (MARCH 1948—AUGUST 1952)

This phase emerged with the Nasik Conference of March 1948 when the Socialists left the Congress and created a separate party of their own known as the Socialist Party of India (SPI). As an independent party in opposition to the Congress, the party, for the first time, enunciated its own socialist principles of foreign policy. It took an independent attitude towards almost all important international issues. The phase continued until its merger with the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (KMPP) and its re-formation as the Praja Socialist Party in September 1952.

The principles of foreign policy adopted by the Socialist Party as totally independent of the Congress covered the concept of the 'third camp' or 'third force', the idea of equidistance between the two power blocs and the suggestion for the formation of regional security arrangements consisting of Asian countries and Egypt. It laid stress on four elements of foreign policy: 1. freedom of people, 2. democracy and social justice, 3. comparatively equal returns to human labour throughout the world and 4. active neutrality.<sup>65</sup> It declared that India should support all popular movements aimed at the liberation of countries from colonial domination and should "enter into non-aggression pacts and treaties of enduring friendship with as many countries as possible".<sup>66</sup> The party adopted its own independent attitude towards India-Pakistan relations, the Korean crisis, the Arab-Israel tangle, the issue of Chinese Sovereignty in Tibet, relations with Nepal and the question of foreign aid. It contended that India along with the newly liberated countries of Asia should not establish close association with either of the power blocs. It demanded that India should discontinue its Commonwealth link.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>65</sup>*Policy Statement, Socialist Party* (Published first in 1947 after the deliberations of August 1947 at Nagpur; Second revised edition in 1949 after the deliberations at Bangalore on 4-5 October; Reprinted, 1951), p. 32.

<sup>66</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 36; *Socialist Party of India, Report of the Sixth Annual Conference held at Nasik, March 1948* (Bombay, 1948), p. 31.

<sup>67</sup>*Socialist Party, Resolutions passed at the 7th Annual Conference held at Patna, 6-10 March 1949* (Bombay, 1949), pp. 17-18.

## COOPERATION WITH RESERVATIONS (SEPTEMBER 1952—AUGUST 1955)

In this phase, the party, after a negotiated merger with the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party, emerged as the Praja Socialist Party of India. It cooperated with the official foreign policy of India with certain reservations. On some of the issues the party supported the stand taken by the Government of India and on some others it totally opposed the Government and vigorously criticised it. On issues like racialism and colonialism<sup>68</sup>, US military aid to Pakistan and the cold war military pacts<sup>69</sup>, it joined in the official protest. On the contrary, on issues such as foreign pockets in India<sup>70</sup>, Sino-Indian Agreement and the Panchsheel<sup>71</sup>, the party had its reservations. It vehemently opposed the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet. It reiterated its own concept of third camp of active neutrality.

In this phase the party reflected a unity of outlook.

## STEADY COOPERATION (AUGUST 1955—JUNE 1964)

The characteristic trends of this phase emerged after the suspension of Lohia from the PSP and the resultant split in the party. After the exclusion of Lohia, the PSP had hardly any vital disagreement with the Government so far as its basic policies were concerned. It showed a broad agreement with the Government on the Suez crisis, rapprochement with Pakistan, support to the Algerian freedom struggle and the Laotian and Congolese crises. It differed from the Government in matters of implementation of policy, as for instance, in the cases of Hungary and China. By 1960, the party became critical of

<sup>68</sup>PSP, *Report of the Special Convention of Betul, June 1953*, pp. 105-16.

<sup>69</sup>Resolutions of National Council held in December 1953 in Allahabad, *Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party* (A Praja Socialist Publication, Bombay, 1954), pp. 29-31.

<sup>70</sup>The Resolution of the National Executive of the party held at Patna in January 1954 on the French pockets in India, and the Resolution of the National Executive of the party held in New Delhi in September 1954 on the Portuguese pockets in India, *ibid*, pp. 133-134.

<sup>71</sup>Statement of Acharya Kripalani, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 5(2), 15 May 1954, Cols. 7548-49.

the conduct of the Government in relation to the Sino-Indian conflict. It raised an alarm of a major Chinese assault in the immediate future.<sup>72</sup>

The party supported India's policy of non-alignment as basically sound. But it was critical of deliberations of the Indian Government at the first non-aligned summit conference at Belgrade in 1961.<sup>73</sup> The party wanted the Government to follow "an effective" and "dynamic" policy of non-alignment.

### THE SHORT TRANSITION (JUNE 1964—JANUARY 1965)

In this short-lived phase, the PSP merged with the Socialist Party which was being led mainly by Dr. Rammanohar Lohia. The merger led to the formation of the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP) of India. The SSP presented somewhat unified, new and distinct outlook towards India's foreign policy. In this phase, the absence of Pandit Nehru and the appearance of a relatively weak Congress leadership on the Indian scene encouraged the SSP to impinge its viewpoints on the policy and some of its specific issues. It vehemently opposed Lal Bahadur Shastri's deliberations at the second non-aligned summit conference held at Cairo in October 1964,<sup>74</sup> but supported his efforts for the amicable settlement of India-Pakistan differences and welcomed the Indo-Ceylon agreement of 1964.<sup>75</sup> The party fully appreciated Shastri's adherence to a policy of peace with human dignity in international relations particularly with reference to India's disputes with China and Pakistan.<sup>76</sup> It also paid attention towards the Rhodesian tyranny and the South African barbarity and urged the Government for a world campaign against them.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>72</sup>Mukut Behari Lal, *Communist China's Aggression* (Praja Socialist Publication, New Delhi, 1959), p. 38.

<sup>73</sup>Nath Pai said, "Non-alignment lost its polish, its glow, its finish in Belgrade". See India, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 60(2), 7 December 1961, Col. 3888.

<sup>74</sup>Editorial, "A futile meeting", *Janata*, 18 October 1964, p. 1; also see Hem Barua, "Dismal Failure at Cairo", *Janata*, 8 October 1964, p. 14.

<sup>75</sup>*Janata*, 18 October 1964, p. 3; also see Nath Pai's statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 35(2), 23 November 1964, Cols. 1290-1292.

<sup>76</sup>Editorial, *Janata*, 14 June 1964, p. 1.

<sup>77</sup>*Janata*, 6 September 1964, p. 15.

Only six months thereafter, at the Varanasi conference of the party in January 1965, this merger was annulled and then again there were splits.

### THE CURRENT PHASE (JANUARY 1965 ONWARDS)

The period after the end of the short merger may be viewed as 'the current phase'. In this phase, on major issues the PSP maintained its own views which were fundamentally different from those of the Government. On issues like the Runn of Kutch, undeclared India-Pakistan war, the Taskent Agreement<sup>78</sup>, the Arab-Israel conflict<sup>79</sup>, and the Czechoslovak crisis<sup>80</sup>, the party did not join hands with the Government. It suggested and maintained its own stands. It differed from the Government regarding the implementation of the policies. On some of the issues like that of US action in South Vietnam<sup>81</sup>, and the Soviet arms supply to Pakistan<sup>82</sup>, the party broadly supported the Government.\*

<sup>78</sup>Resolutions of the PSP National Executive passed in New Delhi, November 13-14, 1965, *Janata*, 21 November 1965, p. 3; and Resolutions of the PSP National Executive passed at New Delhi on February 18-22, 1966, *Janata*, 27 February 1966, p. 10.

<sup>79</sup>Press Statement of N. G. Goray on 10 June 1967, *Janata*, 25 June 1967, p. 3.

<sup>80</sup>Press Statement of N. G. Goray on 22 August 1968, *Janata*, 1 September 1968, p. 5; Lok Sabha Statement of Nath Pai on 22 August 1968, *Janata*, 15 September 1968, pp. 5-8.

<sup>81</sup>*PSP Ninth National Conference, December 30-31, 1967, January 1968, Kanpur, General Secretary's Report* (New Delhi, 1968), pp. 40-41.

<sup>82</sup>Nath Pai and S. N. Dwivedy's Press Statements in Bangalore on 12 July 1968, *Janata*, 21 July 1968, p. 5.

\* Subsequently, the party supported the Government on the issue of Bangla Desh. But, after getting re-merged into the new Socialist Party in August 1971, it attacked the Government for signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty.

## Non-Alignment

Non-alignment has been the key principle of the foreign policy of the Indian Government. The PSP has been essentially in agreement over it. But it has continued to urge some changes in its nature and form. More often than not, consequent upon non-reorientation of the principle, the PSP has been finding something or the other wanting or wrong about its application in the stands that India has taken on several important international issues and developments.

### THE PRINCIPLE

The PSP (which was known as the SPI until 1 June 1952) has been censoring the Government right since 1947 for what it has viewed to be the faults of the nature, spirit and demeanour of non-alignment pursued by it. It has found the official version of non-alignment sterile, passive and inert.<sup>1</sup> The Government, in the opinion of the PSP, has frequently failed to seize initiatives and has been merely reacting to situations.<sup>2</sup> Non-alignment pursued by the Government has appeared to this party rather "formalistic and procedural", thoroughly

<sup>1</sup>*Resolutions passed at Sixth Annual Conference of the Socialist Party, Nasik, 19-21 March 1948* (Bombay, 1948), pp. 8-9; *Policy Statements, Socialist Party* (Published first in 1947 after the deliberations of August 1947 at Nagpur; Second revised edition in 1949 after the deliberations at Bangalore on 4-6 October; Reprinted, 1951), p. 34; *Janata* (New Delhi), 26 January 1949, pp. 45-6; *Presidential Address by Acharya Narendra Deva, Seventh Annual Conference of the Socialist Party, Patna, 6-10 March 1949*, pp. 22-3.

<sup>2</sup>*Janata*, 25 December 1966, p. 2.



devoid of any positive content.<sup>3</sup> The party has perceived vacillation in it and has charged the Government for serving the Atlantic and the Soviet Camps as alternate masters.<sup>4</sup> Non-alignment, as pursued by the Government, has been viewed by it as timid and opportunistic. As Nath Pai put it in December 1966, the Congress Party had reduced it to "pusillanimity at worst and opportunism at best".<sup>5</sup>

In view of the defects noted above the PSP has been generally led to hold that the Government has not been pursuing genuine non-alignment policy.<sup>6</sup> It would have liked the Government to come up invariably impartially against all aggressions irrespective of whosoever might be the aggressor and to stand boldly against all kinds of colonial expansionism.<sup>7</sup> At the same time it would have liked the Government to be constantly, and without fail, on the side of democracy, freedom and progress.<sup>8</sup> Instead, it has, more often than not, found the Government leaning on one of the two cold war sides and supporting it.<sup>9</sup> For example, the Government rightly took Britain and France to task in 1956 for their excesses in Suez, but it failed to rebuke similarly China in Tibet (1950) and the Soviet Union in Hungary (1956). The PSP would have been happy had not the non-alignment policy pursued by the Indian Government been often suffering from such emotional or psychological biases.<sup>10</sup> The party has also noted with regret that the desire of the Government to keep itself disengaged has often drifted into a tendency to pursue the policy of appeasement.<sup>11</sup>

The PSP has also found the non-alignment policy of the Government wanting in that it has not been realistically based

<sup>3</sup>Dr. Rammanohar Lohia, "Foreign Policy : Party Vs. Government", *Janata*, 9 December 1951, pp. 1-2.

<sup>4</sup>Lohia, "Re-inforcing a Constructive Foreign Policy of building the New World", *Janata*, 3 June 1951, p. 5 ; Lohia, "Foreign Policy", *Janata*, 31 January 1954, p. 4.

<sup>5</sup>See n. 2.

<sup>6</sup>H.V. Kamath's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 25(2), 14 February 1964, Col. 824.

<sup>7</sup>N. G. Goray's Press Statement, *Janata*, 7 November 1965, p. 12.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup>S. M. Joshi's Press Statement, *Janata*, 23 February 1964, p. 4.

<sup>10</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 21(2), 16 September 1963, Cols. 6349-50.

<sup>11</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 47(2), 15 November 1965, Cols. 1980-82.

on the primary needs of the national interest and on any firm convictions. Generally, it has not been based on the strict considerations of the security of the nation and has pitifully suffered from inhibitions<sup>12</sup>, the former fault being evident, for instance, in its China policy and the latter in its policy in relation to Israel vis-a-vis the Arab nations.

In early phases the party found some faults with the approach behind non-alignment as reflected in India's membership of the Commonwealth of Nations, its increasing aid from, and trade with, the West and in not realizing, after the Chinese assault in 1962, that India was aligned against China. In its opinion, membership of the Commonwealth amounted to a kind of collaboration with Britain,<sup>13</sup> helped strengthening the Atlantic camp<sup>14</sup> and robbed non-alignment of its attitude of independence in international politics.<sup>15</sup> In 1952, the PSP held that increasing aid from the Western powers and the mounting trade with them tended to undermine a clear, bold and stable independence in foreign policy.<sup>16</sup> In 1962-63 the party censured the Government remaining inhibited and not acting on the basis of the realization that though for the rest of the world India was non-aligned, it was aligned against China.<sup>17</sup>

While the above trends of the attitude of the PSP were censorial, the party did not conceal its agreement with the Government about the broad fundamentals of non-alignment which it valued and endeared.<sup>18</sup> Besides, there was the constructive side of the attitude bearing other elements of the spirit

<sup>12</sup>S. N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 19(2), 19 August 1963, Cols. 1317-18.

<sup>13</sup>*Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party* (Bombay, 1954), pp. 28-29.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*; see also *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7(2), 29 September 1954, Col. 3706.

<sup>15</sup>*Socialist Party Resolutions passed at the 7th Annual Conference held at Patna, 6-10 March 1949* (Bombay, 1949), pp. 17-18.

<sup>16</sup>*Parliamentary Debates*, 2(2), 1952, Cols. 1627-28.

<sup>17</sup>National Executive Resolutions, *Janata*, 25 August, 1st September 1963, pp. 5-6.

<sup>18</sup>Ganga Sharan Sinha, leader of the PSP Group in Rajya Sabha, stated in the *Rajya Sabha* on 29th April 1960 :

"With regard to the policy of non-alignment and neutrality of the nation we have no difference with Prime Minister Nehru and our Government. We are one with them so far as the basic policy and fundamental principles are concerned." *Janata*, 15 May 1960, p. 7.

and other features of the shape in which the PSP itself would have liked to see non-alignment.

The PSP deemed non-alignment as positive, dynamic and active neutrality.<sup>19</sup> Its version of non-alignment would entail the principle of collective security for the non-bloc world, particularly for the countries from Indonesia to Egypt<sup>20</sup> and, if possible, for a wider area.<sup>21</sup> It might involve a common defensive alliance of such countries<sup>22</sup> and regional coordination, even integration, of the policies of those countries.<sup>23</sup> The party, however, asserted that this was possible of being achieved only by a socialist India.<sup>24</sup> Besides pursuing that version of non-alignment, India would have firmly and categorically rejected the measures, and dissociated itself from the tendencies, of Big Power domination of world politics for the sake of bringing about a new world order based on social justice, democracy, freedom and progress. India would have as well dissociated itself from the Big Power agreements of Yalta and Potsdam,<sup>25</sup> would not have consented to the practice of an "international caste system"<sup>26</sup> as reflected in the permanent seats given to the Great Powers in the UN Security Council and in their power of veto there and would have sought to abolish the "politics of spheres of influence".<sup>27</sup>

Discussed below are the elements of the PSP concept of non-alignment.

<sup>19</sup>*Report of the Second National Conference of the PSP, Gaya, December 26-30, 1955* (New Delhi, 1955), p. 142 ; see also *Policy Statement, Socialist Party*, n. 1, pp. 32-34.

<sup>20</sup>*We build for Socialism* (The Platform adopted by the National General Council of the Socialist Party at Ranchi on 4th July 1951), (Bombay, 1951), p. 51.

<sup>21</sup>See n. 1, *Resolutions passed at the Sixth Annual Conference of the Socialist Party held at Nasik, 19-21 March 1948*, p. 9.

<sup>22</sup>*Election Manifesto—Praja Socialist Party* (New Delhi, 1962), p. 14.

<sup>23</sup>*Policy Statement, Socialist Party*, n. 1, pp. 36-37.

<sup>24</sup>Lohia, "A Five-Point Foreign Policy for India", *Janata*, 23 December 1951, pp. 6-7.

<sup>25</sup>Lohia, 1951, n. 4, p. 5.

<sup>26</sup>Resolutions of Special Convention, June 1953, Betul, *Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party*, n. 13, p. 25.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*

## Active Neutrality

Neutrality conceived by the PSP would be positive in that categorical and unequivocal stands would be taken in relation to situations and issues. It would be dynamic by entailing aliveness and motion about them. It would be active by pursuing judgements and stands taken in relation to them. Neutrality would mean absolute neutrality of India in relation to rival, conflicting claims of the contending power blocs.<sup>28</sup> As the chief foreign policy spokesman of the party, Lohia, put it in July 1950 :

Neutrality that is based on national selfishness or passive waiting on events is inconsistent with the world view. To keep one's own country out of war is something wholly different from keeping war out of the world. The former is passive neutrality arising out of national selfishness, while the latter is active neutrality arising out of world view.<sup>29</sup>

The positive contents of active neutrality would include having India's ever-widening influence over the region of South East Asia the nations of which would be induced to have a common foreign and defence policy. They would have a group of their own which would be ideologically based, and would evolve as a factor of peace. The party firmly held that it would not be possible for India to do so as long as it would remain tied to the Commonwealth and thus tagged to the ideology of the Atlantic camp.

Neutrality of the PSP entailed the principle of abstention with regard to the conflicts between the Western powers and the Soviet Union, non-involvement in world affairs and neutrality of the relatively disarmed Asian areas guaranteed by the two power blocs.<sup>30</sup> It would further entail a definite approach of India to Communism. The actions and decisions of the Government in relation to Korea, Tibet, admission of Communist China into UN and exchange of cultural delegations with the Soviet Union and China lacked such an

<sup>28</sup>*Policy Statement, Socialist Party*, n. 1, p. 34.

<sup>29</sup>*Report of the Eighth National Conference* (The Socialist Party of India, Bombay, 1950), p. 223.

<sup>30</sup>Lohia, "A Five-Point Foreign Policy for India", *Janata*, 23 December 1951, pp. 6-7.

approach and, instead, showed "an alarming tendency to pander to the Soviets".<sup>31</sup> On the contrary, the Socialists would keep India out of war and its frontiers secured from infiltration by the Soviets as well as from economic penetration by the United States.

### Equi-distance

From the beginning the Indian Socialists viewed both the Anglo-American and the Soviet blocs as equally bad<sup>32</sup> and believed in the desirability of maintaining equal distance from either. It meant not coming nearer to any one of them than to the other and being equally opposed to the bloc spirit of either. Subsequently, Lohia developed it as the theory of Equal Irrelevance under which both the power blocs were to be deemed equally irrelevant for the Socialists who, by opposing the two camps, should pave the way for a third camp of neutrality. In their latest form as the Socialist Party, the Socialist viewed the Indo-Soviet treaty of 9 August 1971 as India's political and military alignment with the Soviets and described it as "a decent burial" of Nehru's non-alignment policy.<sup>32a</sup>

### Third Camp, Third Force and Regional Alliances

Moving a resolution on international situation at the Sixth Annual Conference of the Socialist Party held at Nasik in March 1948, Lohia said :

Let us pitch our tents everywhere and strengthen third force. We must sign treaties of permanent friendship with Burma, Nepal, Ceylon and other independent countries of South East Asia. Such treaties should lead us into a permanent federation. Once such a federation comes into being to strengthen the third camp, the world can be made safe for democracy and permanent peace.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>31</sup>Madhu Limaye, "Foreign Policy : Some Points for Discussion", *Special Convention of the Socialist Party, Pachmarhi, May 1952* (Bombay, 1952), p. 3.

<sup>32</sup>*Socialist Approach to Foreign Policy, Mahabaleshwar Tracts, No. 4* (Socialist Party, Bombay, 1948), pp. 9-10.

<sup>32a</sup>Samar Guha's Speech in the Lok Sabha on 10 August 1971, *Janata*, 19 September 1971, p. 10.

<sup>33</sup>*Report of the Sixth Annual Conference, Nasik, 1948* (The Socialist Party of India, Bombay, 1948), p. 31.

Seven months later, the party wanted India to strive to create a third camp of active neutrality and spread its area as far as possible.<sup>34</sup> A year later, the General Council of the party outlined two aspects of the third camp policy : governmental and popular. Accordingly, it would like the Indian Government to enter into non-aggression pacts and treaties of enduring friendship with as many countries as possible and to achieve a network of alliances or mutual assistance pacts which would include East Asian countries, the countries of the Arab League and others and, on its own part, it would try "to strengthen the forces of peace throughout the world".<sup>35</sup> It would like India to draw nations having the objective of peace away from military pacts for having them as the third force and stood for policies which would lead to regional integration. The party was of the opinion that the third force could be built in two phases—immediate and long-term.<sup>36</sup> Regional alliances were to be formed immediately whereas states like Sweden, Yugoslavia and several South American nations could be covered in course of time.<sup>37</sup> The party would further like India to take initiatives in the arrangement of mutual aid among the nations of the third camp for economic development and cultural cooperation.<sup>38</sup>

Later elaborations of the concept of third force indicated that it would be such a force of socialism having independence from the two power blocs as its necessary quality.<sup>39</sup> The third camp based on a force would not act as an umpire in international events but as a participator in them in order to be able to judge issues better by playing a part in relation to them to the

<sup>34</sup>"A Policy of Active Neutrality : Socialist Approach to Foreign Policy", *Janata*, 26 January 1949, p. 46; see n. 32 also.

<sup>35</sup>*Policy Statement adopted by the General Council at Bombay, October 1949* (Socialist Party of India, Bombay, 1949), pp. 32-36.

<sup>36</sup>Dr. Balkrishna Gokhale, "Third Force in International Politics", *Janata*, 11 April 1951, p. 3.

<sup>37</sup>In a letter to the Editor of the *New Times* (Moscow) Lohia clarified some misreporting of fact in the *New Times*, No. 29 of 1950 : "The third bloc...does not confine itself to Asia but extends to European States like Sweden and Yugoslavia and several South American States." See *Janata*, 27 August 1950, p. 9.

<sup>38</sup>See n. 30, p. 6.

<sup>39</sup>See n. 29, p. 221.

point of their maturity.<sup>40</sup> Another aspect of the third force was brought to the fore by Asoka Mehta who said :

The Third Force can grow on the basis of a vital home policy ; it cannot be built up by becoming an honest broker of peace between the two rival power blocs.<sup>41</sup>

The Socialist concept of third force appeared to have a considerable impact on the policy of the Government. In his speech of 12 June 1952 Prime Minister Nehru introduced the idea of the "area of peace" to Parliament<sup>42</sup> and in the debates in both the Houses of Parliament on 16-18 February 1953 agreed to call it a "third area". Socialists claimed that there was hardly any difference between their "third force" and this idea of a "third area".<sup>43</sup> Asoka Mehta noted with satisfaction that the pressure of "the camp of peace" was being felt and welcomed even by some of the "constituents of the rival power blocs".<sup>44</sup>

### Opposition to Cold War Military Pacts

The PSP supported the Government in its denunciation of military pacts. In its opinion, military pacts sponsored and patronized by the Great Powers would sustain the cold war and aggravate it. Asoka Mehta held Prime Minister Nehru "right in describing these various pacts, NATO, ANZUS, SEATO...as interlocked arrangements filled with danger to mankind".<sup>45</sup>

The grounds on which the party opposed military pacts were that they involved smaller nations into great power

<sup>40</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, *The Third Camp in World Affairs* (Bombay, 1950), p. 11.

<sup>41</sup>Asoka Mehta, "Indian Foreign Policy : The Socialist View", *India Quarterly* (New Delhi), 7 (April-June 1951), p. 104.

<sup>42</sup>Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy* (Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961), (Delhi, 1961), p. 58.

<sup>43</sup>Acharya J.B. Kripalani, Chairman of the Party, in his statement in Parliament said : "The Prime Minister has talked of a third force. He said not the third force but the third area. I see no difference except that of language. There are many small nations, who are anxious for peace as we are. It is time that we came nearer to these people and tried to consolidate that area and increase it." *Parliamentary Debates*, 10(2), 23 December 1953, Col. 3022.

<sup>44</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 7(2), 26 September 1954, Col. 3705.

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*

entanglements,<sup>46</sup> undermined their spirit of independence from them,<sup>47</sup> caused divisions among them,<sup>48</sup> aggravated the chances of global war<sup>49</sup> and helped the come back of old imperialist powers to the areas which had so recently been freed.<sup>50</sup>

The party raised the alarm signal by condemning South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact<sup>51</sup> and emphasizing from time to time that they would drag Asian nations into the orbit of war,<sup>52</sup> undermine Asian unity,<sup>52</sup> take away the independence of their policies,<sup>54</sup> and involve them in great power entanglements.<sup>55</sup> It hoped that the Asian powers would abstain from such Big Power collective defense arrangements<sup>56</sup> and urged upon them "to come closer together and desire measures of mutual assistance".<sup>57</sup> It would like the Indian Government to initiate multilateral treaties with Southeast Asian countries.<sup>58</sup>

### Peace and Panchshila

The PSP has continued to view world peace as a "great objective" of foreign policy,<sup>59</sup> the concern not only of the socialists but of "all other progressive elements".<sup>60</sup> But it has been hoping that the strengthening of the 'third force' of

<sup>46</sup>*A Socialist Alternative—PSP Election Manifesto, 1967* (Text of the Election Manifesto adopted by the General Council of the PSP at its meeting held at Lucknow, October 7-9, 1966), (Bombay, 1967), p. 26.

<sup>47</sup>Resolutions of General Council, 6-8 June 1954, Indore, *Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party*, n. 13, p. 31.

<sup>48</sup>Madhu Limaye, "SEATO—An Asian View", *Janata*, 24 October 1954, pp. 3-5.

<sup>49</sup>Resolutions of National Council, December 1953, n. 13, p. 29.

<sup>50</sup>See n. 48.

<sup>51</sup>*Policy Statement*, a Praja Socialist Publication (New Delhi, 1956), p. 91.

<sup>52</sup>See n. 47.

<sup>53</sup>See n. 48.

<sup>54</sup>See n. 47.

<sup>55</sup>See n. 22, p. 13.

<sup>56</sup>See n. 19, p. 226.

<sup>57</sup>*Janata*, 13 June 1954, p. 11.

<sup>58</sup>See n. 48.

<sup>59</sup>See n. 33, p. 70-71.

<sup>60</sup>*Policy Statement*, n. 1, p. 38.



socialism could establish an everlasting peace in Southeast Asia and the world as a whole.<sup>61</sup> It has emphasized that to be "meaningful" the plan of world peace has to be based on the "abolition of international caste system and abandonment of politics of sphere of influence".<sup>62</sup> It has regretted that India and other free Asian countries have refused to strike out a new course and have "inclined to equate the pursuit of peace with the doubtful objective of maintaining existing unstable equilibrium".<sup>63</sup>

After the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet was signed in April 1954, the party welcomed the five principles of the *Panchshila*<sup>64</sup> as helping the pursuit of peace as the norms of international life.<sup>65</sup> But, on occasions, it raised doubts about their efficacy. In July 1954, Lohia warned against the easy acceptance of the theory of coexistence between the two systems 'no matter how much Nehru and Mr. Chou may shout'.<sup>66</sup> Acharya J. B. Kripalani had a premonition that the *Panchshila* might remain "a pious wish to which nations may pay lip service".<sup>67</sup> Whereas the principles were noble and deserved support, the Government, the PSP regretted, had been a helpless spectator of the burial of the *Panchshila* in Goa, Kashmir and Hungary.<sup>68</sup> By the end of 1959, in view of the first Chinese attack on India, Kripalani had gone to the extent of viewing the five principles as "absurd and dangerous", "bad and retrograde".<sup>69</sup>

<sup>61</sup>See n. 29, p. 81.

<sup>62</sup>*Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party*, see n. 13, p. 25.

<sup>63</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>64</sup>The principles were : (1) Respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty ; (2) Non-interference in each other's internal affairs ; (3) Non-aggression ; (4) Equality and mutual benefit among nations ; and (5) Peaceful co-existence.

<sup>65</sup>*Policy Statement*, see n. 51, p. 92.

<sup>66</sup>"Chou-Nehru Meet", *Janata*, 11 July 1954, p. 4.

<sup>67</sup>Acharya J. B. Kripalani, "Co-existence", *Janata*, 26 January 1955, pp. 4-5.

<sup>68</sup>Editorial, *Janata*, 17 February 1957, pp. 1-2; also see Ganga Sharan Sinha, "What the PSP stands for", *Janata*, 3 March 1957, pp. 9-12.

<sup>69</sup>Acharya J. B. Kripalani, "The Panchsheel", *Janata*, 27 December 1959, 3 January 1960, p. 3, pp. 5-6 respectively.

## APPLICATION

## United Nations

In the opinion of the PSP, India had not played a positive role in the United Nations and had failed to give a lead on issues of world significance. The party upheld the principles and objectives of the UN Charter. But at the same time, it suggested certain suitable revision of it so that it would become an effective mechanism of world peace.<sup>70</sup> It would have liked the Charter so to be amended as would not provide for any permanent seats in the Security Council and would give no veto to any powers acknowledged as great. In fact, the party deplored the tendency of the Asian States not to seek undoing of the contrary provisions.<sup>71</sup> It further suggested that the membership of the United Nations would have to be opened to all independent nations willing to join it and it would be within the competence of the organisation to take up colonial questions and those relating to national minorities suffering from the loss of their civil liberties and fundamental rights. Besides, it emphasized that membership of the United Nations must entail the renunciation of the right to form power blocs of military character in the name of collective self-defence and an obligation to renounce expansionism in all its forms.<sup>72</sup> It wished to have a strengthened United Nations as an instrument of collective security and felt the need for having sufficient specialised agencies for fostering economic development in the world.<sup>73</sup>

The party regretted that the United Nations did not fulfil the primary requirements of the world, e.g., the withdrawal of foreign authority and armies from Germany, Korea, Japan, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Indonesia, Viet Nam, Malaya and territories of the African peoples.<sup>74</sup> It held that the United Nations failed to help establish national governments in many of these countries. The party also demanded the

<sup>70</sup>National Council Resolutions passed on 29-30 December 1953, Allahabad, n. 13, p. 30.

<sup>71</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>72</sup>*Policy Statement*, n. 51, p. 85.

<sup>73</sup>*We build for Socialism*, n. 20, pp. 50-51.

<sup>74</sup>*Policy Statement*, n. 1, pp. 38-49.

admission of Communist China in the Security Council of the United Nations.<sup>75</sup>

The PSP further regretted that it would be better if India and other Asian countries played a role at the United Nations uncommitted to any power bloc. It viewed India's stand in UN on some of the issues like Korea,<sup>76</sup> Hungary,<sup>77</sup> and Czechoslovakia<sup>78</sup> as not positive and neutral. It felt that India had failed to champion social justice, world freedom, equality and peace on the UN platform,<sup>79</sup> and had not taken any lead in the admission of the Asian nations.<sup>80</sup> The Indian Government, the party regretted, "referred the South Africa and Kashmir questions to the UNO".<sup>81</sup>

### Korean Crisis

On the issue of Korea, the PSP censored the Government in 1950 for its failure to adopt a positive policy. It feared that the official stand taken on this issue was likely to drag India nearer to either the Atlantic or the Soviet bloc. It extended its qualified support to the resolution on Korea moved by the Prime Minister in Parliament and stood for an absolutely "unambiguous and categorical" stand.<sup>82</sup> It maintained that the Korean crisis would be either considered as a civil war or as a case of aggression. If it was a civil war, then India had no business to be there. It opposed the sending of a medical mission to South Korea.<sup>83</sup> Later, the party regretted that India voted in favour of those who considered North Korea as the aggressor, for, in fact, it was a fight

<sup>75</sup> *Report of the Eighth National Conference*, n. 29, pp. 111-112.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> *Bangalore Resolutions* (A Praja Socialist Publication being the Resolutions adopted at the Third National Conference of the PSP held at Bangalore from 25 to 28 November 1959), (Delhi, 1956), p. 14.

<sup>78</sup> Surendranath Dwivedy, "Indira playing the Game of the Aggressor", *Janata*, 8 September 1968, pp. 5-6.

<sup>79</sup> See n. 74.

<sup>80</sup> See n. 33, p. 43.

<sup>81</sup> "Revised Report of the National Executive of the Socialist Party on Foreign Policy, discussed by the Executive at its meeting in Mahabaleshwar, October 1948", *Janata*, 26 January 1949, p. 46.

<sup>82</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, 5(2), 3 August 1950, Cols. 276-380.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

between the two power blocs. Subsequently, it maintained that India should not have accepted the chairmanship of Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) in Korea and should not have thus put the Indian soldiers in awkward situation.<sup>81</sup> Commenting on India's resolution relating to the issue of repatriation of the prisoners of the Korean war, brought in UN in November-December 1952, the party wanted India to act as an independent force and not a satellite of either power bloc. It found the Government leaning on the side of Russia and China and being excessively critical towards the United States. On the whole, the PSP held that the policy of the Government of India in Korea was "neither very wise nor honest".<sup>85</sup>

The PSP fully appreciated the measures of UN taken to safeguard the territorial integrity of the South Korean people and their liberties against external aggression.<sup>86</sup> It held that any decision arrived at by the Security Council must be agreed to and abided by the parties concerned.<sup>87</sup> At the same time, it deprecated the US trick of acting in anticipation of the decision of the Security Council and thus reducing the decision to a mere *fait accompli*. It advocated a Korea policy for India which would be consistent with the principle of active neutrality. Accordingly, it suggested raising a united voice of South-east Asian and West Asian countries outside the two power blocs for the return of warring forces to the 38th parallel and re-opening the issue in the United Nations.<sup>88</sup>

In June 1953, the PSP welcomed the agreement on Korea and hoped that it might lead to an armistice. It also stood for the unification<sup>89</sup> and freedom of Korea<sup>90</sup> to enable its people to lead a full life.

<sup>81</sup>*Parliamentary Debates*, 10(2), 7-24 December 1953, Cols. 3019-20.

<sup>82</sup>Madhu Limaye, "India's Mediation in Korea", *Janata*, 14 December 1952, pp. 1-2.

<sup>83</sup>*Report of the Eighth National Conference*, n. 29, pp. 111-112.

<sup>84</sup>See n. 82.

<sup>85</sup>See n. 86.

<sup>86</sup>Lohia, n. 40, p. 9; and also n. 29, p. 222.

<sup>87</sup>The Asian Socialist Conference which was held at Kalaw (Burma), 25-28 May 1954, suggested in a resolution: "Unification and freedom of Korea and creation of a democratic State can be achieved through a free

### Suez Crisis

On the question of Suez, the PSP fully cooperated with the policy of the Government of India. It supported nationalization of the Suez canal as a rightful step and acknowledged "the need of such nationalization for the Egyptian Government".<sup>91</sup> It strongly condemned "the unprovoked and cynical aggression by Britain, France and Israel against Egypt" and urged "the withdrawal of troops and prompt restoration of the *status quo antebellum*".<sup>92</sup> Speaking in the *Lok Sabha*, Asoka Mehta unequivocally supported the stand of the Indian Government and emphasized on seeing that "aggressors are not permitted to remain on the soil of Egypt".<sup>93</sup> Next day, Acharya Kripalani viewed the aggression of Britain, France and Israel as "unabashed" and "based on the ideas of imperialism".<sup>94</sup>

Subsequently, the PSP welcomed the ceasefire and supported the UN decision to restore peace. In view of Britain's deed, the party reiterated its stand that "India should sever connection with the Commonwealth".<sup>95</sup> The Second Asian Socialist Conference held at Bombay in November 1956 also strengthened the conviction of the PSP regarding its support to the Egyptian Government.<sup>96</sup>

### Hungarian Crisis

In the case of Hungary, the PSP attacked the Government. The stand the party took was that what happened in Hungary

election throughout Korea—North and South—under the supervision of an international authority acceptable to both sides". See *Three Years of Asian Socialist Conference* (Bombay, November 1956), p. 41 ; also, Resolution of the Second Congress of the Asian Socialist Conference, November 1956, *Janata*, 18 November 1956, pp. 9-10.

<sup>91</sup>National Executive Decisions, *Janata*, 15 August 1956, p. 9.

<sup>92</sup>*Bangalore Resolutions*, n. 77, p. 13.

<sup>93</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 9(2), 9 November 1956, Col. 404.

<sup>94</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 9(2), 20 November 1956, Col. 500.

<sup>95</sup>Resolution on Situation in West Asia, *Report of the Third National Conference of PSP, Bangalore, November 1956*, p. 226.

<sup>96</sup>The Conference in a resolution recognised the right of the Egyptian Government to nationalize the Suez Company. The Conference also extended its support to the decision of the UN General Assembly and

was not a civil conflict but a calculated Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of that country.

In a statement, Ganga Sharan Sinha, the Chairman of the PSP, completely dissociated the party from the Government in its assessment of the situation in Hungary. He considered the AICC resolution on Hungary as "woefully weak" and expressed "surprise and shock" at India's abstention from voting on the UN resolution, condemned the use of Russian armed forces and deplored Menon's reported statement made before he left for UN, that the developments were Hungary's "internal affairs".<sup>97</sup> Jaya Prakash Narayan blamed Nehru for the blunders committed in relation to the Hungarian issue and held that Russia had no right to be in Hungary. For him to talk of the Warsaw Pact in this connection was "to make a mockery of freedom". Comparing what the Government of India did in Suez with its role in Hungary, he condemned it for its "double standard".<sup>98</sup> Asoka Mehta characterised the stand of the Government on Hungary as "very lukewarm".<sup>99</sup> The Third National Conference of the PSP held in November 1956 also appealed to the Government of India not to give recognition to the Kadar Government and to view the imposed regime as the illegitimate Government of Hungary.<sup>100</sup> It denounced the Russian intervention, called upon the Soviet troops to withdraw from the soil of Hungary and appealed to UN to assert its authority against the Soviet armed intervention.<sup>101</sup> The Second Asian Socialist Conference also expressed its deep concern over the "armed intervention of the socialist forces against the Hungarian freedom".<sup>102</sup>

called upon the invading forces to withdraw their troops and strive to resolve their dispute, if any, through the normal channel of the UN. See *Janata*, 18 November 1956, pp. 9-10.

<sup>97</sup>*The Hindu*, 12 November 1956.

<sup>98</sup>Jaya Prakash Narayan, "Mr. Nehru Blunders", *Janata*, 18 November 1956, pp. 2-3.

<sup>99</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 9(2), 19 November 1956, Col. 415.

<sup>100</sup>*Bangalore Resolutions*, n. 77, pp. 13-14.

<sup>101</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>102</sup>The Conference demanded "the withdrawal of those troops" and appealed "to the UN to assert its authority against armed intervention". See Resolution of the Second Congress of the Asian Socialist Conference, *Janata*, 11 November 1956, p. 20.

On the Hungarian issue, the PSP accused the Government of India of having a pro-Soviet policy.

### Afro-Asian Conference (Bandung and Algiers)

The PSP hailed Afro-Asian conferences. It considered the Bandung Conference of 1955 as "the most important conference of the century" and held that it "succeeded in bringing together as many as twenty-nine nations of Asia and Africa on a common platform".<sup>103</sup> The Socialists thought that Bandung was the best place to bring into reality the idea of a 'third bloc' of nations and to keep the Asian and African peoples away from the rival power blocs. They resented the fact that Nehru did not condemn the new imperialism of Russia and China whereas the condemnation was necessary in order to clear off the confusion arising out of the two varieties of colonialism and imperialism.<sup>104</sup> They vigorously criticised the fact that Nehru deliberately ignored the final understanding of the Conference in the matter and they also highlighted the danger of Russian type of imperialism as exemplified in the absorption of the East European States.

As regards the Second Afro-Asian Summit Conference at Algiers, the *Janata* regretted the disagreement over the admission of some members. It considered it unfortunate that just because India had been attacked by China, the acts of both the countries were interpreted "mainly in terms of their reaction on one another". It boldly stated that the party did not advocate peace at any price either with Pakistan or China or with the peace-makers, and it disliked the habit of presenting the Indian political system "as a challenge to that of China and then denouncing Indians for their presumption".<sup>105</sup>

On the whole, the Socialists believed that India had failed to tackle colonialism, imperialism and most of the passing

<sup>103</sup>*Janata*, 1 May 1955, pp. 2, 11-12.

<sup>104</sup>M.A. Venkat Rao, "The Dialectic of the Bandung Conference", *Janata*, 15 May 1955, pp. 5-6.

<sup>105</sup>Editorial, "Notes and Comments", *Janata*, 7 November 1965, p. 2.

problems including border issues at these two Afro-Asian conferences.

### Laotian and the Congolese Crises

On the issue of Laos, the PSP fully supported the policy of the Government of India. While referring to this issue in Parliament, Nath Pai said: "We supported the way the Government of India has been approaching the Laos problem". "[But]", he added, "Laos must not be viewed in isolation, but as a development in South-East Asia".<sup>106</sup> The party wanted the South-East Asia policy to be put into practice by the Government. On this issue, Devendra Prasad Singh, a PSP member in the *Rajya Sabha*, hoped that the Fourteen Nations Conference would be successful "both in regard to the question of withdrawal of the foreign troops from the soil of Laos and in regard to the question of neutrality".<sup>107</sup> The PSP welcomed a neutral Government in Laos.

In relation to the Congolese crisis, too, the party supported the policy of the Government. On 7 August 1960, N.G. Goray issued a statement and urged the United Nations to enforce the withdrawal of the Belgian troops from Katanga. He warned colonial powers against doing anything "that will disturb all authority and competence of the UN to deal with the situation in the Congo".<sup>108</sup> The party fully supported UN actions in Congo. In February 1961, the General Secretary of the party issued a press statement and condemned the assassination of the Congolese leader, Patrice Lumumba, and called for world conscience against such barbarity.<sup>109</sup>

### Belgrade and Cairo Conferences

On the eve of the first non-aligned summit at Belgrade in 1961, the PSP was not confident of its success. The party wanted attempts being made to create a semblance or nucleus of the third bloc. When the conference was over, Nath Pai said, "Non-alignment lost its polish, its glow, its finish in

<sup>106</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 56(2), 16 August 1961, Col. 2475.

<sup>107</sup>*Rajya Sabha Debates*, 35(2), 22 August 1961, Col. 1200.

<sup>108</sup>*Janata*, 21 August 1960, p. 8.

<sup>109</sup>*Janata*, 19 February 1961, p. 12



Belgrade". He added, "Non-alignment for its very success depends upon unwavering adherence to objectivity, to impartiality and undaunted courage". "The Belgrade Conference", according to him, "indulged in equivocation : it did not show that bold and honest courage of leadership which it was called upon to provide on the major issues with which the world has been confronted".<sup>110</sup> This conference disillusioned and disappointed the party.

The party looked at the second non-aligned summit held at Cairo in October 1964 as "a futile meeting".<sup>111</sup> Nath Pai did not accept the exaggerated claims of achievements at Cairo, as he fully criticised the various agreements in the communique signed there, and stated : "They do not add to the sum total of India's prestige and influence in the world...We do not find any kind of reference to this fact of aggression by China in this communique."<sup>112</sup> The party maintained that when matters that threaten national security did not find expression, why, after all, it was held and India attended it. Hem Barua, one of the leading members of the party, viewed the conference at Cairo as a "dismal failure".<sup>113</sup>

### SUMMING UP THE ATTITUDE

The PSP has been seeking to project its ideology into its own concept of non-alignment and, as such, the concept of the party becomes ideologically based. This contrasts with the official stand of the Government of India which has been opposed to any kind of ideological bigotry. The Government of India has never stood for having any kind of bloc or any co-ordinated and organised group of nations. Its effort has been to promote a "third area" of countries having the objective of dissociating themselves from cold war machinations and of working for world peace. On the contrary, the PSP has been advocating a "third bloc" of nations as against either power bloc.

<sup>110</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 60(2), 7 December 1961, Col. 3888.

<sup>111</sup>Editorial, *Janata*, 18 October 1968, p. 1.

<sup>112</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 35(2), 23 November 1964, Cols. 1286-1287.

<sup>113</sup>Hem Barua, "Dismal Failure at Cairo", *Janata*, 18 October 1964, p. 14,

Further, it appears that the PSP's concept of non-alignment has been involving some definitive rejection of communism and some aversion for it. That has led it to see a "burial" of non-alignment in the emergence of the Indo-Soviet treaty. It has often, as such, criticised the Government for not having a definite approach to the communist world. Its emphasis on having a third bloc has been considerably aimed at the containment of communism in South and South-East Asia.

The PSP concept has clearly included neutrality, non-entanglement and non-involvement. On the contrary, non-alignment of the Government has been opposed only to alignment or commitment to any of the existing blocs or to any bloc that may be formed independently of them and has been having nothing to do with neutrality. The official version has not been specifically showing any regret for the existence of the Great Powers. It accepts their existence as a fact, deplores the bloc spirit embittering their relations and, thereby, undermining world peace. But the PSP deplores the very fact that some powers are acknowledged as great. It is against entanglement only in relation to their bloc politics serving their interests. It, however, stands for a camp or bloc of nations independent of the Great Powers with the overt purpose to undo their machinations and domination. This party has a special preference in this connection for having a bloc based on regional alliances particularly among the South and South-East Asian nations.

The candidness of the stand of the PSP on non-alignment, conceptual or implemental, has been of an ideological temper in terms of forms as well as the consequences conceived. Its attitude, however, has been that of constructive criticism befitting a responsible opposition party. Its concept of non-alignment has, often, had a considerable impact on the official pursuit of the principle. As a leading example, its concept of the "third camp" induced the Government of India to talk and act in terms of an 'area of peace' or a 'third area'.

## Anti-Colonialism and Anti-Racialism

Beside non-alignment, anti-colonialism and anti-racialism have been the main other principles of the foreign policy of the Government of India. The PSP has broadly accepted the basic norms of these two principles also. But in their case, too, it has been seeing faults or lapses of application and accusing the Government of India of lukewarmness in regard to some imperialist powers.

### ANTI-COLONIALISM

#### The Principle

The PSP (which was known as the SPI until 1 June 1952) has been pressing the Government of India right from 1947 for mobilizing world opinion against all kinds of colonialism and imperialism. It has found the official stands of anti-colonialism hesitant, weak and vacillating.<sup>1</sup> The Government, in the opinion of the PSP, had failed to take up the issues of colonialism in world councils as powerfully "as to isolate and defeat imperialist forces".<sup>2</sup> To the party, the policy pursued by the Government appeared to be full of "contradic-

<sup>1</sup>*Report of the Second National Conference of the PSP, Gaya (Bihar), Dec. 26-30, 1955* (New Delhi, 1956), pp. 142-43 ; also *Bangalore Resolutions* (A Praja Socialist Publication, being the Resolutions adopted at the Third National Conference of the PSP held at Bangalore from 25 to 28 November 1956), (Delhi, 1956), p. 12.

<sup>2</sup>*Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party* (Praja Socialist Publication, Bombay, 1954), p. 27.

tions and discrepancies".<sup>3</sup> It has been viewing the Government inhibited inasmuch as its actions and reactions to situations have lacked uniformity and constancy, being radical against one set of countries and conniving in case of the other set responsible for colonial excesses.

In view of these defects noted above, the PSP has been generally led to hold that the Government has not been pursuing an effective anti-colonial policy. It would have liked the Government "to rescue it from its hesitations and mental reservations".<sup>4</sup> It would have also liked the Government "to strengthen it by removing its faults of execution".<sup>5</sup> It has been urging the Government to stand behind the dependent peoples of Asia and Africa<sup>6</sup> and support them, as for instance, from time to time, in Indonesia, Malaya, Kenya, Tunisia, French North Africa and Portuguese and French territories in India.<sup>7</sup> It would have, further, liked the Government to implement the policy of anti-colonialism as effectively and powerfully as to give continued and intensive support to the subject peoples in their freedom struggle until the last vestige of imperialistic domination would be destroyed.<sup>8</sup>

The PSP views colonialism and imperialism as opposed to socialism, for it is inherently motivated by the spirit of exploitation, poverty, misery, degradation and indignity. It has been viewing the continuance of colonialism and imperialism as a challenge to democracy, a menace to socialism and a constant threat to world peace.<sup>9</sup> It has been keen on an early liquidation of colonialism and imperialism in all its forms and has

<sup>3</sup>Prem Bhasin, "Colonialism needs to be redefined", *Janata*, 15 August 1961, pp. 7-8.

<sup>4</sup>Prem Bhasin, *Socialism in India* (New Delhi, 1968), pp. 23-25; see n. 3.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*; see n. 3.

<sup>6</sup>*Policy Statement, Socialist Party* (Published first in 1947 at Nagpur, Second revised edition in 1949 after the deliberation at Bangalore on 4-6 October, Reprinted, 1951), p. 34.

<sup>7</sup>Betul Resolutions of Special Convention, June 1953, *Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party*, n. 2, pp. 26-27.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*; see also n. 6.

<sup>9</sup>*Policy Statement* (Adopted by the Second National Conference of the Praja Socialist Party held at Gaya on 26-30 December 1955), (Delhi, 1956), p. 80.

regarded self-determination as the right of colonial and dependent peoples. It has held that the will of the people should be the basis of the authority of Government and every one, irrespective of his race or group to which he belongs, should be guaranteed equal right to participate in the Government of his country.

### Western Imperialism

The PSP has been critical of all Western imperialist powers—Britain, France, Holland, Portugal and the United States. In its opinion, India's membership of the Commonwealth of Nations amounts to a kind of collaboration with Britain which continues to be the major colonial power in Africa and exercises effective control over economic affairs in Asia. The only way to reverse the trend, the party believed, was "to give up the inferior membership of the British Commonwealth and free itself from the economic and strategic apron-strings of Great Britain".<sup>10</sup> Considering Britain's colonial policy in Malaya, Kenya,<sup>11</sup> Aden<sup>12</sup> and Central African Federation,<sup>13</sup> the PSP was reaffirmingly convinced that the only alternative for India was to sever connection with the British Commonwealth.

The PSP was not satisfied with India's policy in relation to French colonialism in Tunisia, Morocco, Indo-China and in France's colonial pockets on the Indian soil. The party charged the Government for its attitude of keeping France pleased and, as such, not going beyond "verbal protests".<sup>14</sup> It would have further liked the Government to take a positive stand on the issue of Algeria<sup>15</sup> and speak strongly against the French atrocities in Arab Africa.<sup>16</sup> It strongly denounced the French

<sup>10</sup>Allahabad Resolution of the National Council, December 1953, *Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party*, n. 2, p. 29.

<sup>11</sup>*Parliamentary Debates*, 18(2), 17 September 1953, Col. 4011.

<sup>12</sup>Prem Bhasin's Statement on Aden, *Janata*, 10 October 1965, p. 8.

<sup>13</sup>N.G. Goray's Statement, *Janata*, 29 March 1959, p. 8.

<sup>14</sup>See n. 10.

<sup>15</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 40(2), 16 March 1960, Col. 6271.

<sup>16</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 25(2), 19 February 1964, Col. 1551.

bombardment of the population of Bizerta in 1961 and would like better treatment for the people of Tunisia.<sup>17</sup>

The PSP noted faults also with India's policy towards Portuguese colonialism in Goa and Angola. The party viewed Portuguese imperialism as the worst and the policy of the Government towards the Portuguese possessions in India as "ineffective and timid".<sup>18</sup> Its National Executive, meeting at Madras in June 1961, condemned the brutal *visage* of Portuguese imperialism in Angola and urged the Government to take a bold step in relation to the question of Goa.<sup>19</sup>

The party similarly denounced Dutch imperialism. It joined the hands with the Government of India in its condemnation of the wanton and unprovoked aggression by the Netherlands against the people of Indonesia and demanded the liquidation of the Dutch imperialist authority and armies.<sup>20</sup> At the same time, it called for a speedy solution of the issue of West Irian.<sup>21</sup>

The PSP has been objecting to American imperialism too. It exposed colonial and expansionist trends of US policy and condemned the quest for the "sphere of influence" by putting pressure on nations for preserving the capitalist system and, thus, bringing back colonialism indirectly.<sup>22</sup> It held US diplomacy in Formosa and Korea and towards Portugal's imperialism in North Africa as ambitious and based on political and economic domination of the entire world.<sup>23</sup> In 1958, the party condemned the American military action in Lebanon and considered it as "a grave threat to world peace".<sup>24</sup> It also expressed pains over the imperialistic American attitude towards Vietnam. On this issue, it would like the Government of India to define its position in no "uncertain terms".<sup>25</sup>

<sup>17</sup>*Rajya Sabha Debates*, 35(1), 22 August 1961, Col. 1199.

<sup>18</sup>*Janata*, 18 June 1961, p. 2.

<sup>19</sup>*Janata*, 25 June 1961, p. 7.

<sup>20</sup>National Executive, Lucknow, December 29-31, 1948, *Resolutions* (Socialist Party, 1949, Bombay), pp. 5-6.

<sup>21</sup>*Janata*, 15 December 1957, p. 2.

<sup>22</sup>*Policy Statement*, n. 6, pp. 35-36.

<sup>23</sup>*Policy Statement*, n. 9, p. 87.

<sup>24</sup>See N.G. Goray's Statement, *Janata*, 20 July 1958, p. 9.

<sup>25</sup>See Nath Pai's Statement, *Janata*, 14 February 1965, p. 12.

### Communist Imperialism

The PSP has also opposed with vigour what it has viewed as communist imperialism. It has seen in the Russian and the Chinese expansionist trends a new type of imperialism coming up. The Yugoslav-Russian conflict of 1948 appeared as the first burning example of Russia's tendency for expansion and domination. It condemned the leaders of other Eastern European countries for not having the courage and determination of Marshal Tito.<sup>26</sup> As revealed by the Yugoslav experience, the Soviets appeared indulging in economic exploitation and political and ideological domination of countries of a kind which was similar to that of Western colonialism.<sup>27</sup> Later in 1956, the Soviet Union appeared extremely aggressive and imperialist in its design against the people of Hungary.<sup>28</sup> The Czechoslovak crisis in 1968 gave a further evidence of the fact that Russia had the same kind of interest in the communist world as the other "imperial and colonial powers" were having in "the balance of power in the hey day of colonialism".<sup>29</sup> The PSP would have liked the Government of India to join hands with nations which condemned Soviet imperialism.

The PSP has also found Communist China as much colonial in outlook as Western nations. The Chinese invasion of Tibet in October 1950 showed an expansionist trend.<sup>30</sup> By 1954, the PSP became much more vocal in its denunciation of Chinese colonialism in Tibet. In his *Lok Sabha* statement Acharya J.B. Kripalani said :

I consider this as such a colonial aggression on the part of China as any colonial aggression indulged by Western nations.<sup>31</sup>

The party condemned the People's Republic of China as

<sup>26</sup>See n. 3.

<sup>27</sup>G.S. Bhargava, "Congress Foreign Policy", *Janata*, 15 August, 1954, p. 17.

<sup>28</sup>*Bangalore Resolutions* (Delhi, 1956), p. 14.

<sup>29</sup>Peter Alvarez's Statement, *Janata*, 15 September 1968, p. 15.

<sup>30</sup>*Himalayan Policy for India* (Socialist Party, Bombay, February 1951), p. 20.

<sup>31</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 5(2), 15 May 1954, Cols. 7548-49.

aggressive, expansionist, and colonialist and would have liked the Government of India not to recognise the claims of China over Tibet.<sup>32</sup> Not to do so would be inconsistent with India's policy of fighting against colonialism and imperialism for world peace and freedom.<sup>33</sup> Later, when in October 1962 China invaded India, the PSP did not take it a mere border clash, but as a "neo-imperialist" expansionist design of China parallel to the designs of other imperialist nations.<sup>34</sup> It, as such, urged the Government of India to boldly condemn Chinese imperialism.

## THE APPLICATION

### Indonesia (and West Irian)

In the opinion of the PSP, the Government of India had played an effective role in the question of Indonesian freedom struggle against Dutch imperialism. The Socialists paid tributes to Nehru for the immense service done to the people of Indonesia.<sup>35</sup> The National Executive of the Socialist Party, meeting in December 1948, condemned the "wanton and unprovoked aggression" of the Netherlands Government against the bringing back of the people of Indonesia under their "imperialist domination". It urged the Government to take urgent and positive steps. At the same time, it would have liked the Government to break off diplomatic relations with the Netherlands Government and impose economic blockade including the closing of the Indian ports to Dutch Vessels. The party appealed to the people of India to observe 9 January 1949 as "Indonesian Day" to express their sympathy to the people of Indonesia in their struggle for freedom.<sup>36</sup>

The party also wanted a speedy solution of the West Irian problem. When the campaign to win West Irian from the Dutch had taken a serious turn in Indonesia, the PSP expected

<sup>32</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 34(2), 12 September 1959, Cols. 8007-9.

<sup>33</sup>*Janata*, 12 April 1959, p. 6.

<sup>34</sup>*Report of the Sixth National Conference of the PSP, Bhopal. June 8-10, 1963*, p. 93.

<sup>35</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, "Foreign Policy: Party Vs. Government", *Janata*, 9 December 1951, pp. 1-2.

<sup>36</sup>See n. 23.



from the Government of India to find out a constitutional solution of the problem.<sup>37</sup>

### Malaya and Indo-China

The PSP appreciated the stand of the Government on the question of the struggles of the peoples of Malaya and Indo-China for freedom from the yokes of British and French imperialism respectively, though the stand appeared to it as unduly mild.

In 1950, the Eighth National Conference of the party sent its greetings to the peoples of Malaya and Indo-China in their struggle for independence and demanded immediate withdrawal of all foreign intervention.<sup>38</sup> Lohia accused the Government of India for having a "pro-Atlantic attitude" and emphasised the need for peaceful settlement of the claims of the peoples of Malaya and Indo-China without any interference by either of the two Great Power camps.<sup>39</sup> The special convention of the party, held at Betul in 1953, expressed its deep concern over the mounting reign of repression and violence in Malaya. It urged the Government of India to raise the issue of Malaya before UN.<sup>40</sup> The first Asian Socialist Conference, which was held in 1953 in Rangoon (Burma), also supported the stand taken by the PSP on this issue. It condemned the use of terror whether by the British Administration or by the communist insurgents in Malaya and appealed to the people of Malaya to rally round the democratic socialist forces.<sup>41</sup>

### Kenya

On the issue of Kenya, the PSP supported the official stand of the Government of India, but held that, in this as in many other cases, the Indian Government had preferred expediency

<sup>37</sup> *Janata*, 15 December 1957, p. 2.

<sup>38</sup> *Report of the Eighth National Conference, Madras, July 1950* (Socialist Party, 1950, Bombay), pp. 81-83.

<sup>39</sup> Rammanohar Lohia, *The Third Camp in World Affairs* (Bombay, 1950), p. 17.

<sup>40</sup> *Report of the Special Convention, Betul, June 1953* (Praja Socialist Party, Bombay, 1953), pp. 105-106.

<sup>41</sup> *Three Years of Asian Socialist Conference* (Bombay, November 1956), p. 32.

to the claims of freedom and justice.<sup>42</sup>

In 1952, the PSP felt concerned over the unrest and deteriorating political conditions of the people of Kenya involving terrorist activities.<sup>43</sup> At the Betual Special Convention in 1953, the party raised a voice of protest against the atrocities done to the Kenyan people by the whites. It condemned banning of the Kenya African Union and sent fraternal greetings to the freedom fighters in Kenya.<sup>44</sup> Acharya Kripalani, the Chairman and a leading member of the party, attacked the British policy in Kenya and condemned it as "a veritable reign of terror" prevailing against the Africans and the Indians residing there.<sup>45</sup> The Socialists held Kenya's colonial Government solely responsible for the unhappy state of affairs there. They would have liked the restoration of freedom of assembly and the press, repealing of discriminatory land ordinances and the release of all African political and educational leaders.<sup>46</sup> The PSP urged the Government of India to raise the issue of Kenya in world councils and defend strongly the cause of subjected peoples against the "imperialist forces".<sup>47</sup>

## Goa

From the very beginning the PSP was persuading the Government of India to help activate the struggle against Portuguese colonialism in Goa. It held the policy of the Government excessively passive, spineless and weak.<sup>48</sup> It viewed India's policy in relation to Goa as a total failure.<sup>49</sup> It went as far as charging the Government for sabotaging the liberation movement in Goa.<sup>50</sup>

In 1950, the Eighth National Conference of the party

<sup>42</sup>*Election Manifesto*, PSP (New Delhi, 1957), p. 15.

<sup>43</sup>Asoka Mehta, "Unrest in Kenya", *Janata*, 23 November 1952, p. 12.

<sup>44</sup>*Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party*, n, 2, pp. 26-27.

<sup>45</sup>*Parliamentary Debates*, 18(2), 17 September 1953, Col. 4011.

<sup>46</sup>*Resolutions of the First Asian Socialist Conference*, held at Rangoon from 6 January to 15 January 1953, p. 41.

<sup>47</sup>See n. 44.

<sup>48</sup>Editorial, *Janata*, 17 February 1957, pp. 1-2; also *Report of the Third National Conference, Bangalore, 1956* (Praja Socialist Publication, 1956), p. 224.

<sup>49</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 7(2), 30 September 1954, Cols. 3835-36.

<sup>50</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 1(2), 22 February 1956, Col. 703.

warned the Government of India that the question of the liberation of the Goa could not be decided by holding a plebiscite and appealed to it to take effective steps in order to end the remnants of foreign rule in India and to restore to India political and territorial integrity.<sup>51</sup> In September 1954, the National Executive of the PSP further asked the Government to abandon the policy of dangerous distinction between the Goans and the Indians and asked it to allow the Indian people to play their role in liberating foreign pockets in India.<sup>52</sup> The party viewed the liquidation of Portuguese imperialism not only as a national but also as an international problem. It sent volunteers to Goa who suffered under the steps taken by the Government to prohibit the Indian people from participating in the 'satyagraha' in Goa and branded the Government action as a "betrayal of the people's unity forged to liberate the Portuguese enclaves in India".<sup>53</sup> In 1956, in a resolution, the Third National Conference of the PSP stated :

The Government of India which claims to play a leading role on the anti-colonial front in the world outside India has failed to advance the cause of Goa's freedom. Its policy with reference to Goa is.. faulty. The liquidation of imperialism is an essential condition of peace and progress in the world, and the demand for the liquidation of Portuguese domination over Indian territory is therefore an integral part of the policy of peace.<sup>54</sup>

The conference would have liked the Government to recognise the urgency of the situation and to adopt suitable measures to rid India of this cancer of colonialism.

After a year, N. G. Goray, a prominent leader of the party, hailed the change in the attitude of the Government towards Goa and wanted India to consider Portugal "as aggressor"

<sup>51</sup>See n. 38, p. 84.

<sup>52</sup>New Delhi Resolutions of National Executive, September 1954, *Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party*, n. 2, p. 34.

<sup>53</sup>*Report of the Second National Conference of the PSP, Gaya (Bihar), December 26-30, 1956*, n. 1, p. 141.

<sup>54</sup>*Bangalore Resolutions*, n. 28, p. 12.

and to repel the Portuguese.<sup>55</sup> When in 1960, the International Court of Justice gave its judgment regarding the Portuguese enclaves in India, Peter Alvares, a member of the PSP National Executive, held the decision of the Hague Court as "a triumph for the forces of anti-colonialism".<sup>56</sup> In June 1961, the National Executive of the party urged the Government to adopt a "bold policy towards the question of Goa and take effective steps, "not excluding police action", to secure the liberation of Goa. Such a course of action, the Party Executive added, was demanded by the brave sacrifice of the Indians in Goa, and would be in the right earnest of India's continued determination to eliminate colonialism from the world.<sup>57</sup> A little later that year, speaking in the *Lok Sabha*, Nath Pai held the occupation of Goa as "a case of redeemed aggression" and pledged to resist the aggression.<sup>58</sup> In November, supporting a non-official resolution regarding Portuguese withdrawal from Goa, he called upon the Government to drop its indecision on the issue of Goa and "act immediately". He wanted the Government to exercise the first right of a sovereign nation to use its army as also all other diplomatic and peaceful methods to liberate Goa had failed.<sup>59</sup>

In the context of that non-official resolution, the PSP pressed the Government of India for issuing a final ultimatum to the Portuguese Government to withdraw from Goa. The party claimed subsequently that, as a result of its constant goading, the Government was led to take police action in Goa. Indeed, the impact of the party on the Government in this matter was considerably significant.

<sup>55</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 1 (2), 14 May 1957, Cols. 249-50.

<sup>56</sup>*Janata*, 24 April 1960, p. 12.

<sup>57</sup>"Resolution passed at the meeting of the National Executive of the PSP, Madras, June 1961", *Janata*, 25 June 1961, p. 7.

<sup>58</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 56 (2), 16 August 1961, Col. 2473.

<sup>59</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 59 (2), 24 November 1961, Cols. 1137-9. The non-official resolution was moved in the *Lok Sabha* by S.M. Banerjee. It was discussed in the *Lok Sabha* on 24 November and 8 December 1961. It was supported by almost all the members of the opposition parties who spoke on the occasion.

### Hungary and Czechoslovakia

In relation to the issue of Hungary (1956), the PSP was sore over the fact that the Government of India failed to condemn Soviet imperialism. At the Bangalore Conference in November 1956, the PSP declared that the heroic efforts of the Hungarian people for national liberation and political self-determination had finally torn the veil of the Russian occupation of East European countries and had exposed that rule as "imperialism based on naked use of force".<sup>60</sup>

Much recently, the PSP characterized the "Soviet invasion" of Czechoslovakia in 1968 as a "naked imperialist act" and a "crime against humanity and freedom".<sup>61</sup> It placed the Soviet aggression in Czechoslovakia essentially in the line of "the worst tradition of imperialists".<sup>62</sup> The party attacked the Government of India for its behaviour like a "client country" of the Soviet Union. Nath Pai also expressed "shock and surprise" at the fact that India had failed to fulfil its moral obligation to the freedom movements. He pointed out that the way the Government reacted to Soviet Russia's wanton aggression in Czechoslovakia had firmly established that India was heading to become "a satellite of Soviet Russia".<sup>63</sup> The party appealed to the people to exert the pressure of public opinion on the Government not to act as a Soviet satellite.

### Lebanon

In the opinion of the PSP, the landing of the American troops in Lebanon in 1958 constituted a "challenge to the rising forces of nationalism and a grave threat to world peace". The party directed all its branches to organise public meetings and demonstrations to protest against the American intervention and express solidarity with the freedom fighters of Lebanon.<sup>64</sup> At a press conference, K.K. Menon, Joint Secretary of the party, viewed the landing of American marines in Lebanon as "an outrage against the freedom of small nations".

<sup>60</sup>*Bangalore Resolutions*, n. 28, p. 14.

<sup>61</sup>Prem Bhasin's Statement, *Janata*, 1 September 1968, p. 8.

<sup>62</sup>Peter Alvares's Statement, *Janata*, 15 September 1968, p. 15.

<sup>63</sup>*Janata*, 8 September 1968, p. 14.

<sup>64</sup>*Janata*, 20 July 1958, p. 9.

He denounced the United States for its behaviour as "an imperial power".<sup>65</sup> The party pledged to fight colonialism in any shape and advocated the right of self-determination for the people of Lebanon. It found no justification behind US armed intervention and urged the Government of India to stand by the Panchshila principles.<sup>66</sup>

### Algeria

On the question of freedom struggle in Algeria, the PSP had basically no difference with the policy of the Government. But it was not satisfied with the approach on which it was based. The party noted that the approach was not as firm as it had been in the case of Indo-China. It criticised the "lukewarmness".<sup>67</sup> The party charged the Government for seeking to please the Government of France, ignoring the right of the freedom fighters in Algeria and insulting the entire Arab world by not recognising the Provisional Government.<sup>68</sup>

The PSP wished the Government to take a positive stand. It wanted the Government as well as the Indian people to support the "Provisional Government" of Algeria.<sup>69</sup> In April 1959, the National Executive of the party appealed to the Government of India as much as to all Governments dedicated to the cause of freedom to do all they could to persuade France to seek negotiation with the leaders of Algeria. The PSP welcomed the visit to India of Ferhat Abbas, the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of Algeria, and conveyed to him its deepest sympathy for the people of Algeria. It urged upon the Socialist Party of France to reorient its policy and champion the cause of Algerian independence.<sup>70</sup> When, in 1961, the Avion talk between the nationalist leaders of Algeria and the French Government failed, Nath Pai urged the Indian Government to facilitate the agreement between the two countries and to accord *de jure* recognition to the

<sup>65</sup> *Janata*, 27 July 1958, p. 9.

<sup>66</sup> Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 18(2), 19 August 1958, Col. 1670.

<sup>67</sup> *Lok Sabha Debates*, 9(2), 19 November 1956, Col. 405.

<sup>68</sup> *Lok Sabha Debates*, 25(2), 19 February 1964, Col. 1551.

<sup>69</sup> *Lok Sabha Debates*, 40(2), 16 March 1960, Col. 6271.

<sup>70</sup> *Janata*, 26 April 1959, p. 5.

Algerian Government.<sup>71</sup> When Nehru had almost given an assurance to recognise the FLN (Front Liberation National) Government, what, after all, the party wanted to know, inhibited him to do so.<sup>72</sup> It regretted that the Government of India failed to provide full support to the Algerians in their freedom struggle. The Second Asian Socialist Conference supported the stand taken by the PSP. It appealed to all Governments to support the Afro-Asian move in the United Nations for a quick and peaceful solution of the problem.<sup>73</sup>

### Angola

The PSP has been consistently supporting the people of Angola against Portuguese imperialism. In June 1961, the National Executive of the party saluted the brave freedom fighters of Angola who had raised the banner of freedom against Portuguese colonialism. It regretted the death of thousands of Angolans who, while demonstrating their unbreakable will to be free, exposed the brutal *visage* of Portuguese imperialism. The National Executive condemned the Portuguese Government for the crimes it was committing against the Angolan people and pledged its full support to them in their struggle for independence.<sup>74</sup>

The party believed that the most effective way in which the Government of India could help the people of Angola would be to hasten the liberation of Goa.

### Tibet

In regard to the question of Tibet, the PSP believed that the Government of India had miserably failed to champion the cause of liberation of the people of Tibet. It found the Tibet policy of the Government contrary to its general policy for the liquidation of imperialism. It also charged the Government

<sup>71</sup>Lok Sabha Debates, 56(2), 16 August 1961, Cols. 2479-80.

<sup>72</sup>Lok Sabha Debates, 60(2), 7 December 1961, Col. 3892

<sup>73</sup>Resolutions of the Second Congress of Asian Socialist Conference, *Janata*, 18 November 1956, pp. 9-10.

<sup>74</sup>Resolution adopted at the meeting of the National Executive of the PSP held at Madras on 17th to 19th June 1961, *Janata*, 25 June 1961, p. 7.

for its passivity and indifference in regard to Communist China's aggression in Tibet.<sup>75</sup>

Following the Chinese military action in Tibet in 1950, the National Executive of the party stated :

To justify the invasion of 8 lakh square miles of territory on the basis of sovereign rights which are as doubtful and untenable as they are imperialist is an irony of which no modern Government should have been thought capable. The people of Tibet alone may decide in a free vote or plebiscite their form of Government or of alliance with the outside world.<sup>76</sup>

When, in May 1951, the Sino-Tibetan Agreement was concluded, the Indian Government appeared satisfied with the agreement. But the Socialists were not. The party continued to regard China's occupation of Tibet as a "deliberate act of aggression". It called it "as abominable as the colonialism of any Western power".<sup>77</sup> Immediately after the Tibetan crisis of March 1959, the party declared its solidarity with the Tibetan people and observed 29 March 1959 as "Tibet Day" N.G. Goray, General Secretary of the party, called it a "planned annihilation of a simple people and their personality ; a repetition of what happened in Hungary three years back".<sup>78</sup> The National Executive of the party, in its meeting in April 1959, recognised "the Tibetan people's right to self-determination and extended to them its support".<sup>79</sup> At the same time, the party deplored the non-cooperation of the Indian Government on the question of taking the Tibetan issue to UN. Later, when a new resolution was introduced in the General Assembly by Malaya and Thailand, the PSP welcomed it and hoped that the Government of India would respond to it "in a manner consistent with the stand against colonialism".<sup>80</sup>

The attitude of the PSP towards what it viewed as the Chinese colonisation of Tibet appeared to have a considerable

<sup>75</sup>Mukut Beharilal, "Complacency behind Mounting Red Expansion Danger", *Janata*, 17 December 1961, pp. 11-12.

<sup>76</sup>*Himalayan Policy for India*, n. 30.

<sup>77</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, n. 31.

<sup>78</sup>"Red Imperialism in Tibet", *Janata*, 29 March 1959, p. 3.

<sup>79</sup>*Janata*, 26 April 1959, pp. 3-5.

<sup>80</sup>*Janata*, 6 November 1960, p. 3.



impact on the policy of the Indian Government. It alarmed the Government to a great extent against the danger of Chinese expansion on India's borders and those of Sikkim and Bhutan.<sup>81</sup>

### South Vietnam

The PSP joined hands with the Government of India in deploring US policy in Vietnam. The party denounced US bombing raids on North Vietnam. But it also appealed to Dr. Ho Chi Minh to give up his idea of conquering and subverting states like South Vietnam for Communism.<sup>82</sup> In 1968, the National Executive of the party wanted that all shades of colonial heritage in Vietnam be put to an end. It hoped that the Paris peace negotiations would bring full and complete freedom and independence to the people of Vietnam and they would shape their own future.<sup>83</sup>

## ANTI-RACIALISM

### The Principle

The PSP has also been urging the Government of India for upholding the cause of coloured and oppressed peoples all over the world. It has found the official stand of anti-racial policy weak and vacillating. The Government, in the opinion of the PSP, has not been energetically taking lead to defeat the racial policy of South Africa.<sup>84</sup> The anti-racial policy of the Government has appeared to this party inhibited and thoroughly devoid of any sense because of India's membership of the Commonwealth of Nations which consists of several countries pursuing racial discrimination.<sup>85</sup> The party has charged the Government for not specifically bringing the cause of all coloured peoples, particularly the negroes, along with the Indians in South Africa before the United Nations.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>81</sup>See n. 77.

<sup>82</sup>PSP Ninth National Conference, December 30-31, 1967, January 1, 1968, Kanpur, General Secretary Report, pp. 40-41.

<sup>83</sup>Janata, 18 June 1968, p. 9.

<sup>84</sup>Lok Sabha Debates, 53(3), 13 April 1961, Col. 8843.

<sup>85</sup>Lok Sabha Debates, 7(2), 30 September 1954, Col. 3843.

<sup>86</sup>See n. 35.

In view of the above facts, the PSP has been generally led to hold that the Government has not been perfectly discharging its obligations towards the coloured peoples of the world and the Indians in South Africa.<sup>67</sup> It would have liked the Government to come up boldly and impartially as in duty bound against all kinds of racial oppressions and stand firmly by the side of coloured peoples.<sup>68</sup> At the same time, it would have liked the Indian and other democratic governments of the world to allow UN to take necessary and firm steps against those nations which practised this "semi-Nazi ideology".<sup>69</sup> For example, it urged the United Nations to use force against South Africa and compel it to abandon its policy of racial discrimination and grant full democratic rights to all its citizens irrespective of the pigment of their skin.<sup>70</sup> Further, the party has expected the Government to take a lead and oppose vehemently the white minority Government in Rhodesia.<sup>71</sup> The party has found the policy of segregation and supremacy imposed by the Europeans in Africa as "unjust and inhuman", "based on master race theory" and essentially "fascist in character". It has viewed such a policy as being maintained by vicious laws in shape of "intense racial bitterness, violent upheavals and acts of terrorism".<sup>72</sup> The PSP has, therefore, demanded an early abolition of all sorts of practices of racial discrimination from the world in general and South Africa in particular.

Early in the post-independence days, the PSP appreciated the firm stand taken by the Government of India in UN against South Africa.<sup>73</sup> It held the Government just and correct in its stand in protesting against the theory of racial segregation and apartheid adopted by South Africa. It considered India quite within its right in protesting against such naked violation

<sup>67</sup>Editorial, "Racial Hatred", *Janata*, 24 April 1949, p. 2.

<sup>68</sup>Notes and Comments, "South Africa Racialism", *Janata*, 3 April 1960, p. 2.

<sup>69</sup>"Abandon Apartheid", *Janata*, 5 October 1952, p. 2.

<sup>70</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup>See n. 84.

<sup>72</sup>*Report of the Second National Conference of the PSP*, n. 1, p. 220.

<sup>73</sup>See p. 22.

human rights and dignity.<sup>94</sup> Beside this, the party suggested that it should be the primary duty of citizens of various countries all over the world to unite and lead an international movement to condemn the Government of South Africa and other countries of the world which practised such irrational and inhuman policies.<sup>95</sup> The PSP declared its solidarity towards the brave peoples of South Africa, Angola, Rhodesia and of the Central African Federation and pledged its support to them in their struggle against racial discrimination.

### Apartheid and Racial Segregation

The PSP has denounced the policy of the apartheid and racial segregation adopted by some of the African Governments and the USA. It viewed Dr. Malan's doctrine of apartheid in South Africa as pernicious and wrong, based on the notion of racial superiority.<sup>96</sup> In 1953, the PSP condemned the legislative measures of racial segregation such as that of the Group Area Act, the Separate Representation of Voters Act, the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act of South Africa which provided separate legislation for the Indians living there.<sup>97</sup> It maintained that these enacted laws had turned the Africans into virtual prisoners in their own countries where every movement and action was controlled and restricted by white Governments irrespective of the hardships caused to the Africans in the forms of the segregation of husband and wife, involuntary acceptance by the Africans of employment at whatever wage available in the area where they were confined and "the denial of any free communication with fellow Africans confined in other areas".<sup>98</sup> The party viewed these laws as humiliating and as naked violation of the Declaration of Human Rights and the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. It would have liked the Government of India to

<sup>94</sup>Janata, 13 April 1960, p. 2.

<sup>95</sup>Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party, n. 2, p. 27.

<sup>96</sup>Editorial, "Let Us Fight Malanism: The Pernicious Doctrine of Apartheid Must be Ended", Janata, 16 November 1952, p. 1.

<sup>97</sup>G.B.S. Chaudhari, "The New South African Legislative", Janata, 1 March 1953, pp. 10-12; also Purshottam Trikamdas, "How can any one Tolerate South Africa", Janata, 26 January 1955, pp. 17-19.

<sup>98</sup>"South African Racialism", Janata, 13 April 1960, p. 2.

advise and appeal to the South African Government to reconsider its stand.<sup>99</sup>

The Praja Socialists also emphasise that the civil rights should not be denied to the coloured people living in the USA and Britain. Discrimination against coloured immigrants has not been institutionalized in Britain and yet there would be few coloured people who would not have suffered from the instances of discriminatory behaviour.<sup>100</sup> The PSP viewed the stand of the Government of India as somewhat correct in admitting Britain's right to restrict immigration. But, at the same time, it perceived inconsistency in it with the general terror of the Indian attitude towards Commonwealth immigration.<sup>101</sup>

### White Minority Governments

The PSP has condemned the formation of the white minority Government in South Rhodesia. It has viewed the Ian Smith regime of Rhodesia as having a pre-planned "imperialist-racialist" design. The party strongly deprecated the imposition of a ban by the minority Government of South Rhodesia on nationalist and democratic parties of the country.<sup>102</sup> It held that the rule of one white man against eighteen Africans in Rhodesia could never be democratic and just. It would always be a denial of the actuality of freedom and liberty and would result in the repression of the majority by the minority.

## THE APPLICATION

### South Africa

In 1950, the Eighth National Conference of the Socialist Party wanted the Government of India to withdraw from the Round Table Conference which, according to the party, had been "deprived of all its purpose by the recent legislations and executive actions of the Union Government" (of South Africa).<sup>103</sup> The conference warned the Government of South

<sup>99</sup>"South African Racialism", *Janata*, 13 April 1960, p. 2.

<sup>100</sup>Daniel Lawrence, "Race Riots in Britain", *Janata*, 27 March 1956, p. 13.

<sup>101</sup>*Janata*, 11 July 1965, p. 3.

<sup>102</sup>*Janata*, 6 September 1964, p. 15.

<sup>103</sup>*Report of the Eighth National Conference*, n. 38, p. 220. In pursuance

Africa that the new resurgent Asia would not tolerate the policy of apartheid which was quite opposite to all modern concepts of democracy and the principles of the UN Charter.

On 16 November 1952, the PSP observed "South Africa Day" and protested against the racial policy of Dr. Malan. The party expressed its sympathy and solidarity with the valiant 'satyagrahis' who were fighting against the doctrine of apartheid in South Africa.<sup>104</sup> The Second National Conference of the party strongly condemned the apartheid policy of South Africa and pledged its support to democratic socialists in all dependent territories. It said :

Four to five million Europeans cannot justly dominate and exploit about two hundred million Africans. Persistent struggle for freedom and against economic enslavement will surely continue until European colonists cast off their racial arrogance, renounce their policy of segregation and claims of supremacy and recognise the absolute equality of races.<sup>105</sup>

The PSP appealed to all democratic nations of the world for steps to put an immediate stop to the apartheid policy.<sup>106</sup> The party urged the Government of India to take a lead in organising an international movement against South Africa.<sup>107</sup> At the same time, it would have liked UN to force South Africa to abandon its policy of apartheid and grant full democratic rights to all its citizens irrespective of their race and colour.<sup>108</sup> The PSP also appealed for "a world campaign for the release of South African political prisoners, including men and women prominent in the field of Law, journalism and education as well as university teachers and students". It urged the cumulative conscience of the civilized world "to raise...voice of protest against this most barbarous, inhuman

to the discussion of the question of racialism in the UNO, India, Pakistan and South Africa held preliminary talks in Cape Town, where it was decided to hold a Round Table Conference to explore the question of Indians in South Africa.

<sup>104</sup> See n. 99.

<sup>105</sup> *Policy Statement*, n. 9, p. 81.

<sup>106</sup> See n. 103.

<sup>107</sup> See n. 84.

<sup>108</sup> Editorial, *Janata*, 5 October 1952, p. 2.

and harrowing tale of woe", and hoped that the anti-apartheid movement sponsored by Mr. Jeremy Thorpe (M.P.) would grow from strength to strength.<sup>109</sup>

The Second Asian Socialist Conference expressed its opposition to racial discrimination and segregation practised in any form in South Africa and suggested that human consideration involved racial equality to all individuals of equal worth.<sup>110</sup>

### South Rhodesia

On the question of the white minority Government in South Rhodesia, the PSP fully cooperated with the policy of the Indian Government. The party expressed its "complete solidarity with the freedom struggle of the vast African majority of South Rhodesia".<sup>111</sup> Speaking in the *Lok Sabha*, Surendra Nath Dwivedy denounced Britain for having "double standard" in the case of Rhodesia and a non-white nation like Aden. He looked at the development in Rhodesia as "a threat to the freedom and development of neighbouring countries like Malawi, Tanganyika and Congo".<sup>112</sup> The PSP suggested that India would reorient its policy towards Britain. Considering Portugal's and South Africa's open assistance and Britain's indirect support to Ian Smith regime in South Rhodesia, *Janata*<sup>113</sup> suggested that there should be partition of Rhodesia between the African majority areas and the white-inhabited regions, the former being merged with Malawi and Zambia and the latter joining their brethren in South Africa.

### USA

The PSP also joined hands with the Government in expressing concern over the denial of civil rights to the coloured people in the USA. The National Executive of the party,

<sup>109</sup>*Janata*, 6 September 1964, p. 15.

<sup>110</sup>See Resolution of the Second Congress of Asian Socialist Conference, n. 75.

<sup>111</sup>Prem Bhasin's Statement, *Janata*, 6 September 1964, p. 15.

<sup>112</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 47(2), 15 November 1965, Col. 1985.

<sup>113</sup>Muslaihuddin Ahmed, "Partition only Solution for Rhodesia", *Janata*, 8 May 1966, p. 4.

in its meeting of April 1968, paid homage to Dr. Martin Luther King, the great negro leader who championed the cause of the coloured people and illumined the path of twenty million negroes in the USA. The party viewed him as not only a non-violent fighter for the rights of negroes, but also a fighter for the rights of all oppressed peoples.<sup>114</sup> The PSP *hoped that his martyrdom would achieve what could not be accomplished in his life-time.*

### SUMMING UP THE ATTITUDE

The approach of the PSP towards India's policy of anti-colonialism and anti-racialism has been essentially socialist in import. Fundamentally the party has no disagreement over the basic principles of those two policies. But its vigorous attack on neo-imperialism of Russia and neo-colonialism of China obviously presents a contrast with the stands of the Government. The Government of India has never criticised Russia as an imperialist nation. It has merely denounced the People's Republic of China as expansionist without accusing it of imperialism. On the contrary, the PSP has continued to view both Russia and China as imperialist.

As an opposition party, the attitude of the PSP towards India's anti-colonial and anti-racial policy has been effective and valuable. On various anti-colonial and anti-racial world issues with which India has been concerned, the party has offered constructive criticisms befitting the situations. They had considerable alarming effect. The stands of the PSP on India's policies of anti-colonialism and anti-racialism, conceptual and implemental, have been generally sober and responsible. The PSP, as stated earlier,<sup>115</sup> had a considerable influence on the official pursuit of the principles in relation to the issues of Goa and Tibet.

<sup>114</sup>National Executive Decisions, *Janata*, 28 April 1968, p. 3.

<sup>115</sup>See n. 81.

## Foreign Aid

Foreign aid or external assistance appears to be an important and basic aspect of the foreign policy of a developing nation like India. The PSP has been of the view that a country like India should have more and more reliance on internal resources and should avoid foreign capital as much as it can.

### THE PRINCIPLE

The PSP has been regretting that economic policy of the Government of India has been highly dependent on foreign investment and external resources for the economic development of the country.<sup>1</sup> It has accused the Government of placing excessive reliance on US and Soviet money.<sup>2</sup> The party found the Government hesitant at fostering economic cooperation and mutual aid among nations outside the orbit of bloc politics.<sup>3</sup> It has objected to the official policy of accepting foreign loans for direct industrial investment.<sup>4</sup> The party, however, has been opposed to any doctrinaire inhibition against foreign aid.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup>*Parliamentary Debates*, 10(2), 23 December 1953, Col. 3020 ; see also Surendranath Dwivedi, "Good Bye to Socialism-II", *Janata*, 29 May 1966, p. 14.

<sup>2</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 5(2), 15 May 1954, Cols. 7553-4.

<sup>3</sup>*Report of the Second National Conference of the PSP, Gaya (Bihar), December 26-30, 1955* (New Delhi, 1957), pp. 142-3.

<sup>4</sup>"Socialist Approach to Foreign Policy" (Revised Report of the National Executive of the Socialist Party on foreign affairs, discussed at its meeting at Mahableshwar, October 1948), *Janata*, 26 January 1949, p. 56.

<sup>5</sup>See H.V. Kamath's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 28(2), 21 March 1964, Col. 6701.



### Necessity

In the fundamental sense the PSP has been agreeing with the Government that a semi-developed country like India should seek foreign aid in order to develop its resources and industrial potentialities and pool itself with the rest of the world in the matter of endeavours being made for economic development.<sup>6</sup> But at the same time, the PSP has been objecting to excessive dependence on foreign aid. The party agreed with the Government that, in order to advance industrialization, raise the standard of living and carry on the planning, foreign assistance was essential, for it was indispensable for the import of machineries, capital equipment and producer goods. It acknowledges that the programme of financing economic development solely by internal resources may mean heavy strain on the people whose standard of living is already so much below the subsistence level that it may in the long run pave the way for the establishment of a full-fledged dictatorship.<sup>7</sup> Thus, according to the party, it is obvious that a developing nation like India can stand on its legs only when it gets help from foreign countries.<sup>8</sup> But, at the same time, it does not like undue reliance being placed on foreign aid for making up the lag in national savings.

According to the PSP, foreign aid or loan is necessary only for the purpose of economic development and not for direct industrial investments which would mortgage its vital national resources and circumscribe its freedom.<sup>9</sup> Foreign aid is desirable only to the extent to which it does not entail economic exploitation and political motivations.

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The party has been strongly against aid with "strings".<sup>10</sup> The objective behind foreign assistance should, according to the

<sup>6</sup>*Policy Statement* (Adopted by the Second National Conference of the PSP held at Gaya, 26-30 December, 1955), (New Delhi, 1956), p. 84.

<sup>7</sup>Madhu Limaye, *Evolution of the Socialist Party* (Hyderabad, 1952), p. 29.

<sup>8</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 18(2), 19 August 1958, Col. 1679.

<sup>9</sup>See n. 4.

<sup>10</sup>*Policy Statement* (Socialist Party, Second Revised Edition, 1949), p. 39.

party, be purely socialist in nature. That is to say, technical and financial assistance should carry the conviction that "eradication of poverty is the common need and responsibility of the entire humanity".<sup>11</sup> It has maintained that advanced countries should place a duty on themselves to assist the underdeveloped countries and, thereby, promote world peace and economic stability as well as human happiness and welfare. The party holds that the objective of foreign assistance should be humanitarian, having no strings or political motives attached to it. At the same time, it must be intended to supplement India's resources in the implementation of its five-year plans.

### Nature, Form and Conditions

Foreign aid can be either economic or military in nature. Economic aid includes both technical and financial assistance. The PSP has fully supported the policy of the Government of India to receive both economic and military aid. But it does not "contemplate with equanimity any enlargement of private investors' control over the economy of underdeveloped regions".<sup>12</sup> The party rejects plans which serve the narrow short-term interests of industrial nations conflicting with the fundamental principles of equality in relations between different peoples. It disapproves the attitude of superiority which the advanced nations have towards less fortunate peoples and seeks to build up a wholly new relationship between assisting and assisted nations which would be based on their mutual respect and cooperation to meet common economic needs.

### Quantum

The PSP has also been conscious of excessive quantum of external aid and external loans coming to India. The party has continued to caution that the external assistance must have "some relation to the capacity of the economy to pay it back".<sup>13</sup> Foreign assistance amounted to Rs. 196.60 crores

<sup>11</sup>*Report of the Second National Conference of the PSP*, n. 3, pp. 221-22.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup>Banka Behary Das, "Union Budget—Concessions to the Rich: Burden to the Poor", *Janata*, 31 March 1968, p. 9.

(excluding those under United States Private Law 480) in course of the first five-year plan. That meant Rs. 39 crores every year and 5% of India's total import. In the second five-year plan, the aid rose up to Rs. 185 crores a year and in the third five-year plan almost one-half of the total import depended on foreign aid. It was estimated that by the end of the third plan almost two-thirds of the investments depended on foreign help. India's foreign debt formed nearly one-fifth of national income and entailed a repayment and servicing liability of nearly Rs. 200 crores per annum. That is to say about 25% of export earnings would have to be diverted to repayments. The party feels that, in course of time, the growing burden would become "unbearable".<sup>14</sup>

### Effect

The PSP has cautioned the Government of India against the bad effects of excessive foreign aid. It has been of the view that "the participation of foreign capital in Indian concerns would result in the gradual subjugation of our economy to foreign control".<sup>15</sup> The Praja Socialists apprehend damage to India's economy and its independence in foreign policy as a result of the increasing reliance on foreign aid. They believe that private foreign investments would exert significant pressure towards the abandonment of the social policies and would "result in grave dissatisfaction".<sup>16</sup>

### Mitigation

Perceiving the bad effects of the foreign aid, the party has been suggesting that the best thing would be "to do without aid", the next best being "to limit aid to the essential minimum",<sup>17</sup> and that the Government of India should give first preference to aid from smaller countries rather than to military power blocs.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>14</sup>Prem Bhasin, *Socialism in India* (New Delhi, 1968), pp. 225-26.

<sup>15</sup>Madhu Limaye, n. 7.

<sup>16</sup>*Janata*, 19 December 1959, p. 2.

<sup>17</sup>Editorial, "Politics of Aid", *Janata*, 3 October 1965, p. 1.

<sup>18</sup>*Parliamentary Debates*, 10(2), 23 December 1953, Col. 3020.

### Political Complex

The PSP has been fully aware of the political complex of foreign loans or assistance. It realises that usually receiving nations tend to take side with the aiding nation in political issues. Like the other opposition parties, for instance the Communist Party of India, the PSP has been fearing that excessive economic aid from the United States and other Western nations would hinder foreign policy independence.<sup>19</sup> The party has been emphasising on doing away with foreign aid and increasing and using internal resources so that foreign interest in national economy and affairs may be minimised. In 1952, the PSP did not approve of the agreement regarding the opening of two oil refineries through foreign assistance.<sup>20</sup> The motive in doing so was to see that India was not put under the thumb of the aid-giving country. In view of the aid-giving competition between the Western nations and the Soviet Union, the PSP would like both the power blocs to be discarded and India's economic development to be based solely on its internal resources. It believed that such unstringed aid could be secured as would not interfere with the nation's political freedom and liberty.

### Economic Complex

The PSP has continued to show concern also with the economic complex of foreign aid. The party holds that the foreign policy of the Government does not provide sufficient solution to the economic ills of a country like India. It presumes that the present economic aid policy would result in economic "influences and interference"<sup>21</sup> of the outsiders. Dependence on the United States and other countries in matters of food, capital and machinery would in the long run circumscribe India's freedom in international politics. The Praja Socialists have been laying emphasis on the enlargement of public enterprises. They would like the Government of

<sup>19</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 5(2), 15 May 1954, Cols. 7553-54.

<sup>20</sup>Madhu Limaye, n. 7.

<sup>21</sup>Madhu Limaye, "Foreign Policy : Some Point for Discussion", *Special Convention of the Socialist Party, Pachmarhi, May 1952* (Bombay, 1952), p. 4.

India "to nationalise banks, mines and mineral oils". In order to accelerate capital formation, they would like "to take over big plantations and trade, wholesale and foreign, in selected commodities". The party stressed on the planned utilisation of India's own resources. It firmly opposed "the monopolist expansion of a few business houses" and declared its determination "to break up industrial monopolies".<sup>22</sup> It felt that a powerful private sector would be incompatible with planned economy. It believed that the excessive dependence on foreign aid and private enterprises might result in one-sided trade. That kind of dependence might result further in the economic exploitation of India by way of trade.

The PSP suggested that "foreign loans should be from State to State without permitting direct alignment of India and foreign capitalists".<sup>23</sup> The party disliked even foreign loans and considered it dangerous, as, for the payment of these loans, the Government would have to export steel and agricultural products.<sup>24</sup> That might further result in economic exploitation in trade.

### Developed Countries

The PSP has also raised voice against the attitude of the developed countries in giving aid. It has found the developed countries more interested in helping one another rather than giving aid to the underdeveloped countries. It has, as such, suggested a positive approach for India and other underdeveloped countries—to have more and more reliance on internal resources.<sup>25</sup> It has emphasised the mobilisation of resources through socialisation and State efforts. The policy statement adopted at the Gaya Conference in 1955 clearly stated :

"Socialists wish advanced countries to extend to under-

<sup>22</sup>PSP Election Manifesto (1957) in S.L. Poplai, ed., *National Parties and 1957 Elections in India* (Delhi, 1957), p. 86.

<sup>23</sup>"Revised Report of the National Executive of the Socialist Party on Foreign Affairs, discussed at its meeting in Mahableshwar, October 1948", *Janata*, 26 January 1949, p. 56.

<sup>24</sup>Acharya J.B. Kripalani, *Main Problems—How to Solve them* (A Janata Publication), (Bombay, March 1958), p. 3.

<sup>25</sup>*Janata*, 28 July 1968, p. 10.

developed countries technical and financial assistance. But they do not contemplate with equanimity any enlargement of private investment or any increase in private investors' control over the economy of underdeveloped regions".<sup>26</sup>

The Praja Socialists believe that "advanced countries [have to] place a duty on them [selves] to assist the underdeveloped countries and thereby promote world peace and economic stability".<sup>27</sup>

### Underdeveloped Countries

The PSP has as well emphasised that the Government of India should make efforts for the economic co-operation among the underdeveloped countries. It would have liked the Government to make efforts for breaking the national barriers in the economic field.<sup>28</sup> It has suggested that the Government should make efforts for large grouping of underdeveloped countries in matters of economic co-operation and mutual aid. It has further suggested that the Government should give first preference to smaller countries for military and economic aid.<sup>29</sup> It has emphasised the need for regional economic co-operation for accelerating the process of economic development and has felt the need for economic co-operation among the countries of South, Southeast and West Asia.<sup>30</sup> Speaking in the *Lok Sabha*, Surendranath Dwivedy stated :

"I would suggest that we have to develop not only political relationship but close economic ties with our neighbours like Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Nepal, Malaysia, Singapore and Japan on a basis of mutual co-operation and friendship".<sup>31</sup>

This suggestion of the PSP for close economic co-operation and mutual assistance among the underdeveloped neighbouring

<sup>26</sup>*Report of the Second National Conference of the PSP, Gaya, n. 3, p. 221.*

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 221-22.

<sup>28</sup>*Policy Statement*, n. 10.

<sup>29</sup>See Acharya J.B. Kripalani's Statement, *Parliamentary Debates*, 10(2), 23 December 1953, Col. 3020.

<sup>30</sup>*Report of the Fifth National Conference of PSP, Bombay, November 5-9, 1959* (New Delhi, 1959), p. 246.

<sup>31</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 47(2), 15 November 1965, Col. 1983.

countries of Asia had a great impact on India's official policy, for subsequently the Government has been making efforts for the same. In this respect, the PSP has also suggested that "Greater attention must be given to economic co-operation and mutual aid among the Colombo and allied countries".<sup>32</sup> The party held that the best protection against the potential threat of communism among the Asian countries would be mutual economic aid programme for themselves. That would even do away with the tension in these regions which are economically backward due to centuries' imperial domination.

#### Assistance through UN

As the developing countries are depending more and more on foreign aid and loans from the developed nations, the PSP fears that there is a chance of spreading foreign influence over these countries. The party has, as such, been suggesting that "the foreign capital requirements of the underdeveloped countries should be met through an international institution organised under the direct control of the United Nations".<sup>33</sup> The party has viewed it as the only remedy in order to avoid any embarrassment inherent in the flow of aid or loan from one country to another. At the same time, it would have liked economic assistance through international agencies such as a World Development Corporation and a World Food Pool<sup>34</sup> and would have cherished UN as an instrument for fostering balanced economic development among the Afro-Asian nations and in the world as a whole.<sup>35</sup> The first Asian Socialist Conference, which was held in Rangoon in 1953, had suggested creation of a World Development Authority and a World Development Pool to which all would contribute in proportion to their capacity. The Conference further suggested that from the Asian side, too, efforts would have "to be made to receive and channelise this aid in a planned and co-operative manner".<sup>36</sup> The PSP has been emphasising that

<sup>32</sup>Asoka Mehta, "Our Foreign Policy", *Janata*, 3 October 1954, p. 16.

<sup>33</sup>*Policy Statement*, n. 6, p. 84.

<sup>34</sup>*We Build for Socialism—Platform of the Socialist Party* (Adopted by the National General Council of the Socialist Party at Ranchi on the 4th July 1951), (Bombay, 1951), p. 15.

<sup>35</sup>*Election Manifesto—Praja Socialist Party* (New Delhi, 1957), p. 15.

<sup>36</sup>*Janata*, 4 January 1953, pp. 1-8.

the time has come when the Government of India should press UN to make provisions for the flow of economic aid through its various agencies. At the same time, it would have also liked the Government of India to make efforts for the formation of markets on the continental level like the European Common Markets.<sup>37</sup>

## APPLICATION

### Assistance from the United States

The Government of India has been receiving assistance from the United States mainly through the Indo-US Technical Cooperation Programme (1952), the US Economic Assistance under Public Law 480, Public Law 665, Third Country Currency Assistance (1961) and the Indo-US Educational Foundation (1965). Besides, assistance in the field of teaching, research and fellowship programme assistance had also been provided through some philanthropic foundations like the Carnegie Corporation, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation. From the very beginning the socialists have considered loans through private corporations and bilateral backstairs deals between India and US High Finance as "the most pernicious fetters on the economic life of the country".<sup>38</sup> They have pointed out that though concessions to US private capital may look attractive it may amount to a negation of India's basic social policies. As early as in 1954, the PSP had doubts about US economic assistance and did not view it as free from blemishes.<sup>39</sup> Even foodgrain, for instance, wheat supplied by the US under Public Law 480, had been considered by the party as the subject of annoyance—"a liver of political policy". It held US aid under PL 480 as hindrance to India's urge for self-reliance in food.<sup>40</sup> Regarding the utilisation of the PL 480 Funds, Surendranath Dwivedy launched an all-out attack on the Government. What the Government of India had been

<sup>37</sup>See Surendranath Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 47(2), 22 November 1960, Cols. 1646-7.

<sup>38</sup>Editorial, *Janata*, 30 January 1949, p. 2.

<sup>39</sup>See Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 5(2), 15 May 1954, Cols. 7353-54.

<sup>40</sup>*Janata*, 21 November 1965, p. 2.



doing would, he said, spell ruin for all this nation had been standing for.<sup>41</sup> Speaking on a communist motion disapproving the Indo-US Foundation, he stated :

"It creates the fear whether this is not going to influence the entire educational system, whether through these funds they are not going to inject the American way of life. That needs to be guarded against".<sup>42</sup>

In spite of the assurance of the Government of India that the Foundation would never permit American influence to be injected into the Indian culture and way of life, the PSP stressed that the aims and objectives of the Foundation should be clearly provided in the Foundation itself. If setting up the Foundation would have such strings attached to it as might be against India's national interest, the Foundation had to be withdrawn. Another practical suggestion was that the funds be given to the University Grants Commission to distribute them in the way it viewed best.<sup>43</sup>

In relation to the issue of setting up of the Foundation, the PSP had a great impact on the policy of the Government of India towards the better utilisation of PL 480 Funds. It even alarmed the people against the slow infiltration of the American way of life in our society.

### **Assistance from the Commonwealth Countries**

India has received considerable economic assistance from Britain and other Commonwealth countries. In addition to Britain, which provided technical assistance under the Colombo Plan, other Commonwealth countries like Australia, Canada and New Zealand also provided help to India. The PSP has fully supported financial and technical assistance to India under the Colombo Plan.<sup>44</sup> It has not opposed economic aid from the countries like Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The total capital assistance authorised by Australia during 1951-55 came to about 9.6 million Australian pounds. During the first five year plan, Canada contributed to India approxi-

<sup>41</sup>*Janata*, 22 May 1966, p. 10.

<sup>42</sup>*PSP in Parliament* (Praja Socialist Party, New Delhi, 1967), p. 17.

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.* See also *PSP Ninth Nation Conference, December 30-31, 1967-January 1, 1968, Kanpur, General Secretary's Report*, p. 101.

<sup>44</sup>See n. 32.

mately about 77 million dollars. Canada has also indirectly assisted the Mayurakshi Project by supplying electric equipment worth 3 million dollars. In addition, the Canadian Government has also supplied a reactor for the Atomic Research Centre at Trombay at the estimated cost of 7 million dollars. At the inception of the Colombo Plan the Government of New Zealand announced a contribution of one million pounds over a period of three years to be utilised for making up the capital cost of the All India Medical Institute.<sup>45</sup>

Though some of the Commonwealth countries have provided considerable help to India, yet the PSP has always opposed India's membership of the Commonwealth of Nations. The party still believes that during the last several years the Commonwealth has not made any significant contributions in the economic and international fields. It believes that only the Colombo Plan has been of some assistance to underdeveloped countries. The party would be happier if "a plan of this type could have been evolved outside the Commonwealth".<sup>46</sup> Among other economic grounds on which the party opposed India's membership was Britain's entry in the European Common Market which might pose difficulties for all other Commonwealth countries. Therefore, in a resolution of 1961, the National Executive and the General Council of the party urged that Britain's entry into the European Common Market should not be at the cost of a developing country like India.<sup>47</sup>

### Assistance from the Soviet Union

The Soviet Union, too, has been providing economic assistance to India. But the PSP has been underlining the fact that financial and technical aid provided by the Soviet Union has been considerably less than that provided by the United States or by the Commonwealth countries together or even by West Germany.<sup>48</sup> The five year Indo-Soviet trade agreement

<sup>45</sup>"Foreign Aid to India", *Janata*, 29 January 1955, pp. 12-13.

<sup>46</sup>Editorial, *Janata*, 31 March 1957, pp. 1-2.

<sup>47</sup>*Resolution of the National Executive and General Council of the PSP, October 5, 1961, Sarnath, Varanasi, Janata*, 15 October 1961, p. 8.

<sup>48</sup>Subodh Roy, "India and USSR—the Khrushchev Era", *Janata*, 1 May 1966, pp. 10-14.

signed in December 1953 was considered by the PSP as the first sign of cordiality between the two countries. In 1954, the Soviet Government proposed to build a steel plant in India and in course of a few years a Rs. 12 crore steel plant was constructed with Soviet aid at Bhilai in Madhya Pradesh. About 250 Soviet specialists worked on the project and more than 300 Indian technicians were sent to Russia for training in metallurgical work. In 1959, considering the Chinese aggression the PSP had no hesitation in suggesting that even military aid on a large scale could be had from the Soviet Union.<sup>49</sup> Regarding the Soviet MIG Jet plane deals, the party was of the view that India was at liberty to obtain defence equipment from any country on most advantageous terms.<sup>50</sup> Even the Soviet offer to provide equipment and technical assistance for setting up a helicopter factory in this country was appreciated by the party. The Praja Socialists reacted similarly in view of a new five year Indo-Soviet trade agreement for 1963-68.

### SUMMING UP THE ATTITUDE

The approach of the PSP towards India's foreign aid policy has proved essentially constructive in nature. The party has been constantly vigilant over aid without 'string'. Fundamentally, it agrees with the Government that foreign aid is unavoidable. But, at the same time, it has held excessive reliance on foreign capital would ruin India's economy. It has vigorously criticised the Government for accepting such foreign aid as has been based on political motives. From time to time, the PSP has been able to raise effective alarm against foreign economic pressure. Its suggestion for avoiding excessive aid from the developed nations and its emphasis on having a large group of underdeveloped countries in matters of economic co-operation and mutual aid proved fruitful. Its emphasis on economic and financial assistance through international institutions appeared sound.

<sup>49</sup>See Acharya J.B. Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 4(2), 30 May, 1962, Col. 7834.

<sup>50</sup>See H.V. Kamath's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 4(2), 30 May 1962, Col. 7834.

## Defence

Like foreign aid, defence, too, is a key point of the foreign policy of the Government of India and the PSP has shown a constant and critical concern with the same. It has been of the view that the Government of India has been neglecting and not vigilantly protecting Indian frontiers. It has urged upon the Government for defence re-orientation and has, as such, *questioned the stands that India has taken in relation to Sino-Indian and India-Pakistan military conflicts.*

### THE PRINCIPLE

The PSP (the SPI until 1 June 1952) has been accusing the Government of the negligence in India's defence, of adopting an "ambivalent policy"<sup>1</sup> and of following a "weak-kneed defence policy".<sup>2</sup> As a result, the PSP has been holding, the Government has failed to defend India's frontiers properly. The Government has misled the country with the deceptive phrase "interest of security".<sup>3</sup> The party has viewed the defence policy as excessively dissociated from the people, lacking mass support and kept extremely secret from Parliament.<sup>4</sup> In 1961-62, the PSP held the Government responsible for lowering the morale of the Armed Forces, wasting the money of the nation, following a long-term defence strategy and paralysing

<sup>1</sup>Editorial, "The Arm Policy", *Janata*, 31 March 1963, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>*Janata*, 5 February 1967, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup>See Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 16(2), 6 April 1963, Col. 8292.

<sup>4</sup>See Acharya J.B. Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 23(2), 8 December, 1958, Col. 3721; Surendranath Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 16(2), 15 April 1963, Cols. 8011-15.

the armed forces at the time of the massive Chinese aggression.<sup>5</sup> It blamed the Government for not having properly organised the military staff, not having made efforts for achieving self-sufficiency in every branch of weaponry, nuclear as well as conventional, and not developing well-trained military personnel.<sup>6</sup>

In view of the defects noted above the PSP has been led to hold that the Government has not been pursuing an effective, bold and positive defence policy. Considering the threat to India's freedom and integrity both from China and Pakistan, the PSP would have liked an adequate strengthening of India's defence. It has, however, joined hands with the Government in accepting the fundamentals of defence policy in respect of India's relation with these two neighbouring countries. In 1953-54, agreeing with the Government, the PSP regretted that the arms aid pact between the United States and Pakistan would create disaster in future and would be a threat to India's security.<sup>7</sup> The party has also disliked the trend among the Western and West Asian nations and the USSR to equate India and Pakistan in matters of their defence potentialities and aid.<sup>8</sup> Agreeing with the Government regarding the possibility of the violation of the territorial integrity of India by Portugal in connection with Goa, the PSP wished for a strong well-equipped navy to clear off the alien occupation of the Indian territories under Portugal's colonial possession.<sup>9</sup> At the time of the Chinese aggression in 1962, the party called for firm determination over recovering India's territory lost to China and, for the purpose, it would have liked the Government to strengthen its armed forces.<sup>10</sup> With the growing

<sup>5</sup>*Janata*, 16 April 1961, p. 2; *Lok Sabha Debates*, n. 3, Col. 8290.

<sup>6</sup>Surendranath Dwivedy's Statement, n. 4; *A Socialist Alternative—PSP Election Manifesto*, 1967 (Bombay, 1966), pp. 14-15.

<sup>7</sup>National Council Resolution, 29-30 December Allahabad, *Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party* (A Praja Socialist Publication, 1954, Bombay), pp. 30-31.

<sup>8</sup>*A Socialist Alternative—PSP Election Manifesto*, 1967, n. 6.

<sup>9</sup>See N.G. Goray's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 3(2), 24 July 1957, Cols. 5039-40.

<sup>10</sup>*Report of the Sixth National Conference of the PSP, Bhopal, June 8-10, 1963*, p. 93.

collusion between China and Pakistan and India's confrontation with China, "recalcitrant and truculent as ever having accreted a nuclear arsenal, and with Pakistan talking in revanchist tones after replenishing her arms", the PSP has further felt the extreme desirability of strengthening India's defence.<sup>11</sup> It has viewed it as extremely necessary to have all possible help from the United States and the Commonwealth countries against the contingency. It has stressed the need to ensure that hostile Powers would not get a foothold or develop spheres of influence on the periphery of the country.<sup>12</sup> The party has also objected to the foreign elements working among the Naga and Mizo rebels, threatening India's security and thus giving rise to the apprehension that one day the entire belt from the Rann of Kutch to the Mizo Hills may turn into a war front.<sup>13</sup> For such an emergency, the PSP would have liked the Government of India to strive for self-sufficiency in every branch of weaponry, conventional as well as nuclear.

For the PSP, India's defence policy needs being democratised for security. It is not the concern only of the Government, but requires "a total mobilisation of manpower, the energies and the inspired participation of the whole nation".<sup>14</sup> It has demanded the efforts not only of the soldiers on the front but also of the worker in the factory, the peasant in the field, the office assistant, the teacher, the student and the housewife to share, at their different levels of involvement, the vigours and hazards of war. As such, the PSP would have liked India's defence being broadbased by ensuring the widest association of the people with the defence efforts. The party has felt that "the Government's reluctance or failure to break out of the framework of the present benumbing social order has to be judged as a failure of defence efforts".<sup>15</sup> It has, therefore, believed that strengthening of India's defence demands planned optimum utilisation of its economic resources

<sup>11</sup>See Nath Pai's Interview to the "Hindustan Times", *Janata*, 26 December 1966, p. 2.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup>The Secretary's Report, *Janata*, 14 August 1966, pp. 3-4.

<sup>14</sup>National Executive Resolutions, *Janata*, 25 August-1 September 1963, pp. 5-6.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*

and a climate of equality that can give faith to the people and the Army, for defence-preparedness needs consolidation of socialism and not its dilution.<sup>16</sup> The party has, as such, suggested that radical changes must be brought about in India's socio-economic policies in order that the resources of the nation be adequately mobilised to meet the enemy's challenge.<sup>17</sup> According to the PSP, the Jawans fighting on the front should feel that they are fighting not merely for the defence of a geographical entity but the defence of a new egalitarian society. Thus, the party has expressed a need for the coexistence of defence and socialism.

### **Organisational Aspects of Defence**

The PSP has perceived some glaring defects and deficiencies in the organisational aspects of India's defence. Inside the internal organisation, the party has found that there have been unwarranted, unjustifiable, uncalled for ministerial interference in the day-to-day working of the armed forces. The morale of the armed forces has been degraded and poisoned by excessive groupism, cliquism and favouritism. There has been also a "cynical subordination of the needs and requirements of the defence...to political prejudices and pre-conceived theories of international affairs".<sup>18</sup> At the same time, as the party has pointed out, India's defence ministry has been suffering from many complex problems like that of the unusual transfer of important officials, excessive retrenchment of the civil employees of the Defence services, and the rampant caste system in the recruitment of defence cadets.<sup>19</sup> Regarding the recruitment of the Army personnel, the party has accused the Government of following a policy laid down by the Britishers which requires certain rigid qualifications having no relation whatsoever to the present circumstances pertinent to the Army. Now, after independence, the PSP has pointed out, the Army should really belong to the people and there should be no

<sup>16</sup>*A Socialist Alternative—PSP Election Manifesto, 1967*, n. 6.

<sup>17</sup>National Executive Resolutions, n. 14.

<sup>18</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, n. 3, Col. 8290.

<sup>19</sup>N.G. Goray's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 3(2), 24 July 1957, Cols. 5040-43.

barrier between the Army and the people. As such, the party has felt that the defence policy of the Government should be based on the concept that "the Army should be of the people and for the people".<sup>20</sup> Advocating such a concept, the PSP has been opposed to excessive secrecy maintained by the Ministry of Defence in the matters of war preparations, strategy and defence developments. The party has found it necessary that the military department should have effective contact with the masses and should enlighten them in the matters of national defence.<sup>21</sup> It has also pointed to the deficiencies of the military intelligence staff which has often misguided the entire war strategy. From 1962-63, the PSP has been criticising the Government for creating confusion in the name of co-ordination in the Defence Ministry. It has viewed co-ordination between the Defence and Finance Ministries as highly essential. It has held that the defence organisational set-up, being based on divided responsibility, would one day create utter confusion as it would not give full responsibility to a single Defence Minister.<sup>22</sup>

While the above trends of the attitude of the PSP towards the organisational aspects of India's defence policy seem to be censorial, there has been also its constructive side with impact on the official defence policy.

Taking into consideration the threat to India's territorial integrity from China and Pakistan, the PSP has put forward its idea of the defence organisational set-up which would rest on the basic conviction that public participation is essential for effective defence arrangements. As such, the party has favoured the proposal for setting up a Defence Council which "would bring together a number of influential authorities both civil and military for consultation and decision".<sup>23</sup> For securing the involvement of the widest section of the people, the party believed that the Defence Council would bring opposition and the ruling parties together for national defence. The party pleaded that through its select and special staff as well as the

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup>Acharya J.B. Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 23(2), 8 December 1958, Cols. 3720-21.

<sup>22</sup>Surendranath Dwivedy's Statement, n. 4, Cols. 8021-23.

<sup>23</sup>*Election Manifesto-Praja Socialist Party* (New Delhi, 1962), p. 14.



intimate association with the Prime Minister the Council would achieve effective civilian control over the armed forces.<sup>24</sup> Stressing the importance of a second line of defence, the PSP has also suggested that India's armed forces in border areas be supplemented by establishing cooperative agricultural communities which would combine agricultural work with defence preparations.<sup>25</sup> The party would have liked to organise such labour cooperatives in a manner as would widen their intellectual and cultural horizons and impart to them elementary military training. The PSP has fundamentally agreed with the Government over the organisation and management of the National Cadet Corps in schools and universities.<sup>26</sup> It would have, however, liked such training to be extended and strengthened to a much wider extent. It would like the Government to pay attention to the improvements in training and disciplining the Home Guards.

With regard to the arms and armament, the PSP has suggested that, in the present situation when the country has been facing the mounting pressure of China well-equipped with nuclear weapons and of an aggressive neighbour like Pakistan, conventional weapons would not do. The party has, as such, called upon the Government to harness the atomic energy both for nuclear technology and manufacture of nuclear weapons.<sup>27</sup> It has held that the manufacture of nuclear weapons has become essential for India as a deterrent against the growing nuclear menace. It opposed the draft Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty proposed by the USA and the USSR and condemned "the efforts of the Super Powers to coerce India into signing the Treaty under threat of withholding economic and other aid".<sup>28</sup> It feared that the "dithering and vacillation" shown by the Government of India would only encourage the Super Powers to attempt to apply even greater pressure. The party disliked the pathetic gesture of the Government for nuclear guarantees, for that only showed its incredible lack of awareness

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*; see also *A Socialist Alternative—PSP Election Manifesto, 1967*, n. 6, p. 15.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup>Editorial, "Atom for Defence", *Janata*, 15 May 1966, pp. 1-2.

<sup>28</sup>National Executive Resolution, *Janata*, 28 May 1967, p. 6.

of the issues raised by the Treaty and its lack of courage to face the veiled threat to India's sovereignty. It, as such, emphasised that to "refuse to sign the Treaty is to forge and preserve a valuable shield of our defence".<sup>29</sup> Nath Pai viewed the draft Non-proliferation Treaty as "a conspiracy on the part of the Super Powers to perpetuate their hegemony in the nuclear field" and called upon the Government not to sign the Treaty unless a mutuality and reciprocity of obligations and rights was accepted.<sup>30</sup> The party has also held that the idea to secure a nuclear umbrella, as conceived by the members of the Swatantra Party and others, would rob India of its independent and non-aligned foreign policy and run counter to its national interest.<sup>31</sup> The PSP, therefore, believes that for India the only course left open would be to develop nuclear weapons and to become self-reliant in conventional as well as non-conventional weapons.<sup>32</sup> It has urged upon the Government for a bold and positive nuclear policy to strengthen India's defence.

### Regional Defence Cooperation

The PSP has been regretting that the Government of India has paid no attention to regional defence cooperation for Asia's collective defence against the Chinese menace and US intervention. It has deplored the "sterile and timid"<sup>33</sup> policy of the Government of not associating the Asian countries together in a chain of defence link out of the fear of disapproval of one or the other Super Power. The PSP, as such, held the official "barren policy" responsible for the Chinese expansionism and the growing American intervention.

In view of the unawareness and lack of initiative on the Government for regional defence arrangement of Asian countries the PSP has been advocating the idea of a chain of defence link stretching from Japan to Afghanistan.<sup>34</sup> It holds that

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*; also *Praja Socialist Party Ninth National Conference, December 30-31, 1967, January 1, 1968 Kanpur, General Secretary's Report*, p. 38.

<sup>30</sup>*PSP In Parliament* (Praja Socialist Publication, 1967), p. 15; also *Janata*, 17 September 1967, p. 3.

<sup>31</sup>*Janata*, 15 May 1966, p. 2.

<sup>32</sup>Statement of N.G. Goray, *The Times of India* (Delhi), 27 August 1967, p. 6.

<sup>33</sup>National Executive Resolutions, *Janata*, 27 August 1967, p. 6.

<sup>34</sup>See n. 11; also *A Socialist Alternative—PSP Election Manifesto, 1967*, n. 6, p. 16.

India has a special responsibility for the defence collaboration among the countries of South and Southeast Asia.<sup>35</sup> The party has also drawn the attention of the Government to the needs for building up a strong defence link among the countries in the Himalayan region. From 1950, after the Himalayan State of Tibet was subjected to the Chinese military action, the party stressed the need for a "bold and enlightened" Himalayan policy.<sup>36</sup> In 1959, following the growing Chinese intrusions in the regions of NEFA and Ladakh and their insidious propaganda for the formation of the Himalayan Federation consisting of Ladakh, Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA, the PSP drew the attention of the Government to the issue of security and defence of the Himalayan States.<sup>37</sup> After the massive Chinese aggression in 1962, the PSP demanded a reappraisal of the policy of the Government towards the Himalayan region.<sup>38</sup> It demanded the abandonment of the existing defence policy with regard to NEFA and the settling of people from the plain in its thinly populated regions. The party advocated its full integration with the rest of India.<sup>39</sup> It alerted the Government against the possible Chinese threat to Sikkim, Bhutan, Burma, appealed for entering into agreements with these countries and suggested necessary steps for the defence cooperation among them.<sup>40</sup>

The emphasis of the PSP on the regional defence cooperation of the Asian countries and the countries of the Himalayan belt appeared to have a considerable impact on the official defence policy. Lately, the Government has been effortful for defence cooperation with Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal and Burma.

<sup>35</sup>*Election Manifesto, PSP*, n. 23.

<sup>36</sup>*Himalayan Policy for India* (Socialist Party, Bombay, 1951), p. 20; "Need for a Himalayan Policy", *Janata*, 25 June 1967, p. 13; Amit Kumar Nag, "Wanted : A Joint Himalayan Bastion", *Janata*, 11 December 1966, pp. 23-24.

<sup>37</sup>*Janata*, 19 April 1959, p. 2.

<sup>38</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 20(2), 21 September 1963, Col. 7505.

<sup>39</sup>"A New Policy for NEFA's Defence and Development", *Janata*, 27 October 1965, p. 17.

<sup>40</sup>*Janata*, 25 June 1967, pp. 13-14; B.C. Nag, "The Defence of Bhutan", *Janata*, 6 November 1966, p. 7; National Executive Resolutions on Bhutan, *Praja Socialist Party Ninth National Conference, December 30-31, 1967-January 1, 1968, Kanpur, General Secretary's Report*, p. 37, n. 29.

## Military Aid

Fundamentally, the PSP has been with the Government in respect of military aid. In 1953-54, the party viewed military aid as dangerous as economic and warned against the same being excessive.<sup>41</sup> Particularly, it suggested avoiding to have it from military power blocs. But in view of the Chinese menace beginning in 1959, the PSP has been admitting that India must "start obtaining arms without strings or pact from East and West so as to build up its military strength..."<sup>42</sup> Speaking on Sino-Indian Relations in the *Lok Sabha* in November 1959, Acharya Kripalani stated :

"As the Chinese aggression has nothing to do with world communism, we shall be entitled to seek help in a military emergency, both from the East and the West and, of course, from neutral countries, even as we get economic aid from every quarter. Help may be had on lend lease or any other honourable basis not impairing our sovereignty or independence. A declaration of readiness to accept foreign military aid in an emergency, I feel, will be very helpful".<sup>43</sup>

Estimating the strength of the Pak Air Force derived from US Military Aid Pact, the PSP suggested that efforts be made to have similar powerful aircrafts for India also. It has also held that the Government is at liberty to obtain defence equipment from whichever country it can acquire them easily.<sup>44</sup>

In 1962, immediately after the massive Chinese aggression on the Indian territories, Asoka Mehta declared, "we must not hesitate to seek assistance, even the strongest and proudest countries had to resort to lend-lease assistance. History shows that such lend-lease cooperation did not compromise the independence of the country".<sup>45</sup> The PSP, as such, has not opposed the acceptance of military aid from any quarters in

<sup>41</sup>Acharya J.B. Kripalani's Statement, *Parliamentary Debates*, 10(2), 23 December 1953, Col. 3020.

<sup>42</sup>H.V. Kamath's Press Conference Statement, "New Delhi Under-rates Chinese Menace", *Janata*, 10 January 1959, pp. 5-6.

<sup>43</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 35(2), 25 November 1959, Col. 1731.

<sup>44</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 4(2), 30 May 1962, Col. 7834.

<sup>45</sup>*Janata*, 28 October 1962, p. 3.

order to meet the military threat posed by the People's Republic of China. It has thanked the USA and the Commonwealth countries for giving all possible military help to India and strengthening its Armed Forces at the critical juncture.<sup>46</sup> The party also perceived the desirability of military aid against all eventualities of aggression from Pakistan. After the Tashkent Agreement, the recent Soviet commitment to supply arms to Pakistan has been continuously focussed by the party as a potential threat to India's integrity.<sup>47</sup> The PSP has alarmed the Government against the shift in Soviet attitude involved in its military aid being given to Pakistan.

## APPLICATION

### Chinese Aggression

On the issue of the Chinese aggression, the PSP censored the Government in 1962 for its failure to adopt a strong defence policy. The party held the Government of India entirely responsible for NEFA and Ladakh reverses and debacle. It accused the Government for not properly grasping the dimensions and significance of the menace posed by Chinese expansionism.<sup>48</sup> On the basis of the Defence Minister's own statement the party pointed to the main drawbacks of Indian defence in that "there were no arms even for training, much less for defence, there was no proper orientation; there was no transport; there were no proper road, no equipment, no intelligence, no leadership, no command".<sup>49</sup> The PSP viewed the main cause of the reverses in NEFA and Ladakh not merely in the points of military failure but in a total failure of political leadership. The party held that military failures were inescapable corollaries to the political myopia and jaundice from which our leadership was then suffering".<sup>50</sup> At the same time, the PSP charged the Government for showing "im-

<sup>46</sup>*Report of the Sixth National Conference of the PSP*, n. 10.

<sup>47</sup>Peter Alvares, "Arms Aid to Pakistan", *Janata*, 28 July 1968, p. 5.

<sup>48</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 21(2), 21 September 1963, Cols. 7495-7500.

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*; H.V. Kamath's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 28(2), 21 March 1964, Col. 6696.

<sup>50</sup>See n. 48.

measurable irresponsibility" in connection with arm supplies, for not using Air Forces and for fighting a mere defensive war.<sup>51</sup> Admitting the sincerity of the Defence Minister's report, the party believed that the ineffective planning lay at the root of the tragedy.<sup>52</sup>

The PSP criticism in the context of the Chinese aggression appeared to have a considerable impact on the subsequent defence policy of the Government of India. It alarmed the Government for strengthening its defence potentiality to such an extent that for years to come it may be able to safeguard its territorial integrity.

### Undeclared India-Pakistan War

In the case of the undeclared war between India and Pakistan in 1965, the PSP, as a whole, fully appreciated the defence policy of the Government of India. Only with regard to the skirmish in the Runn of Kutch in May 1965, the party saw some weakness. It held the Government "lacking in determination and evasive in action in its approach to the country's vital interest".<sup>53</sup> The party charged the Government and its Defence Minister for showing "pusillanimity", no firmness, no courage and no strength, in the tiny war between India and Pakistan.<sup>54</sup> It also held the Government responsible for neglecting the patrolling of border areas, not assigning highest priority to the problem of the security of that area and not exercising constant vigilance against intrusions. The party also blamed the intelligence service of the Government for the negligence of its duty.<sup>55</sup>

As regards the full-fledged undeclared India-Pakistan war in September 1965, the PSP had all appreciations. In a broadcast talk over the All India Radio, Shri Surendranath Dwivedy stated :

<sup>51</sup>See Surendranath Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 16(2), 5 April 1963, Cols. 8013-17.

<sup>52</sup>H.V. Kamath's Statement, n. 49.

<sup>53</sup>Statement of Prem Bhasin, *Janata*, 11 July 1965, p. 7.

<sup>54</sup>H.V. Kamath's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 44(2), 17 August 1965 Cols. 478-81 ; *Janata*, 6 June 1965, p. 2.

<sup>55</sup>Surendranath Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 44(2), 24 August 1965, Col. 1542.

The courage and valour displayed by our armed and air forces, the deadly blow that they have given to the enemy has brought further glory not only to our defence forces but also raised the prestige of the Indian nation. It has already been established by the heroic deeds of our air forces that Pakistan's armour and air power are no match against the indomitable striking ability of our patriotic forces. We are all proud of them.<sup>56</sup>

The party hailed the performances of the Indian Army, its good leadership and good equipment.<sup>57</sup> It thanked the Indian defence forces for maintaining the territorial integrity of the country and preserving its lost prestige.

### Naval Bases

With regard to Anglo-American naval bases in the Indian Ocean, the PSP fully supports the official policy. Prem Bhasin, in his report as Secretary, published in September 1967, feared that the building up of UK-US military bases in the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and in the Laccadive Islands, and the big American base in Cam Ranh village in South Vietnam Bay would invite the Soviet Union to gain a foothold in the region.<sup>58</sup> He argued that China's subversive activities in Southeast Asia had compelled US for its permanent presence in the Indian Ocean. He drew the attention of the Government to the possibility of the rivalry of the three Great Powers in this region, because of which the country might be "pressurised, jostled around, contained and subverted in the future".<sup>59</sup> The presence of Chinese warships in the Indian Ocean in May 1970 led N.G. Goray to suggest to the Government for improving the fire power of India's aircraft carrier and protecting its naval bases from the Chinese tension.<sup>60</sup> The signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty on 9 August 1971 further led the Socialists to suggest to the Government that it might

<sup>56</sup> *Janata*, 26 September 1965, p. 5.

<sup>57</sup> Nath Pai's Statement, *Janata*, 10 October 1965, p. 9.

<sup>58</sup> *Janata*, 10 September 1967, pp. 3-4; see also n. 29; *PSP Ninth Conference, December 30-31, 1967-January 1, 1968, Kanpur, General Secretary's Report*, p. 41.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> *The Indian Nation* (Patna), 8 May 1970.

give Russia a scope for extending her bases in the Indian Ocean.<sup>61</sup>

### SUMMING UP THE ATTITUDE

The approach of the PSP towards India's defence has been essentially ideological. The party has been seeking to project a defence ideology which is highly socialist in its import. It has been constantly underlining the need for having a strong defence. It has been vigorously criticising the organisational aspects of India's defence policy and has been pointing out glaring defects and deficiencies. Its suggestions regarding the organisational and regional aspects of India's defence set-up were constructive and deeply ideologically rooted. Its emphasis on having regional defence cooperation among a group of Asian countries and a separate Himalayan defence policy was well-meant. The PSP stress for harnessing the atom both for peaceful development and manufacture of nuclear weapons carried weight in the context of the probable nuclear threat from China.

The PSP stands on the official defence policy, conceptual or implemental, have been effective and valuable. The party has often alerted the Government against the eventualities of external aggression. It has had, as a whole, a valuable impact on India's foreign policy in matters of close defence cooperation with its neighbouring countries and in alarming the Government for strengthening its defence potentialities in view of the Chinese aggression.

<sup>61</sup>Samar Guha, "Soviet Satellite for 20 plus 5 years", *Janata*, 19 September 1971, p. 10.



## Relations with the West

The PSP has been having a distinct attitude towards the policy of the Government for relations with the West. It has viewed certain aspects of India's link with some of the Western countries as inconsistent with some of the principles of its foreign policy. From time to time, it has been pointing out weaknesses in the official policy.

### GENERAL ISSUES WITH THE BLOC

The PSP has been of the opinion that excessive collaboration with Great Britain and other countries of the Western bloc would have an adverse effect on its relations with several newly independent Asian and African countries.<sup>1</sup> It feared that the policy pursued towards the British Commonwealth and other countries of the Western bloc would inevitably tie India with that bloc and would cause deviation from the path of strict adherence to "the policy of neutrality".<sup>2</sup> India might get involved in the war between power blocs. Attachment with the West might obstruct the fulfilment of the pledge India had taken before independence for the oppressed and dependent nations.<sup>3</sup>

Keeping in view the question of India's defence and security, the PSP would have liked the Government not only to be free of commitment with the Western bloc but to take necessary

<sup>1</sup>*Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party* (Bombay, 1954), pp. 28-29.

<sup>2</sup>"Acharya Narendra Deva Presidential Address at Patna, Seventh Annual Conference of the Socialist Party from March 6 to 10, 1949", *Janata*, 13 March 1949, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup>National Executive, Lucknow, December 29-30, 1949, *Resolutions* (Socialist Party, Bombay, 1949), pp. 1-2.

steps for "the creation of a third force with a view to prevention of another world war and in particular to organise an alliance of Asian countries in furtherance of this object".<sup>4</sup> From the beginning, it appeared assuming that India's military circumstances and economic conditions were behind the Government coming nearer to the Western bloc. Particularly after the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation it was afraid that India's alignment with Britain might put her in a wrong position with Asian nations struggling against one or the other NATO powers.<sup>5</sup> In order to secure the frontiers of India and other smaller Asian countries from the Western entanglements and their various pacts, it would have liked the Government to enter into non-aggression pacts and treaties of enduring friendship and regional alliances with as many Asian countries as possible and to strengthen the "third force" in Asia, Africa and South America.<sup>6</sup> It viewed the Atlantic powers as responsible for creating hindrances and internal friction within the third camp by way of India-Pakistan and Egypt-Israel tangles.<sup>7</sup> As such, it wanted the Government to oppose all treaties and arrangements of Western Powers which were likely to bring the cold war to the region extending from Egypt to Indonesia. It would like India also to oppose their tendency of establishing air, military and naval bases outside their own borders as of US in Korea and of Britain in Singapore and Trinkomalee. It would further like protest being voiced against the presence of British forces in Suez, Jordan, Iraq, Singapore, Malaya and Ceylon.<sup>8</sup> In view of the potential threat to the security of Asia from Western air and military bases, it urged efforts to allay the fears and suspicions that India's sheer physical bigness might "create in the minds of its neighbouring states by offering them no

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>Editorial, "Atlantic Diplomacy", *Janata*, 27 March 1949, pp. 1-2.

<sup>6</sup>"Revised Report of National Executive of the Socialist Party on the Foreign Policy discussed in its executive meeting, Mahableshwar, October 1948", *Janata*, 26 January 1949, p. 46.

<sup>7</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, *The Third Camp In World Affairs* (Bombay, 1950), p. 13.

<sup>8</sup>*Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party*, n. 1, p. 29.

war and mutual aid pacts" against the Western countries.<sup>9</sup> It condemned the efforts of the Atlantic camp to form South East Asian Treaty Organisation which had drawn South Asian governments in its orbit and war area.<sup>10</sup> It also condemned the Baghdad Pact—an effort made by Britain and other countries to constrain mounting nationalism in West Asia.<sup>11</sup> Thus, in order to shun cold war and Western influence, the PSP urged upon the Government of India to invite a conference of Asian governments for the purpose of arriving at "no war and mutual aid pacts".<sup>12</sup> It admitted the fact that the Western domination in Asia would not end without the combined efforts of China, Japan and India. It regretted that by agreeing to American tutelage Japan had excommunicated itself from the Asian Community and, as such, India would do well to offer its good office so that Japan might abrogate the security treaty with the United States.<sup>13</sup>

In its anxiety for world peace and security, the PSP has shown concern also over the attitude of the Government of India towards the Western moves for disarmament. It has been generally cooperating with the Government. It felt the need for banning the use of nuclear weapons and the increase in expenditure on armaments for ensuring world peace and securing general disarmament.<sup>14</sup> The stand of the Government of India for a general and complete disarmament and the destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons had all along been appreciated by the PSP. In 1963, it hailed the Nuclear Test-ban Treaty. But in 1964, when the People's Republic of China exploded its first atom bomb, the party felt the desirability of a change in India's nuclear policy. Though a section

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup>Indore Resolutions, *Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party*, n. 1, p. 29.

<sup>11</sup>*Policy Statement* (Adopted by the Second National Conference of the PSP held at Gaya, 26-30 December 1955, New Delhi, 1956), p. 91.

<sup>12</sup>Allahabad Resolutions, *Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party*, n. 1, p. 31.

<sup>13</sup>Madhu Limaye, "Peaceful Coexistence plus Something", *Janata*, 8 August 1954, p. 15.

<sup>14</sup>*Report of the Second National Conference of the PSP held at Gaya, 26-30 December 1956*, p. 223.

of India's public opinion suggested India's complete lining up with the Western bloc,<sup>15</sup> the PSP totally opposed any permanent alliance with the West as detrimental to its independence in international affairs and feared it getting dragged into the cold war sphere. It also opposed the idea of having Western nuclear "guarantee" or "a nuclear umbrella", for that would create a new contradiction in India's policies and would run counter to its national interest.<sup>16</sup> While the draft of the proposed Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was under the consideration of the Government of India, the PSP asked for the rejection of the same.<sup>17</sup> It also condemned the diplomatic pressure being exerted by the United States on India to sign the Treaty and requested the Government not to be perturbed by the US threat to stop economic and other aid.<sup>18</sup>

Apart from the considerations of security, the PSP also opposed India's close contact with the West on economic grounds. It had been opposing the tendency of leaning towards the Western powers for economic assistance. It disagreed with the Government over increasing aid and trade with the Western powers.<sup>19</sup> It held that India's excessive collaboration with Great Britain and the Commonwealth would result in Britain's control over its economic affairs.<sup>20</sup> It as well opposed excessive reliance on the aid from the United States,<sup>21</sup> It would have, as such, liked to do away with the economic help from the Western bloc and counselled as much elimination of the Western interest in India's commerce and industry as possible.

<sup>15</sup>M.R. Dandavate, "Chinese Nuclear Challenge to Indian Democracy", *Janata*, 29 January 1965, p. 11.

<sup>16</sup>*Janata*, 15 May 1966, pp. 1-2.

<sup>17</sup>Brij Mohan Toofan, "India and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty", *Janata*, 12 May 1968, p. 5.

<sup>18</sup>*PSP in Parliament* (New Delhi, 1967), p. 15; *PSP Ninth National Conference, December 30-31, 1967-January 1, 1968, General Secretary Report*, p. 38.

<sup>19</sup>*Parliamentary Debates*, 2(2), 1952, Cols. 1627-28.

<sup>20</sup>National Council Resolutions, n. 12.

<sup>21</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 5(2), 15 May 1954, Col. 7553.

## RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

**Economic**

The PSP has been viewing India's relations with the United States as essentially guided by US economic policies. It has shown the awareness that for the Government of the United States the best insurance against "Red advance" in India, and Asia as a whole, would be the economic reconstruction of the region.<sup>22</sup> Early in 1949, the Socialists favoured close cooperation of the Government of India with the United States for the sake of technological resources in the interest of India's enriched economic growth.<sup>23</sup> They believed that in order to remove the barriers to economic underdevelopment India had to seek economic help from the United States without having political alignment with it.<sup>24</sup>

The United States started giving economic assistance to India with wheat loan worth 190 million dollars in 1950 and, in 1952, contributed 54 million dollars to a pool called the Indo-American Technical Cooperation Fund which was chiefly meant for increasing food production and rural community development. Considering the reconstruction of India's poor economy, from the very beginning the PSP admitted the importance of US economic assistance, but, at the same time, abhorred excessive dependence on American money.<sup>25</sup> In 1960, the signing of the Indo-US Food Pact for the sale of 16 million tons of wheat and one million tons of rice to India over the period of four years was viewed by the party as "an expression of the personal interest of the President of US" taken in the development efforts of India.<sup>26</sup> It hailed the agreement, for it enabled the Government of India "to launch on the Third Five Year Plan in a big way without fears of any large scale inflationary pressure development in the process".<sup>27</sup>

Assistance has also been granted from US public funds in

<sup>22</sup> *Janata*, 13 February 1949, p. 1.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> "Editorial", *Janata*, 13 November 1949, p. 1.

<sup>25</sup> Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Parliamentary Debates*, 10(2), 23 December 1953, Col. 3020.

<sup>26</sup> *Janata*, 8 May 1960, p. 2.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

various forms like low interest loans and gift. Private philanthropic agencies such as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, too, have been providing ample assistance in medical and agriculture research, technical advice, and pilot development projects. Eighty per cent of the interest and repayment of the principal of these loans and assistance are usually returned to India under the United States Public Law 83-480 to be utilised for economic development through schemes approved by the Government of the United States. There has been a lot of nationwide controversy regarding the use of PL-480 funds and the PSP has also been reflecting its opinion on the issue. According to the PSP, the approval of Government of India for the establishment of Indo-US Educational Foundation for the utilisation of these funds purely for educational concerns would be "an encroachment in the entire educational policy...of India".<sup>28</sup> The PSP has objected to the conditions, purposes and objectives of the US Mutual Educational and Cultural Act of 1961 which empowered the US Government to establish such Foundations in different countries to utilise PL-480 funds. The party has been fearing that when such funds have been made available for purely educational purposes, it might create confusion in the minds of the people "whether through those funds they are not going to inject the American way of life".<sup>29</sup> As the entire control, management and direction of the funds would be under the US representatives, the Government of India having the limited power to function within the ambit of this organisation, the PSP has been cautioning the Government. It has suggested that these funds be put at the disposal of the University Grants Commission or the money be set apart for buildings or for other educational purposes so that it may be used for more fruitful things.<sup>30</sup> It would have liked to see the Government on guard so that at least the sphere of education would remain "purely and truly Indian with no interference or

<sup>28</sup>Surendranath Dwivedi, "Good Bye to Socialism-II", *Janata*, 29 May 1966, p. 14.

<sup>29</sup>*PSP in Parliament*, n. 18, p. 17.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*; Surendranath Dwivedi, "Let UGC Spend PL-480 Funds", *Janata*, 18 September 1966, pp. 7-9.

influence, direct or indirect, of any country whatsoever".<sup>31</sup>

The PSP opposed the Indo-US Educational Foundation also on the ground of recent disclosures regarding the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the US sponsored academic institutions of foreign countries for carrying out intelligence or espionage activities through surreptitious means.<sup>32</sup> The statement in Mr. John Smith's article about the activities of the CIA in India led the PSP member, Hem Barua, to table in the *Lok Sabha* a calling attention notice. He assailed the Government for not having taken any firm action against foreign diplomats carrying on subversive activities. He also sought an assurance that stern measures would "be taken to put an end to the CIA activities and that Indians and foreigners engaged in espionage on behalf of the CIA would be severely dealt with".<sup>33</sup>

The PSP drew the attention of the Government also towards some weaknesses manifest in the fertiliser deal of 1966 with the United States. The party held that, by allowing Americans to participate in India's public undertakings, the Government had ignored its industrial policy, for the Americans would have complete control over majority shares and they would have also a say in 70 per cent of the distribution as also in the fixation of the price of fertilisers.<sup>34</sup> In the opinion of the PSP, "we are completely helpless, and we are surrounding our own rights on the matters on which others would normally have no say".<sup>35</sup>

With regard to the devaluation of the Indian currency in June 1966, the party felt that the Government of India had been forced to take the plunge because of the American reluctance to offer any aid otherwise".<sup>36</sup> No doubt, the want of measured and calculated statements from the Finance Ministers and unplanned foreign exchange balances have been viewed by

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.* ; Sunil Banik, "Indo-US Educational Foundation", *Janata*, 29 May 1969, p. 11.

<sup>33</sup>"PSP in Parliament", *Janata*, 26 November 1967, p. 3.

<sup>34</sup>Surendranath Dwivedi's Statement, n. 28.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup>Suresh Ram, "The Nation Stands Devalued", *Janata*, 19 June 1966, p. 9.

the PSP as the main reasons behind the agony ; yet "the selfish role played by the American investors" in the matter was never ignored by the party.<sup>37</sup>

### Political

Major among India's own political issues causing concern with the United States have been the Kashmir question, military aid to Pakistan and the Chinese invasion.

With regard to Kashmir, the PSP, along with the Government of India, has felt that the United States has been showing partiality for Pakistan. As early in 1953, in one of his letters, Dr. Rammanohar Lohia saw in US interference in the affairs of Kashmir a "malicious intention" to get Kashmir annexed to Pakistan and, as a second choice, to secure its independence".<sup>38</sup> Suspecting it as a part of US global interest to secure the areas of the world firmly to the anti-Soviet alliance, he spelled out the possibility of its disastrous consequences for Indo-US friendship.<sup>39</sup> The party viewed the US-Pakistan military pact and US support to Pakistan in the debates of the UN Security Council as responsible for the subsequent developments in Kashmir. The PSP opposed the intervention of a third party in Kashmir and deplored the attitude adopted by the Government of the United States and others who, without looking into the question of Pakistan's aggression, merely talked of "plebiscite".<sup>40</sup> At the same time, it accused the United States for not accepting India's position that "the accession of Kashmir is final and irrevocable".<sup>41</sup> From 1962, however, the PSP has been perceiving some change in US attitude. President Kennedy's advice to Pakistan for exploring the possibilities of bilateral understanding was hailed by the party as it gave new expectation for the settlement of Kashmir dispute at a time

<sup>37</sup>Mulka Govind Reddy, "Devaluation to Benefit American Interest", *Janata*, 18 September 1966, p. 13.

<sup>38</sup>Dr. Rammanohar Lohia, "Letters from Kashmir", *Janata*, 16 August 1953, p. 19.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Parliamentary Debates*, 10(1), 23 December 1953, Col. 3021 ; see also *Janata*, 1 July 1962, p. 1.

<sup>41</sup>Peter Alvares's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 2(2), 24 September 1965, Col. 7429.



when India was faced with the Chinese aggression.<sup>42</sup> With the undeclared India-Pakistan war of 1965 and Pakistan's excessive collaboration with China, this shift in US stand on Kashmir became more apparent to the party and was viewed by it as an outcome of new power alignments in international politics.<sup>43</sup>

US military aid to Pakistan was another important political problem with which the Government of India felt concerned. With the signing of US-Pakistan military pact in 1953, the PSP, in one of its National Council resolutions of the same year, pointed out the inevitable repercussions of the agreement on Asia and India-Pakistan relations. It appealed to the democratic opinion in the United States to prevail upon their administration for not adopting a course that would "sow seeds of discord among the Asian States and foul relations between the peoples of Asia and the United States".<sup>44</sup> Till 1958, the party had no fear that the arms supplied by the United States to Pakistan would be actually used against India unless Pakistan would be prepared for a third World War.<sup>45</sup> But the coming of the military regime in Pakistan, the constant forays against India's border, forcible occupation of India's territory and shooting down of Indian Air Force planes in contravention of international law and usage, etc., compelled the PSP to show a grave concern over the military pact entered into by the United States with Pakistan. The party held that the pact served neither "the cause of peace nor the vital interest of Pakistan or the United States".<sup>46</sup> It urged the Government of the United States to provide economic, instead of military, assistance to Pakistan. In 1961, when on President Ayub Khan's visit to US, a joint communique issued on his talks with President Kennedy said that Pakistan would be

<sup>42</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 2(2), 30 April 1962, Cols. 1664-65; Asoka Mehta, "Changing Face of Asia", *Janata* 26 May 1963, pp. 3-4.

<sup>43</sup>Peter Alvares, "Kashmir and Power Balance in Asia", *Janata*, 14 November 1965, pp. 3-4.

<sup>44</sup>Resolutions of National Council, n. 1, pp. 30-31.

<sup>45</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 13(2), 14 March 1958, Col. 4985.

<sup>46</sup>Resolutions of National Council (held in April 1959), *Janata*, 26 April 1959, p. 5.

permitted to use US arms in case of danger to its security, the PSP requested the Government of India to impress on the Kennedy Administration "the probable dangers inherent in allowing Pakistan her own way in dispute with her neighbour<sup>47</sup>." The party raised the alarm that the arms and equipment supplied by the United States to Pakistan might not only be guns and planes but also missiles.<sup>48</sup> In the wake of the Bangla Desh movement also some of the Socialists requested the Government of the United States to discontinue its military aid to Pakistan. They felt that such assistance would hamper the solution of the problem of refugees and the autonomy of East Pakistan.<sup>48a</sup>

With regard to the Chinese invasion in 1962, the PSP, along with the Government of India, expressed gratefulness for the sympathy shown by the Government of the United States. The party thanked the Government of the United States for readily supplying India with military equipments.<sup>49</sup> It also expressed its obligation for the economic assistance, as it believed that only modernisation of industry and agriculture could ensure India against further aggression.<sup>50</sup>

In regard to the undeclared India-Pakistan war of 1965, the PSP, along with the Government of India, resented the one-sided attitude adopted by the Government of the United States. Earlier also with regard to India-Pakistan military confrontation in the Rann of Kutch, the PSP had accused the United States for indirectly supporting and helping Pakistan. While criticising US partiality for Pakistan, Surendranath Dwivedi stated in the *Lok Sabha* :

"The Americans are negatively helping this attack on India. There are so many explanations given by Americans, but I do not see why it is, when there has been proof of American ammunition being used by Pakistan against India, that

<sup>47</sup> *Janata*, 23 July 1961, p. 2.

<sup>48</sup> Asoka Mehta's Statement, *Janata*, 23 July 1961, p. 3.

<sup>48a</sup> Rebati Nath Sarkar, "America and Bangla Desh", *Janata*, 18 July 1971, p. 13.

<sup>49</sup> Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 9(2), 10 November 1962, Col. 728.

<sup>50</sup> Report of the Sixth National Conference of the Praja Socialist Party, Bhopal, June 8-10, 1963, p. 93.

not a word has come from the State Department or any spokesman of American Government condemning this".<sup>51</sup>

The party also took note of the change of administration in America and condemned the pro-Pakistan attitude of President Johnson. Along with the Government of India, it accused the United States for its constant threats and pressures by way of the suspension of arms aid, etc., exerted in the hope that India's "defence initiative may be crippled".<sup>52</sup> The party condemned the United States also for its sympathetic attitude towards Pakistan with the futile aim of weaning it away from China.<sup>53</sup>

### Global Issues

The major global issues which have prominently figured in Indo-US relations have been the Korean War, the Lebanese crisis, the Arab-Israel tangle and the Vietnam War.

At the onset of the Korean War, the PSP accused the Government of India for adopting an essentially pro-American attitude. It held it wrong for India to vote for US resolution naming North Korea as the aggressor.<sup>54</sup> It believed that in Korea the fight was not between North Korea and South Korea but between the United States and the Soviet Union and, as such, India's commitment with the United States was wrong. It noted that the Government of India gave a formula for the settlement of the Korean issue which it subsequently modified at the instance of the United States and England. This act, the party believed, annoyed Russia and China and gave an impression to the world that India was taking side with the United States and working as one of "the stooges of capitalism and imperialism".<sup>55</sup> In its opinion, as the Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, India failed, even with US support, to accomplish the mission entrusted to it.<sup>56</sup> It also recorded its strong disapproval of the unilateral US

<sup>51</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 42(2), 28 April 1965, Col. 11656.

<sup>52</sup>Peter Alvares's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, n. 41, Col. 7430.

<sup>53</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Janata*, 10 October 1965, p. 9.

<sup>54</sup>*Parliamentary Debates*, 10(1), 23 December 1953, Col. 3019; Madhu Limaye, "India's Mediation in Korea", *Janata*, 14 December 1952, p. 1.

<sup>55</sup>*Parliamentary Debates*, 8(1), 17 September 1953, Cols. 4009-10.

<sup>56</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 7(2), 30 September 1954, Cols. 3832-33.

intervention in Formosa and viewed it as very obnoxious.<sup>57</sup>

The PSP was with the Government in opposing US military intervention in Lebanon (1958). The party held that "there was no justification for armed intervention in this case".<sup>58</sup> It would have also liked India to lodge a vigorous protest. At a press conference, N.G. Goray, its General Secretary, unequivocally condemned the American military action in Lebanon and viewed it as a "challenge to the rising forces of nationalism and a grave threat to world peace". He maintained that the US action had shocked the conscience of the democratic world and had injured the unfettered sovereignty of a free nation.<sup>59</sup> In the opinion of the PSP, the withdrawal of American troops from the soil of Lebanon was "necessary and inevitable".<sup>60</sup>

As regards war in Vietnam, the PSP, along the Government of India, denounced US policy of escalating the conflict. N.G. Goray, then the Chairman of the party, in his press statement of 3 July 1966, expressed extreme pain over US bombing raids on the North Vietnamese targets and denounced "this butchery of hundreds of innocent men and women and children in and around Hanoi who have under the Communist Whip perhaps no other alternative but to support Dr. Ho's War on South Vietnam".<sup>61</sup> The party appealed to President Johnson "to stop these massive air raids", to refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of Vietnam and to give the Vietnamese opportunity to shape their own destiny according to their genius and without interference from outside. It also opposed the use of gas by the United States and urged the Government of India to create world public opinion and to uphold strongly the thesis that "no body should use in

<sup>57</sup>Report of the Eight National Conference of the Socialist Party, Madras, 1950, p. 11; Asoka Mehta's Statement, Lok Sabha Debates, 1(2), 24 February 1955, Col. 324.

<sup>58</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, Lok Sabha Debates, 18(2), 19 August 1958, Col. 1670.

<sup>59</sup>Janata, 20 July 1958, p. 9.

<sup>60</sup>Asoka Mehta, "Adventure in West Asia", Janata, 27 July 1958, p. 3.

<sup>61</sup>PSP Ninth National Conference, December 30-31, 1967-January 1, 1958, Kanpur, General Secretary's Report, pp. 40-41.

any war any weapons beyond conventional".<sup>62</sup> However, some Praja Socialists tried to justify US involvement in Vietnam, for they thought that only the United States could contain China in Vietnam and ensure India's own defence against China's expansionist policies.<sup>63</sup> They even appreciated the firmness and zeal shown by the United States for upholding democracy in Vietnam.<sup>64</sup> Some of them indirectly advocated that, for the protection of democracy in Vietnam, India had to extend at least moral support to the United States and other political elements in Vietnam for the sake of an alternative better than communism.

In regard to Arab-Israel tangle (1967) the PSP doubted the US role, for it might escalate the war and give a different shape to the entire West Asian crisis. The party feared that US sympathy and support to Israel might provide an opportunity to China for having a free hand in Vietnam and on the Indian frontiers.<sup>65</sup> The Standing Committee of its National Executive felt that the United States and the other "Big Powers could not be completely absolved of their responsibility in bringing about the final denouement". It held that "the unrestricted supply of arms to the mutually hostile parties for the past many years by all the Big Powers was not exactly a contribution to peace in this sensitive area".<sup>66</sup> The party would like India to make efforts for bringing the entire region of West Asia out of the sphere of influence of the United States and other Big Powers.

## RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN (COMMONWEALTH)

### Membership of the Commonwealth

From the beginning the PSP has been insisting on India's

<sup>62</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 40(2), 1 April 1965, Col. 7225.

<sup>63</sup>Peter Alvares, "Escalation Renders Peace in Vietnam Urgent", *Janata*, 16 July 1967, pp. 5-6; Pradip Bose, "India and the Vietnam Crisis", *Janata*, 16 May 1965, pp. 5-9.

<sup>64</sup>Editorial, "The US in Vietnam", *Janata*, 1 August 1965, p. 1.

<sup>65</sup>*Janata*, 28 May 1969, p. 1.

<sup>66</sup>*Janata*, 18 June 1967, p. 9; *PSP Ninth National Conference, December 30-31, 1967-January 1, 1968, Kanpur, General Secretary's Report*, pp. 26-27.

withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Nations. Even before independence the Socialists had been demanding that complete independence of India must include a total separation from the British Empire. In June 1947, Jaya Prakash Narayan had opposed the policy of compromise with the British Government and accepted Dominion Status as "a stop-gap arrangement of a defined duration".<sup>67</sup>

After independence, the party categorically declared that India's membership of the British Commonwealth "is inconsistent with the basic policy of active neutrality".<sup>68</sup> Then onwards, in various resolutions passed from time to time, the party reiterated that India's association and commitment with the British Commonwealth meant in practice a passive linking up with the Anglo-American bloc on vital issues.<sup>69</sup> The party also declared that it "cannot be a party to India remaining a part of the British Commonwealth".<sup>70</sup> Its main arguments were that the policy of racial discrimination and economic exploitation was being followed by several member nations, that Britain and its friends in the Western bloc were pursuing imperialist policy in Asia and Africa as they wanted to retain "a strategic foothold in Asia" and that the membership of the Commonwealth would inevitably tie India's foreign policy to "the economic and strategic apron-strings" of the bloc.<sup>71</sup> In March 1949, demanding the severance of India's relations with the Commonwealth, Acharya Narendra Deva, in his Presidential address at the Seventh Annual Conference of the Socialist Party, stated :

<sup>67</sup>*Indian Annual Register*, Vol. I, Jan-June 1947, p. 250.

<sup>68</sup>*Policy Statement* (Socialist Party, Bombay, First Published in 1947, Second Revised Edition 1949, Reprinted in 1951), p. 37.

<sup>69</sup> "Revised Report of the National Executive of the Socialist Party on Foreign Policy discussed in its executive meeting, Mahableshwar, October 1948", *Janata*, 26 January 1949, p. 46 ; *Socialist Approach to Foreign Policy, Mahableshwar Tracts No. 4* (Socialist Party, Bombay, 1948), pp. 9-10 ; also *Policy Statement* (Adopted by the Second National, Conference of the PSP, December 1955, Bombay, 1956), p. 90.

<sup>70</sup>*Resolutions passed by National Executive, Belgaum, 24-26 May 1948* (Socialist Party, 1948), p. 2.

<sup>71</sup>*Resolutions passed by National Executive, Lucknow, 29-31 December 1948* (Socialist Party, Bombay, 1949), pp. 1-2; also National Council Resolutions, n. 12, p. 29.

"India's interests demand that it should keep out of the war and every possible effort should be made to see that the peace of the world is not disturbed. Membership of the British Commonwealth carries with it the obligation to participate in its policies of peace and war ; and even if it is not so, it is sure to excite suspicion of others about our bona fides to remain neutral".<sup>72</sup>

The party also insisted on India playing a definite role against the remnants of British imperialism in Malaya, Singapore and other parts of Asia and, for uniting the countries of Asia in a powerful peace bloc, dissociating itself from the Commonwealth. It reiterated further that India's neutrality would become "a force" if it were to retain its tie with the British Commonwealth which was "tied to the Atlantic Pact".<sup>73</sup> The Declaration of 1949 allowing India to stay in the Commonwealth even as a Republic was vigorously opposed by the Socialists. Jaya Prakash Narayan went to the extent of announcing that the party would take the first opportunity, whenever it would be in a position to do so, "to undo this great national blunder". He thought that the agreement proved to be "a triumph for British diplomacy and not for Nehru". India's association with the Commonwealth, he said, would prevent India from "gaining self-confidence and standing on her own feet".<sup>74</sup> The party observed "Anti-Commonwealth Day" all over the country on 9 August 1949 and denounced the Commonwealth link.

The other reasons for opposing the Commonwealth connection lay in the India-Pakistan questions like Hyderabad, Kashmir and the undeclared war (1965). Britain had consistently supported Pakistan. The party viewed Britain's policy on the question of Hyderabad as "vague and unsatisfactory", "hardly calculated to induce mutual trust and cooperation between India and Pakistan".<sup>75</sup> As regards the Kashmir question, it found Britain as "the great propagandist" against

<sup>72</sup>*Janata*, 13 March 1949, pp. 3-4.

<sup>73</sup>*Resolutions passed by the 7th Annual Conference, Patna, 6-10 March 1949* (Socialist Party, Bombay, 1949), p. 16 ; *Janata*, 15 May 1949, p. 3.

<sup>74</sup>*The Hindu*, 1 May 1949, p. 4.

<sup>75</sup>Editorial, "Republic and the Commonwealth", *Janata*, 24 April 1949, p. 1.

India.<sup>76</sup> When in March 1956, the SEATO Council at Karachi discussed the Kashmir question, Acharya Kripalani demanded the breaking of the Commonwealth link and urged the Government of India to make it clear that "if England and other Commonwealth countries persist in showing scant regard to our vital national interests and side our opponents, our membership of the Commonwealth cannot continue".<sup>77</sup> Similarly, at the time of the undeclared war of 1965, Peter Alvares strongly advocated severance of the Commonwealth link, for Britain had shown its partial attitude towards Pakistan.<sup>78</sup>

Even from the point of view of international peace and security, the PSP did not agree with the view that the Commonwealth had a stabilising influence in world affairs. Stressing this point Madhu Limaye stated :

"If the concept of peace is a dynamic concept and if it means freedom of ever-increasing number of nations not only from direct colonial rule but from foreign economic domination and military commitments with either of the two camps, then the Commonwealth must be deemed a reactionary force. The failure of the Government of India to make a dynamic approach to the problem of peace is sufficient proof of the harmful influence this unequal association with Britain has been having on India's policies".<sup>79</sup>

The PSP viewed India's Commonwealth link also as essentially in contravention of its policy of anti-colonialism and anti-racialism. It objected to the colonial and imperialist policy being pursued by Britain in Malaya and Kenya.<sup>80</sup> At the same time, the policy of racial discrimination being

<sup>76</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 5(2), 15 May 1954, Cols 7552-53.

<sup>77</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 3(2), 28 March 1956, Col. 3607.

<sup>78</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 46(2), 24 September 1965, Cols. 2429-33.

<sup>79</sup>Madhu Limaye, "On PSP's International Policy", *Janata*, 18 April 1954, pp. 45.

<sup>80</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Parliamentary Debates*, 18(1), 17 September 1953, Col. 4011.



pursued by South Africa, then a member of the Commonwealth, gave sufficient ground to the PSP to demand India's withdrawal from the Commonwealth. It believed that India's stay in a Commonwealth which suffered from the disease of racial discrimination would be humiliating.<sup>81</sup> It also felt that by remaining in the Commonwealth India could not effectively champion the cause of dependent nations in Africa and Asia.<sup>82</sup> In 1956, it charged Nehru for keeping mum in the Commonwealth Conference over the questions of Cyprus and Singapore. It regretted that Nehru failed "to prevent Cyprus being repeated in Singapore" and, by letting India remain in the Commonwealth, he "made a funeral of his beloved Panchshila".<sup>83</sup>

From the economic point of view, too, the PSP deplored India's association with the Commonwealth. It held that India's excessive collaboration with the Commonwealth had resulted in Britain's domination over the economic affairs of Asian States. The only alternative, the party suggested, was for India "to give up the inferior membership of the British Commonwealth and free itself from the economic and strategic apron-strings of Great Britain".<sup>84</sup> Only by dissociating itself from the Commonwealth, India would be able to develop an international relationship of its own money and other international monetary transactions.<sup>85</sup>

Following Britain's "assault on Suez Canal" in 1956, the Third National Conference of the PSP demanded severance of connection with the Commonwealth.<sup>86</sup> Similar demands for dissociation from the Commonwealth were also made in the *Rajya Sabha* and the *Lok Sabha*.<sup>87</sup> When at the Common-

<sup>81</sup>*Parliamentary Debates*, 10(1), 23 December 1953, Col. 3021.

<sup>82</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 39(2), 26 February 1960, Cols. 3042-5.

<sup>83</sup>National Council Resolutions, n. 12.

<sup>84</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup>Surendranath Dwivedi, "Why Leave Commonwealth", *Janata*, 25 August 1957, pp. 4-5.

<sup>86</sup>Resolution on Situation in West Asia, *Report of the Third National Conference of PSP, Bangalore, November 1956*, p. 226.

<sup>87</sup>Kishan Chand's Statement, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, 15(1), 15 December 1956, Cols. 1802-4 ; M.S. Gurupada Swami's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 1(2), 25 March 1957, Col. 690.

wealth Conference the Russian intervention in Hungary and Anglo-French attack on Egypt were not condemned, Surendra-nath Dwivedi said, "we became a party to a decision where these two wanton aggressions were not condemned". He demanded that India should leave the Commonwealth "not only on account of sentimental reasons but because of practical reasons".<sup>88</sup>

Objections of the PSP to India's membership of the Commonwealth had been based essentially on its foreign policy objectives and the pledge which the Socialists along with other freedom fighters had taken before independence. The party had never opposed India's cultural and commercial collaboration with Britain. It opposed India's Commonwealth link also because the UK and other Commonwealth countries had shown scant regard to India's vital interests and had often sided with India's opponents; for instance, Britain had supported Pakistan over Kashmir and Portugal over Goa. Its demand for the severance of India's Commonwealth link appeared to have a considerable bearing on India's foreign policy. It might have been considerably due to the impact of the PSP that the experiences of Anglo-French attack on Egypt in 1956 and the India-Pakistan undeclared war in 1965 led the Government at least to think of severing India's relations with the Commonwealth.

### Colonial Issues

The PSP has been charging the Government of India with slackness shown towards the British colonial issues. It condemned the Government for its refusal even to speak strongly against British colonial possessions in Asia and Africa.<sup>89</sup> It believed that Britain's colonial policies in Malaya, Kenya, Singapore, Cyprus and Aden had proved a great hindrance to Indo-British collaborations. As regards British's colonial policy in Kenya and Nyassaland, it regretted that the Government of India had never strongly protested to, and condemned, the British Government for its policy of the worst sort of terror

<sup>88</sup>See n. 85; *Janata*, 25 August 1957, pp. 4-5.

<sup>89</sup>National Council Resolutions, n. 12, pp. 28-29.

against the Africans and the Indians over there.<sup>90</sup> In Malaya, the party pointed out, the worst had happened, but the Government of India never uttered a single sentence against Britain.<sup>91</sup> It urged the Government to protest to the existence of the British military base in Singapore and expected an early liquidation of the British rule from the territory.<sup>92</sup> In regard to the British rule in Cyprus, it noted that the Government of India hardly uttered a single word in support of the people struggling against the British Government. It urged the Government to warn British against using Cyprus as "a military base".<sup>93</sup> It condemned the British rule in Aden. In 1965, the party saw no justification for Britain's repressive measures of control over the city and its decision to suspend the constitution.<sup>94</sup>

### Racial Discrimination

The PSP, along with the Government of India, had been vigorously criticising the Government of Britain and of other Commonwealth countries for racial discrimination. Britain's support to Dr. Malan and his pernicious doctrine of apartheid in South Africa were viewed as very dangerous. It charged Britain that it, too, was suffering from colour bar".<sup>95</sup> It noted that in 1960 the mass shooting of the African demonstrators of Indian origin in South Africa did not even occasion any sense of shock to be expressed in the House of Commons.<sup>96</sup> At the same time, some Praja Socialists also condemned the British Government for its hand behind establishing the white minority Government in South Rhodesia. They accused

<sup>90</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Parliamentary Debates*, 18(2), 17 September 1953, Col. 4011 ; N.G. Goray's Statement, *Janata*, 29 March 1959, p. 8.

<sup>91</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, n. 76.

<sup>92</sup>National Council Resolutions, n. 12, pp. 28-29.

<sup>93</sup>Asoka Mehta's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 9(2), 19 November 1956, Col. 404.

<sup>94</sup>Prem Bhasin's Statement, *Janata*, 10 October 1965, p. 15 ; Surendranath Dwivedi's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 47(2), 15 November 1965, Cols. 1980-84.

<sup>95</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7(2), 30 September 1954, Col. 3843.

<sup>96</sup>*Janata*, 27 March 1960, p. 2.

Britain for obliging and consolidating the Ian Smith regime and for playing "double standards". They held the British policy in South Rhodesia as well-planned and skilfully executed. In principle, Britain's support to the African stand in the face of its backing of the Smith regime was enormously dangerous.<sup>97</sup>

### Suez Crisis

The Suez crisis (1956) was another important issue on which the Indo-British relations were put to test. The PSP, along with Government of India, condemned Britain's aggressive policy. The party charged Britain for not even informing and consulting India before forming this kind of "unflinching attitude" towards the crisis.<sup>98</sup> It denounced Britain as an aggressor and accepted the right of Egypt over the Suez canal. It also demanded adequate compensation for Egypt from Britain for the losses inflicted and damage done to its civilian population and reiterated its demand "that India should sever connection with the Commonwealth".<sup>99</sup>

### Undeclared India-Pakistan War

The India-Pakistan undeclared war of 1965 was a decisive factor of Indo-British relations. The PSP joined hands with the Government in vigorously reacting against Britain's attitude towards the conflict. Regarding the issues both of the Rann of Kutch and the undeclared war, the PSP accused the Government of Britain for partiality towards Pakistan. Criticising the agreement over the Rann of Kutch as "stupid" and "shameful", the party perceived Britain's hand behind Shastri's "blunders". It noted that the Government itself had acknowledged in the *Lok Sabha* that there was the suggestion from the British Government in connection with the talks regarding the final agreement. The PSP doubted Britain's intention. Britain chose not to divulge the correct legal

<sup>97</sup>Surendranath Dwivedi's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, n. 94  
Muslaibuddin Ahmad, "Partition only Solution for Rhodesia", *Janata*,  
8 May 1956, p. 4.

<sup>98</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 9(2), 19 November 1956, Col. 404; *Lok Sabha Debates*, 39(2), 26 February 1960, Cols. 3042-45.

<sup>99</sup>*Bangalore Resolutions* (Delhi, 1956), p. 13.

position of the two countries over the disputed territory.<sup>100</sup>

With regard to the undeclared war in September 1965, the PSP denounced Britain's partiality towards Pakistan. Immediately after the ceasefire, Peter Alvares declared: "The U.K. could at least make an impartial assessment and, on the basis of the Secretary General's report, name Pakistan an aggressor".<sup>101</sup> The party charged Britain for its malicious representation of facts, during the war, over the BBC.<sup>102</sup> It alleged that UK and US had been providing help to Pakistan only "in the vain hope of weaning her away from China".<sup>103</sup>

## RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

### West Germany

The PSP has been pleading for strengthening ties with West Germany and solving the problem of two Germanies. From the beginning, it was opposed to the game played by the Big Powers behind the divisions—East Germany, West Germany and Berlin. As early as in 1947, in its Policy Statement the party had strongly urged for the withdrawal of foreign authority and armies from Germany and asked the Government of India to make endeavours for the reconstitution of national government in that country.<sup>104</sup> In a resolution adopted by the Second National Conference in 1955, it urged the Government of the Soviet Union "to agree to the unification of Germany on the basis of free elections".<sup>105</sup> It wanted the Government of India to make efforts for solving the problem and believed that the best solution would be "a demilitarised, neutralist, independent and United Germany". It held that the problem of Berlin could not be viewed in isolation or in vacuum, for its ultimate solution lay in an effort to provide a solution to the problem of Central Europe

<sup>100</sup>N.G. Goray, "A Stupid, Shameful Pact", *Janata*, 18 August 1965, pp. 3-4; H.V. Kamath's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 44(2), 17 August 1965, Col. 484; *Janata*, 13 June 1965, p. 1.

<sup>101</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, n. 41, Col. 7429.

<sup>102</sup>*Janata*, 26 September 1965, p. 2.

<sup>103</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Janata*, 10 October, 1965, p. 9.

<sup>104</sup>Policy Statement, n. 68, pp. 38-39.

<sup>105</sup>*Report of the Second National Conference of the PSP held at 26-30 December 1955*, n. 14, pp. 224-225.

and of Germany as a whole.<sup>106</sup> It believed that the West-Berliners had got a right of self-determination and they could not be "bartered away because of some hotch-potch agreement". It argued that only by granting that right a solution to the Berlin problem could be possible.<sup>107</sup> The Praja Socialists pointed also to a number of plans and proposals, for instance, those of Rapachki, Kennan, Gaitskell, Khrushchev and Prof. Karl Jaspers, etc., explaining that the ultimate theme of all those plans was to reconstitute a unified, demilitarised and uncommitted Germany free from military alliances both of the Western powers and the Soviet Union.<sup>108</sup>

### France

The Government of India was concerned with France mainly over its colonial possessions in India and in North Africa. With regard to the five French settlements of Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahe, Yanam and Chandranagore in India, the Socialists had been persuading the Government of India from 1947 to make efforts for the withdrawal of the French imperialists from these tiny pockets. They recurringly continued to draw the attention of the Government to those "forgotten" French settlements.<sup>109</sup> The French Declaration of 1948 regarding them appeared to be "as much of window dressing as the Franco-Vietnamese Agreement".<sup>110</sup> The PSP criticised the Government of India for its mere "verbal protests" against the continuance of the existence of these French pockets and for its soft policy towards French colonialism. But it supported the Government over the rejection of the

<sup>106</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 56(2), 16 August 1961, Cols. 2478-9.

<sup>107</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>108</sup>D.P. Singh's Statement, *Pooya Sabha Debates*, 35(1), 22 August 1961, Cols. 1185-87; Nripendranath Ghosh, "Berlin Diary-V", *Janata*, 1 March 1959, pp. 9-10; Resolutions of the Fifth Congress of the Socialist International in Vienna, July 1957 (PSP represented by Acharya Kripalani), *Janata*, 21 July 1957 p. 12.

<sup>109</sup>*Janata*, 4 February 1951, p. 1.

<sup>110</sup>Dr. Balkrishna Gokhale, "French Imperialist, New Techniques of Exploitation", *Janata*, 29 April 1951, p. 12.

French proposal of a referendum in these territories, particularly Pondicherry. It appreciated Nehru's Madras Statement of October 1952 in which he had made it clear that there would be no talks and negotiations as "these foreign settlements are parts of India and will be so".<sup>111</sup> In 1954, it regretted over the breakdown of the French-Indian talks regarding the merger of the territories with the Indian Union. It held the French Government responsible for the failure of talks and warned France that it "would be responsible if the situation in Pondicherry and other territories worsens".<sup>112</sup> Thus, till the final merger of these territories into the Indian Union, the Praja Socialists were making strong protests against the delay in the French decision and were constantly persuading the Government of India to liberate and merge them with the Indian Union.<sup>113</sup> The efforts of the PSP proved of help in expediting the liquidation of the French rule from those tiny pockets.

As regards colonial possessions of France in North Africa, the PSP continued to charge the Government of India for its mere "verbal protest".<sup>114</sup> It criticised mainly the policy of the Government regarding French Algeria and viewed its stand as not bold and vocal enough in its opposition to French colonialism. But it supported the Government in its condemnation of French attack on Egypt in 1956 and the French bombing of Bizerta in 1961.

### Portugal

Like France, Portugal, too, has been causing concern to India mainly on account of its colonial possessions in India and Central Africa. With regard to the Portuguese settlements of Goa, Daman, and Diu in India, from the beginning, the Praja Socialists had been persuading the Indian Government to liberate them from Salazar's clutches. In its various resolutions passed from time to time, the PSP had been

<sup>111</sup> *Janata*, 26 October 1952, p. 12.

<sup>112</sup> *Janata*, 13 June 1954, p. 18.

<sup>113</sup> Surendranath Dwivedi's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 40(2), 16 March 1960, Col. 6274.

<sup>114</sup> National Council Resolutions, n. 12, pp. 28-29.

reiterating that the Government of India should make efforts for the withdrawal of the Portuguese rule.<sup>115</sup> The party held these territories as an integral part of India and thought that the liquidation of the Portuguese rule and their full integration with the Indian Union was "a vital concern of the Indian people".<sup>116</sup> The PSP regretted over the failure of the negotiations with Portugal which were initiated on 27 February 1950 and resulted in wrong charges of aggression, blackmail, and other kinds of crimes alleged by the Portuguese Government against the Government of India.<sup>117</sup> It viewed Portuguese occupation of these territories as "an act of continuous aggression" and maintained that the Indian Government had a responsibility for repelling the aggressors and liberating them from the colonial domination.<sup>118</sup> In 1957, welcoming the assurance of the Government to consider the Goa issue more vigorously, the PSP suggested bold and positive actions against the Portuguese Government in Goa.<sup>119</sup> Later on, by 1960-61, the party accused the Government of India of passivity in its policy relating to Goa and pleaded that time had come for varying its old policy and exercising its sovereign right to resist aggression.<sup>120</sup> Until India's military action and the final merger of these territories into the Indian Union the PSP continued to press the Government against its indecision, lack of determination and timidity.<sup>121</sup> Its constant pressure for adopting energetic policies towards these Portuguese territories in India considerably influenced the decision in favour of police action in Goa in December 1961 when, in spite of the Western opposition, the Government of India

<sup>115</sup>*Report of the Eight National Socialist Party Conference, 1950, Madras*, p. 84; *Resolutions of National Executive, Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party*, n. 1, p. 34; see also *Report of the Second National Conference of the PSP held at Gaya, 26-30 December 1955*, n. 14, p. 226.

<sup>116</sup>*Bangalore Resolutions*, n. 99, p. 12.

<sup>117</sup>Asoka Mehta's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7(2), 29 September 1954, Cols. 3714-15.

<sup>118</sup>N.G. Goray's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 1(2), 14 May 1957 Cols. 249-50.

<sup>119</sup>Editorial, "Welcome Signs", *Janata*, 31 March 1957, pp. 1-2.

<sup>120</sup>*Janata*, 24 April 1960, p. 4; *Lok Sabha Debates*, 56(2), 11 August 1961, Col. 2473.

<sup>121</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 59(2), 24 November 1961, Col. 1131.



successfully integrated these territories into the Indian Union.

As regards Portugal's colonial possessions in Africa, the PSP has been persuading the Government of India to raise an effective voice against the colonial rule as in Angola and Mozambique. It advocated a joint action of the people of India and Angola to liquidate the remnants of Portuguese colonialism from the world.<sup>122</sup> The PSP has been giving a total support to the Government in its denunciation of Portuguese colonialism and has always pleaded a bold and positive policy against Portugal.

### SUMMING UP THE ATTITUDE

The attitude of the PSP towards India's relations with the Western countries appears to have been greatly effective. Fundamentally, the party has supported the Government over having cordial relations with the countries of the Western bloc. But it has disagreed over excessive collaboration. The demand of the party for severance of India's relations with the Commonwealth appeared to be essentially consonant with the basic principles of India's foreign policy. The criticisms of the PSP regarding India's relations with some of the countries of the Western bloc appeared sound and effective. Its strong opposition to India's excessive economic, military and political dependence on the Western bloc was in conformity with its foreign policy objectives.

It appears that the attitude of the PSP towards India's relations with some of the countries of the Western bloc had some impact. Particularly in relation to the United States and the Great Britain, the PSP has effectively raised alarm against their excessive dominance in India's economy and politics. At the same time, as has also been seen earlier, it often had some impact on the official policy in relation to India's Commonwealth link and to the liquidation of the French and Portuguese pockets in India.

<sup>122</sup>Resolution adopted by the meeting of the National Executive of the PSP held at Madras on 17-19 June 1961, *Janata*, 25 June 1961, p. 7. Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 59(2), 24 November 1961, Col. 1138.

## Relations with the Soviet Bloc

The PSP has been keeping its vigil over India's policy in regard to, and relations with, the Soviet Union and other members of the Soviet bloc.

### GENERAL ISSUES

The PSP has been more often than not holding that the Government of India leans on the USSR and the countries of the Soviet bloc. The implicit acceptance by the Government of what the PSP views as the Soviet policy of the "sphere of influence" has been, in its opinion, inconsistent with the set principles of India's foreign policy.<sup>1</sup>

The party has been fearing that the acquiescence in the policies of the USSR would undermine the independence of foreign policy and belie "the hopes that the emergence of free India had aroused among the peoples of Asia and Africa".<sup>2</sup> Continued attachment with the Soviets would reduce India to the status of Russian dependency and the Russian dictates would be determining the Indian pattern of life.<sup>3</sup> It would cause a deviation from the correct policy of neutrality and

<sup>1</sup>*Policy Statement* (Socialist Party), (Bombay, First Published in 1947, Second Revised Edition, 1949, Reprinted, 1951); *Special Convention Resolutions, June 1953, Betul*, p. 36; *Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party* (Bombay, 1954), p. 26; N.G. Goray, "Indo-Soviet Relations", *Janata*, 21 July 1968, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>*We Build for Socialism* (Platform of the Socialist Party—adopted by the National General Council of the Socialist Party at Ranchi on the 4th July 1951, Bombay, First Published, July 1951, Reprinted, November 1951), p. 30.

<sup>3</sup>Jaya Prakash Narayan, *Political Trends* (Bombay, 1951), p. 8.

friendly relations with the neutral Governments and might involve India in the war between power blocs.<sup>4</sup>

Keeping in view the question of India's defence and security in particular and world peace and order in general, the PSP would have liked the Government to work for a new world order of freedom, equality and peace and for the formation of a "third alternative".<sup>5</sup> It has been characterising the Soviet bloc as expansionist and rigid and as suffering from Russian "chauvinism" and authoritarianism" charged with the ambition of world dictatorship.<sup>6</sup> It has been accusing Russia of following the old foreign policy of the Czars which was based on nibbling its weaker neighbours and keeping them within its dominance.<sup>7</sup> The Soviet policy of dominance and of sphere of influence has been viewed by the party as a permanent threat to world peace and security. It has continued to regret that the Government of India has acquiesced in the policy of "spheres of influence" has recognised "the new and extended frontiers of communism" and has been tolerating their "further extension".<sup>8</sup> It has viewed Soviet "imperialism" in East European States as a threat to the peace and security of the region.<sup>9</sup> It has been accusing the Indian Government of failing "to protest against the new Soviet imperialism in East European States which has not only deprived these peoples of their national independence but is exploiting their economic resources in furtherance of its own interest".<sup>10</sup>

With the formation of the Soviet military pacts, it wanted all Asian powers to abstain from such collective defence arrangements and avoid all commitments which would serve the interests of Big Powers and draw them into the orbit of

<sup>4</sup>Madhu Limaye, *Evolution of Socialist Policy* (Hyderabad, 1952), p. 23.

<sup>5</sup>Jaya Prakash Narayan, "India's Domestic and Foreign Policy", *Janata*, 22 July 1951, p. 9.

<sup>6</sup>Policy Statement, n. 1 ; *Report of the Second National Conference of the Praja Socialist Party held at Gaya, 26-30 December 1955*, p. 224.

<sup>7</sup>Acharya J.B. Kripalani's Statement, *Parliamentary Debates*, 8(1), 17 September 1953, Col. 4069.

<sup>8</sup>National Council Resolutions, December 1953, Allahabad, *Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party*, n. 1, p. 27.

<sup>9</sup>*Special Convention Resolutions, June 1953, Betul*, n. 1, p. 26.

<sup>10</sup>See n. 8, p. 29.

the Soviet bloc.<sup>11</sup> As such, it urged upon the Government of India to oppose all treaties and arrangements of the Soviet bloc which would bring cold war in the region extending from Egypt to Indonesia, result in the establishment of air, military and naval bases outside their own borders, such as Russian naval base in Port Arthur and the Sino-Russian attempts to transform North Korea, Manchuria, Sinkiang and Tibet into strong air and military bases and, thereby, threaten the security of Asia and the world.<sup>12</sup> On its own part, India ought to have sought to allay the fears and suspicions that its sheer physical bigness would create in the minds of its neighbouring States by offering them no-war and mutual aid pacts.<sup>13</sup> The PSP also condemned the Soviet aims of expansion in South Asia—by drawing the Governments of the region within its orbit and thus bringing cold war to the region.<sup>14</sup> It opposed the formation of the Warsaw Pact which drew the East European Governments within the Soviet orbit.

The PSP has shown concern over the attitude of the Government of India towards the Soviet moves for disarmament. Though it has basically agreed with the Government of India, it has felt the need for banning the use of nuclear weapons and the increase in expenditure on armaments to secure general disarmament.<sup>15</sup> The Soviet role in international talks on disarmament and on the signing of Moscow Nuclear Test-ban Treaty in 1963 did not appear to the party to be something more commendable than the Western.<sup>16</sup> The Soviet silence over the explosion of the first Chinese atom bomb in Lop Nor in 1964 aroused suspicion in the minds of the members of the PSP regarding the policy of Khrushchev's successors.

<sup>11</sup>*Policy Statement* (Adopted by the Second National Conference of the Praja Socialist Party held on 26-30 December 1955 at Gaya, December 1956), p. 91.

<sup>12</sup>See n. 8, p. 29 ; *We build for Socialism*, n. 2, p. 30.

<sup>13</sup>*Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party*, n. 8.

<sup>14</sup>See General Council Resolutions, Indore, June 1954, *Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party*, n. 8, p. 27

<sup>15</sup>*Report of the Second National Conference of the PSP held at Gaya, 26-30 December 1955*, n. 6, p. 223.

<sup>16</sup>Subodh Roy, "India and USSR—the Khrushchev Era", *Janata* 1 May 1966, pp. 9-14.

The PSP feared that Khrushchev's withdrawal from power might prove to be a precursor to Sino-Soviet rapprochement and might mean "a menace to democratic forces in Asia and, in particular, India in the context of the Sino-Indian Conflict".<sup>17</sup> Though, at that critical juncture, a section of the public opinion in India urged the Government to line up with the Western bloc, the PSP disliked a permanent commitment to the West, for that would undermine India's independence in international affairs and would create a new contradiction in foreign policy.<sup>18</sup> To the party, the proposed draft Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of the Super Powers was highly questionable and it demanded its total rejection by India.<sup>19</sup> It viewed the draft treaty as a conspiracy on the part of the Super Powers for their hegemony in the nuclear field. At the same time, it condemned the diplomatic pressure being exerted by the USSR on India by threatening to stop military assistance lest India signed the treaty.<sup>20</sup> The party accused the USSR along with other Big Powers of being "motivated not by high ideal or ideological considerations but by sheer self-interest and by motives of extending their spheres of influence".<sup>21</sup> A non-proliferation treaty, according to the PSP, would be meaningless in the context of China's emergence as a nuclear power. It urged the Government of India to draw the attention of the nuclear powers, specially the USSR, to the growing Chinese threat to India's security.<sup>22</sup>

The PSP has been opposing India's dependence on the Soviet bloc on economic grounds also. From the beginning, it

<sup>17</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Press Statement, *Janata*, 25 October 1964, p. 6.

<sup>18</sup>M.R. Dandevate, "Chinese Nuclear Challenge to Indian Democracy", *Janata*, 29 January 1965, p. 11; *Janata*, 15 May 1966, pp. 1-2.

<sup>19</sup>PSP Ninth National Conference, December 30-31, 1967-January 1, 1968, Kanpur, General Secretary's Report, pp. 38-39; Brij Mohan Toofan, "India and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty", *Janata*, 12 May 1968, p. 5; Brij Mohan Toofan, "Nuclear Treaty India's Pitfall", *Janata*, 14 July 1968, pp. 2-3.

<sup>20</sup>"PSP in Parliament", *Janata*, 23 July 1967, p. 11; National Executive Resolutions, *Janata*, 28 May 1967, p. 6.

<sup>21</sup>Banka Behary Das, "Soviet Policy Bias : Protest 'Must' ", *Janata*, 11 August 1968, p. 7.

<sup>22</sup>See Hem Barua's Statement, *Janata*, 23 July 1967, p. 11.

had shown its dislike for too much reliance on foreign aid.<sup>23</sup> It criticised the Government for its later tendency to lean more on the Soviet bloc for economic and technical assistance. At times, it even appealed to the people "to exert pressure of public opinion on the Indian Government not to become a satellite of Russia under the compulsion of aid".<sup>24</sup> The party held that, like PL-480 funds from the USA, the rupee funds of the communist countries had created a potential danger in this country by paying and purchasing politicians and parties in many ways.<sup>25</sup> It felt that the economic penetrations by the Soviet bloc would drag India into the Soviet camp and would reduce it to a Russian dependency.

## RELATIONS WITH USSR

### Economic

As India attained independence, the PSP urged that in its own interest free India must live on the friendliest possible terms with Soviet Russia and seek inspiration from its economic system. It had a great admiration for the Soviet Union for the valuable work done in that country in "the sphere of planning and nationalised economy."<sup>26</sup> Inspired by the Soviet planning, it had believed that in order to remove the barriers to economic under-development India, too, should have recourse to planning to increase its productivity and should seek economic assistance from Soviet Russia without having any kind of political alignment with it.<sup>27</sup>

Economic relations between the Soviet Union and India started with the signing of the five-year Indo-Soviet trade agreement in December 1953. Earlier, there were merely exchanges of cultural delegations and films, art exhibitions and exchange of the visits of artists and intellectuals between the two countries which were looked upon by the PSP as "an alarming tendency

<sup>23</sup>*Parliamentary Debates*, 10(2), 23 December 1953, Col. 3020.

<sup>24</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Janata*, 8 September 1968, p. 14.

<sup>25</sup>Peter Alvares's Statement, *Janata*, 15 September 1968, p. 15.

<sup>26</sup>"Socialist Party Policy Statement: Foreign Policy", *Janata*, 28 December 1947, pp. 5, 11.

<sup>27</sup>Pradip Bose, "Economic Tie-ups with Red Nations", *Janata*, 13 June 1965, p. 11.

of the Government of India to pander to the Soviets''.<sup>28</sup> From 1954 onwards there was expansion in Indo-Soviet cultural and economic relationship as a number of Indian artists, lawyers, businessmen, journalists, economists, legislators, technicians, and trade unionists visited the Soviet Union and their Russian counterparts returned such visits. The Soviet aid programme for India was also launched and implemented and trade relationship between the two countries became close. In 1954, the Soviet proposal to build a steel plant in India was viewed by the PSP as "triumph for the communists".<sup>29</sup> Finally, the Indo-Soviet agreement was signed in February 1955. It brought India a long-term Soviet credit at a low interest rate for the construction of a big metallurgical plant at Bhilai in Madhya Pradesh. This plant, as estimated, was to produce more than one million tons of steel and a corresponding quantity of rolled metal every year. At the same time, under that agreement the Soviets would also train the Indian engineering personnel. At the end of the Russian leaders' visit in December that year, a trade agreement was further signed in New Delhi whereby Russia undertook to sell to India a million tons of steel together with oil-mining and other equipment in the following three years in return for substantially increased Soviet purchases of raw materials and manufactured goods. An Ilyushin plane was also presented to Nehru as a gift from the Soviet Government. Soviets' economic and technical assistance further increased after Anastas Mikoyan visited India in March 1956. As a result, towards the end of 1956 the Soviets offered a credit of 500 million roubles at a liberal interest rate of 2.5% per annum.

In view of the probability of a massive Chinese aggression, the PSP suggested that even military aid on large scale could be had from the Soviet Union as India had already been receiving financial assistance from Moscow.<sup>30</sup> A new five-year Indo-Soviet economic agreement signed in December 1958 was

<sup>28</sup>Madhu Limaye, "Foreign Policy : Some Points for Discussion", *Special Convention of the Socialist Party, Pachmarhi, May 1952*, p. 3.

<sup>29</sup>Acharya J.B. Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7(2), 30 September 1954, Col. 3533.

<sup>30</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 35(2), November 1959, Cols. 1730-31.

further welcomed by the party. In 1962, it whole-heartedly supported the Government in respect of the deal of Soviet MIG supersonic jet planes and held that India was at liberty to obtain defence equipment from whichever country, whether Russia or another, she could acquire on most advantageous terms.<sup>31</sup> A year after the massive Chinese aggression, the party M.P.'s questioned in the *Lok Sabha* the delay in the supply of all the twelve contracted Soviet MIG planes and in setting up of the proposed Soviet MIG factory in India.<sup>32</sup> They suspected the Soviet Government and feared that the Soviet Government might be "tailoring its attitude and its action in this matter to the needs of its ideological conflict in China".<sup>33</sup> Apart from this, the Soviet offer to provide India with equipment and technical assistance for setting up a helicopter factory astonished them.

The party noted the big expansion in Indo-Soviet trade following the Chinese aggression.<sup>34</sup> In 1962, Russia supplied half a million tons of oil products to India and in 1963 she received one million tons of kerosene products. In 1963 the USSR decided to import shoes, some raw materials, raw jute, iron and steel and even bananas from India. Finally, a five-year Indo-Soviet trade agreement for 1963-68 was signed in New Delhi. For the fourth five-year plan India expected aid to the tune of Rs. 250 crores and Russia was to assist India in 50 projects. In 1959 India had trade with Russia to the tune of Rs. 18 crores whereas in 1967 it was to the tune of Rs. 170 crores. The excessive economic and trade relations between the two countries and India's dependence on the Soviet Union led S.N. Dwivedy to say that "We are not in a position even to speak out our mind freely".<sup>35</sup> In matters of planning, too, excessive dependence on the Soviet Union and the Indian experts' and planners' visit to the USSR before drawing up the next five-

<sup>31</sup>H.V. Kamath's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 18(2), 10 December 1962, Col. 5133.

<sup>32</sup>H.V. Kamath's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 25(2), 14 February 1964, Col. 823.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup>Subodh Roy, n. 16.

<sup>35</sup>S.N. Dwivedy, "Soviet Arms Supply to Pakistan", *Janata*, 4 August 1968, p. 3.



year plans were questioned by the party.<sup>36</sup> The PSP feared that the excessive reliance of the Government on the Soviets might result in the Soviet penetration of India's economic set-up.

At the same time, in this new era of Indo-Soviet cooperation, the PSP raised alarm against the possibility of Soviet indoctrination in India with the coming up of the institutes like the one of Russian Studies. In 1965 it urged the Government to keep a watchful eye on such institutes and give the assurance that they would not result in any kind of undesirable Soviet indoctrination.<sup>37</sup> It wanted the Government to ensure that the Indian students and people were safe against the possibility of "the export of communist revolution to India".

The PSP further took the Government to task for the agreement of the Press Information Bureau with the official Soviet news agency, Novosti, for regularly circulating its publicity material and photographs. Hem Barua, while tabling a calling attention notice in Parliament, described Novosti as "almost a counterpart" of the CIA.<sup>38</sup> He criticised the Government for its agreeing to act as an agent of an official Soviet news agency and reminded the Minister concerned that Radio Peace and Progress, managed by Novosti, had surpassed Peking in heaping abuse on India and its leaders.<sup>39</sup> Similar was also the reaction of S.N. Dwivedy, another PSP M.P. in the *Lok Sabha*.

With regard to Soviet economic aid and assistance to India PSP has often cautioned the people and the Government "against displaced complacency arising out of magnanimous offers of economic aid from countries which refuse to judge issues of vital interest to India objectively".<sup>40</sup> It has been urging the Government not to behave on issues of vital importance as a client country of the Soviet Union under the compulsions of economic assistance given.

<sup>36</sup>Editorial, "India and the Soviet Union", *Janata*, 14 July 1968, p. 1.

<sup>37</sup>H.V. Kamath, "The Export of Revolutions", *Janata*, 28 November 1965, p. 7.

<sup>38</sup>"PSP in Parliament", *Janata*, 10 December 1967, p. 7.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup>Prem Bhasin's Statement, *Janata*, 30 May 1965, p. 9.

## Political

Among India's major political issues causing concern with the USSR have been the Kashmir question, the Sino-Indian conflict, the Soviet arms supply to Pakistan and the Indo-Soviet treaty (1971).

With regard to Kashmir, from 1948 along with the Government of India the PSP has been appreciating the Soviet Union for its support to India's stand in the United Nations. But, at the same time, the PSP has been pointing to the shifts in the Soviet attitude. As early as in 1950, in one of his articles in the *Janata*<sup>41</sup> Dr. Lohia criticised the attitude of the Indian communists and the Soviet Union reflected in their idea of an independent Kashmir. He pointed out that the Soviets' support to India on UN floor was guided by their own interest. The party held that the Soviet gave India a preferential treatment so that India would keep out of the iron ring of alliances initiated by the Atlantic camp the sole aim of which was containing communism. The PSP thus saw a "subtler game".<sup>42</sup> In 1953-54, while declaring India's Kashmir policy as a total failure, the PSP charged the Government and the Indian communists for acting agents of Russian imperialism.<sup>43</sup> The visit of the Soviet leader to India in December 1955 and their statements in Srinagar describing Kashmir as "one of the states of the Republic of India" caused a change in the attitude of the Praja Socialists. They began appreciating the Soviet attitude and expressed their sense of gratitude to the Soviets for vetoing the resolution in the UN Security Council and showing a clear understanding of the Indian case.<sup>44</sup> The PSP, again, visualised a shift in the Soviet attitude towards Kashmir in 1965, when during the undeclared India-Pakistan war, calling for a ceasefire, the Soviet Government cooperated

<sup>41</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, "India and Pakistan : The Kashmir Tangle", *Janata*, 5 November 1950, p. 5.

<sup>42</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, "Letters from Kashmir", *Janata*, 16 August 1953, p. 19.

<sup>43</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Karnal Conference address, *Janata*, 4 October 1953, p. 12 ; Ved Bhasin, "Political Integration of Kashmir", *Janata*, 13 June 1954, p. 7.

<sup>44</sup>Editorial, "UN Debate on Kashmir", *Janata*, 1 July 1962, p. 1.

with other Great Powers in de-freezing this issue at the UN level. Its representative, the party noted, agreed that "the political issue underlying the present conflict shall be settled finally".<sup>45</sup> This led the PSP to apprehend that the Russians, who had been applauding the accession of Kashmir to India as final and irrevocable, would now onwards give up their previous policy commitment and would cease to invoke their veto in the Security Council. The party analysed the actual meaning of the Soviet resolution and, for the time being, came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union and other Great Powers were anxious to bring about a cessation of hostilities and save Pakistan from "ignominious defeat".<sup>46</sup> Later on, it saw in Moscow's policy a choice of neutrality between India and Pakistan. The shift in the Soviet stand was, as the party felt, encouraged partly by the position of the Indian Government itself which suffered from "uncertainty and ambiguity" regarding Kashmir's inseparability and partly by the new power-balance politics in Asia which had compelled the Russians to toe up an opportunist line for weaning Pakistan away from the Western military alliances and from the entanglement with China.<sup>47</sup>

As regards the undeclared India-Pakistan war in 1965, the PSP was one with the Government of India in resenting the Soviets' treatment of India and Pakistan on a footing of equality. Earlier, in the context of the confrontation in the Rann of Kutch, the party pointed to the neutral attitude of the Soviet press, which preferred to treat both sides alike and refused to blame either for the conflict, and resented the like treatment being given by the Soviets to both India and Pakistan.<sup>48</sup> During the full-fledged fighting in September 1965, the party noted the Soviet policy of neutrality even in the publication of news and radio broadcasts wherein more or

<sup>45</sup>Peter Alvares's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 46(2), 24 September 1965, Cols. 7433-34.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, n. 45, Cols. 7433-34; Peter Alvares, "Kashmir and Power Balance in Asia", *Janata*, 14 November 1965, pp. 3-4; J.A. Naik, "Indo-Soviet Relation and Kashmir", *Janata*, 31 March 1968, p. 4.

<sup>48</sup>J.A. Naik, n. 46.

less equal frequency was maintained in referring to India and Pakistan.<sup>49</sup> In its opinion, even the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin's mediation at Tashkent did not prove highly beneficial as it only exposed the weaknesses of the Indian Government which was led to accept a more complete Soviet neutralisation on the issue.

The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 was as well testing for Indo-Soviet relations. From the beginning, the PSP had been suspicious of the role of the Soviet Union and had been questioning the unwarranted emphasis of the Indian Government on the so-called rift between China and Russia and its hope that the Soviets would prevent the Chinese from attacking India.<sup>50</sup> But, the party pointed out, just the reverse happened. At the commencement of the Sino-Indian conflict Khrushchev described India as a "friend" and China as a "brother" of the Soviet people.<sup>51</sup> To the PSP that meant a more favourable treatment to "fraternal China" than to "friendly India". It also took note of Khrushchev's address to the Supreme Soviet on 12 December 1962 wherein he described the foreign policy of People's China as essentially based on "the principles of peace, equality and friendly international cooperation" and practically dismissed China's aggression on India as "a sudden flare up of a bloody border conflict".<sup>52</sup> The party inferred that Russia had refused to hold China an aggressor and had thus "exploded the myth of her benevolent neutrality in the Sino-Indian conflict".<sup>53</sup> The Soviet publication of the Chinese map showing some Indian territories as Chinese further gave an ample ground to the party to suspect Russia. It believed that "Soviet Russia was very cleverly playing the Chinese game of getting dragged into the atmosphere of unreality, of distrust of all other nations except communist ones".<sup>54</sup> It regretted the connivance

<sup>49</sup>J.A. Naik, "Brief for Tashkent", *Janata*, 12 December 1965, p. 3.

<sup>50</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 13(2), 22 February 1963 Cols. 748-9.

<sup>51</sup>H.V. Kamath's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 9(2), 9 November 1962, Col. 390.

<sup>52</sup>Subodh Roy, n. 16.

<sup>53</sup>Report of the National Executive of the PSP, New Delhi, November 1962, *Janata*, 11 November 1962, p. 7.

<sup>54</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 9(2), 10 November 1962, Col. 728.

of the Government at such unfriendly Soviet acts. In the context of the Chinese invasion it would have been satisfied only if Russia would have come to India's rescue. But, instead, Moscow ridiculed and attacked the States which came forward to help India and appeared to be worried whether the entire country would go into the lap of the Western Powers.<sup>55</sup> The PSP was clearly disappointed at the Soviet attitude of placing the two countries, India and China, on the same moral plinth and of not condemning China for its atrocious and treacherous acts. When, subsequently, the USSR and other East European countries condemned China for its aggression against India, it appears that the PSP did not take any particular note of the fact.

With regard to the Soviet supply of arms to Pakistan in 1968, among all political parties of the opposition the PSP appeared to be the most vigorous with its protest. The party felt that the Soviet decision had given rise to a situation which was more serious than that of 1962 following the Chinese invasion.<sup>56</sup> As asserted by Nath Pai at the meeting of the leaders of the opposition with the Prime Minister, the Soviet action was viewed as likely to constitute a grave "threat to the security of the country and to the peace of this sub-continent".<sup>57</sup> The party apprehended that the Soviet military aid to Pakistan would seriously impair relations between India and the Soviet Union.<sup>58</sup> In this connection, it was with the Government in seeing a shift in the Soviet policy and believed that the Soviet decision was fraught with a great danger. Peter Alvares viewed the Russian attitude as "an outright departure from its "traditional" friendship towards India.<sup>59</sup> Addressing pressmen in Bangalore on 12 July 1968, S.N. Dwivedy urged a re-orientation of India's foreign policy, for, in his opinion, India "cannot count on Russia any more".

<sup>55</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 13(2), 21 February 1963, Col. 552.

<sup>56</sup>Surendranath Dwivedy, "Soviet Arms Supply to Pakistan". *Janata*, 4 August 1968, pp. 3-4.

<sup>57</sup>Mulka Govind Reddy, "Tashkent and Arms to Pakistan", *Janata*, 4 August 1968, p. 5.

<sup>58</sup>Banka Behary Das, n. 21.

<sup>59</sup>Peter Alvares, "Arms to Pakistan", *Janata*, 28 July 1968, p. 5.

He also demanded that a joint session of Parliament be convened to discuss the issue which was of national importance.<sup>60</sup> The party charged the Government for not even having passed a single resolution "voicing the feelings of this country and disapproving of the action of the Soviet Union in supplying arms to Pakistan".<sup>61</sup> "The only fitting response to the change in Russia's policy", suggested N.G. Goray, "would be to decide to become self-reliant in matters of defence in as short a time as possible".<sup>62</sup> Prem Bhasin, General Secretary of the party, counselled: "we should stand on our own and not rely on any country, be it America or Russia".<sup>63</sup>

In the wake of the Bangla Desh Movement and the subsequent Pakistan aided Kessinger-Chou talks, India signed a *Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation with the USSR* on 9 August 1971. On that very day the Socialist Party came into being as a result of the merger of the PSP with the SSP and the ISP. The first thing that it did was to offer a strong criticism of that treaty. Samar Guha a socialist member of the *Lok Sabha*, observed:

"The reality of situation demands that we should have friendly relations, very close relations with Soviet Russia, but it is wholly unnecessary to codify this relationship of friendship in the form of a treaty binding us to Soviet bloc politics for 20 plus 5 years".<sup>64a</sup>

The party raised doubts regarding the nature of treaty and was apprehensive that if the treaty would mean a defence shield against the aggressive design of Pakistan, in case of a conflict, it might have more costly, more destructive and more prolong result. In the context of the continuing Sino-Soviet conflict it might make China apprehensive that it is meant against itself.<sup>64b</sup> India would have done better first to sound the Chinese on the development in Bangla Desh.<sup>64c</sup> Certain

<sup>60</sup>"Russian Arms for Pakistan", *Janata*, 21 July 1968, p. 3.

<sup>61</sup>Mulka Govind Reddy, n. 57.

<sup>62</sup>See n. 1; *Janata*, 21 July 1968, p. 3.

<sup>63</sup>Prem Bhasin's Bombay address, *Janata*, 14 July 1968, p. 12.

<sup>64a</sup>Samar Guha's speech in *Lok Sabha*, *Janata*, 19 September 1971, pp. 10-11.

<sup>64b</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>64c</sup>*Janata*, September 1971, pp. 10-11.

clauses incorporated in this treaty might stand in India's way to act independently to give recognition to Bangla Desh. The Socialists viewed the signing of the treaty a "historic deviation" from the policy of non-alignment. The treaty might give Russia a scope for extending her bases in the Indian Ocean. It might have a serious impact on India's economy and planning which is based on 80 per cent foreign aid and assistance from the countries other than the Soviet bloc.<sup>63d</sup> The party, thus, doubted the long term goal of the Indo-Soviet treaty and held it as another Tashkant for India without fighting a war or partially winning it.<sup>63e</sup>

### Global Issues

Some major among issues of global concern which have prominently figured in Indo-Soviet relations have been the Korean War, the Hungarian Crisis, and the Soviet-Czechoslovakia tangle.

With regard to the Korean War, at the point of its commencement, the PSP accused the Indian Government of adopting an essentially anti-Russian attitude. It held it wrong for the Government to vote for US resolution which named North Korea as aggressor.<sup>64</sup> The party believed that the logic of India's voting would lead this country to the position taken up by General McArthur. Therefore, some of the Praja Socialists thought that it would have been better had India refused to be involved.<sup>65</sup> They feared that India had annoyed Russia and China and had given the impression to the world that it was taking the US side against the Soviet.<sup>66</sup> The PSP as well regretted the Soviet attitude reflected in not compelling the North Korean Government to provide facilities for the UN Commission on Korea to organise democratic elections for that country as a whole, thus to help restoring to it an everlast-

<sup>63d</sup>Samar Guha, "Soviet Satellite for 20 plus 5 years", *Janata*, 19 September 1971, p. 10.

<sup>63e</sup>Brij Mohan Toofan, "The Die is cast, Lament is of no avail, *Janata*, 24 October 1971, pp. 8-9.

<sup>64</sup>*Parliamentary Debates*, 10(1), 23 December 1953, Col. 3019.

<sup>65</sup>Madhu Limaye, see n. 28, p. 2.

<sup>66</sup>*Parliamentary Debates*, 8(1), 17 September 1953, Cols. 4009-10.

ing unity.<sup>67</sup> It held that what had happened in Korea had only exposed the hollowness of the peace offensive organised by the Soviet-led communists all over the world.<sup>68</sup> It also criticised Soviet-led communist China for having reacted violently against the Indian resolution and accusing India of interference at the instigation of "US imperialists".<sup>69</sup> Thus it believed that in relation to the Korean issue the Government of India did not represent itself as an independent force outside either the Soviet or the American camp.

In regard to the Hungarian crisis of 1956, the PSP was vigorous in its attacks against what it viewed as the pro-Soviet policy of the Government. It believed that the Hungarian struggle for freedom had started on 22 October with huge demonstrations against the pro-Soviet Government in Budapest and that on 24 October Imre Nagy assumed power on the rising crest of a revolution, but Nehru did not give a single important statement till 5 November. It pointed out that even on 5 November, at the UNESCO Conference, Nehru merely passingly referred to Hungary at a time by which Nagy was arrested, a Russian puppet was put in his place and the entire tragedy was at its "last act".<sup>70</sup> Nehru's account of the Hungarian events submitted to the AICC, the party noted, had no other source than the Russian press as it was the true copy of Bulganin's version which stated that the Nagy Government had asked for the Russian help to suppress disorder. India's abstention at the time of the adoption of the first UN resolution on Hungary and Menon's pro-Soviet speech at the time of the second resolution led Jaya Prakash Narayan to say that "a more perverse and false view of the situation could have hardly been imagined".<sup>71</sup> Earlier, the PSP had strongly reacted against Menon's reported statement that the developments

<sup>67</sup>*Report of the Eighth National Conference of the Socialist Party, 1950, Madras, p. 11.*

<sup>68</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup>Madhu Limaye, "India's Mediation in Korea", *Janata*, 14 December 1952, p. 1.

<sup>70</sup>Jaya Prakash Narayan, "Mr. Nehru Blunders", *Janata*, 18 November 1956, pp. 2-3.

<sup>71</sup>*Ibid.*



were Hungary's "internal affairs".<sup>72</sup> At its Third National Conference, it hailed the decision of the Nagy Government which had denounced all Soviet military entanglement and declared Hungary's neutrality. It also denounced the baseless and scandalous Soviet attempts at challenging "the moral integrity and political honesty of the Hungarian freedom fighters".<sup>73</sup> The party was satirical in suggesting that, as the Government of India had often described Hungary and other East European States as sovereign States, it should make efforts for the protection of their sovereignty from the Russian dominance. Later on, the party viewed it as the reversal of the official policy of the Government of India when the latter made a "sudden" pronouncement that Kadar's was not a free Government but an imposed one and welcomed the new trend.<sup>74</sup> It urged the Government to support the total withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Hungary and Hungary's severance from the Warsaw pact.<sup>75</sup>

On the issue of the Soviet intervention in Hungary, presumably, the PSP vitally influenced India's attitude towards the Soviet Union. It was considerably as a result of the severe criticism that the Government changed its initial reaction. It might have been an impact of the hue and cry raised by the PSP that in his *Lok Sabha* speech of 19 November 1956<sup>76</sup>, while discussing international situation, Nehru appeared reversing his stand on Hungary.

With regard to the Soviet-Czechoslovak tangle of 1968, the PSP held that the performance of the Government of India in the Security Council and its abstention on the crucial seven-nation resolution had made a nonsense of the Prime Minister's assurance on the floor of the *Lok Sabha* that India would

<sup>72</sup>*The Hindu*, 12 November 1956.

<sup>73</sup>*Bangalore Resolution* (Delhi, 1956), p. 14.

<sup>74</sup>*Janata*, 25 November 1956, pp. 1-2.

<sup>75</sup>Asoka Mehta's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 9(2), 19 November 1956, Col. 416.

<sup>76</sup>Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru stated : "...but the major fact is that the people of Hungary, or a very large part of them, claim freedom from outside control or interference objected to the Soviet forces and wanted them to withdraw. That is a basic fact which I think nobody can deny". See *Lok Sabha Debates*, 9(2), 19 November 1956, Col. 378.

support Czechoslovakia's right under the Charter "when the issue came up before the Security Council".<sup>77</sup> It regretted the attitude of the Government which, according to it, involved a betrayal of India's tradition.<sup>78</sup> While moving the adjournment motion in the *Lok Sabha*, Surendranath Dwivedy deplored India's abstention.<sup>79</sup> N.G. Goray, the party chief, appealed for sympathy and support for the Czechoslovak people and wished that India and like-minded countries would convey to them "that they are on their side in this unequal struggle and not on the side of those who seek to stifle and chain them".<sup>80</sup> Prem Bhasin, General Secretary of the party, appreciated the stand taken by Sucheta Kripalani in Parliament and the rare courage of conviction shown by Asoka Mehta, in supporting her and resigning from the Government.<sup>81</sup> Nath Pai asked the Government not to shirk from its responsibility.<sup>82</sup> The party appealed to the Government to initiate steps in every forum for protecting Czechoslovakia's sovereignty.<sup>83</sup> It also urged the Government not to behave as a "client country of the Soviet Union".<sup>84</sup> Thus the PSP played the effective role of an opposition party by exerting the pressure of public opinion on the Government.

## RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

### East Germany

From the beginning the PSP had opposed the role of the Soviet Union and the other Great Powers in the partition of Germany and of Berlin. As early as in 1947, in its policy statement it had demanded the withdrawal of foreign authority

<sup>77</sup>Prem Bhasin's Statement, *Janata*, 1 September 1968, p. 31.

<sup>78</sup>Nath Pai, "Delhi Betrays Nations Tradition", *Janata*, 15 September 1968, pp. 5-8.

<sup>79</sup>Surendranath Dwivedy, "Indira playing the Game of Aggressors", *Janata*, 8 September 1968, p. 5.

<sup>80</sup>N.G. Goray's Statement issued on July 25, 1968, *Janata*, 4 August 1968, p. 6.

<sup>81</sup>See n. 77.

<sup>82</sup>See n. 78.

<sup>83</sup>Lucknow Resolution of the Uttar Pradesh PSP, *Janata*, 1 September 1968, p. 11.

<sup>84</sup>Peter Alvares's Statement, *Janata*, 15 September, 1968, p. 15.

and armies from Germany and had urged the Government to make endeavours for the reconstitution of national government for that country as a whole.<sup>85</sup> In its resolution adopted by the Second National Conference in 1955, it urged the Government of the Soviet Union "to agree to the unification of Germany on the basis of free elections".<sup>86</sup> It expressed its fear against "the authoritarian, expansionist and dictatorial policy of the Soviet Union" which had brought East Germany and other European countries within its "sphere of influence and economic and political dominance".<sup>87</sup> It accused the Government of India for its connivance at the Soviet "colonial domination" in East Germany.<sup>88</sup> It would like the Government to champion the cause of the freedom of the German people.<sup>89</sup> At the same time, it regretted that the Government had, in fact, no policy for East Germany. It criticised the Government for its refusal to have diplomatic relations with East Germany<sup>90</sup> and pointed out that Chancellor Kiesinger's departure from the old Hallstein doctrine meant a better opportunity for establishing India's diplomatic ties and trade relations with the German Democratic Republic.<sup>91</sup> The Praja Socialists would have liked the Government to work for "a demilitarised, neutralist, independent and United Germany" free from the military alliances both of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union.<sup>92</sup> Nehru's endorsement at the Belgrade Conference of "the realities of two Germanies" was rated by them as "an act of gross ingratitude" towards the Germans.<sup>93</sup>

<sup>85</sup>*Policy Statement*, n. 1, pp. 38-39.

<sup>86</sup>*Report of the Second National Conference of the PSP held at Gaya, 26-30 December 1955*, n. 6, p. 225.

<sup>87</sup>*Policy Statement*, n. 11, p. 87.

<sup>88</sup>G.S. Bhargava, "Congress Foreign Policy", *Janata*, 15 August 1954, p. 17.

<sup>89</sup>National Council Resolutions, *Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party*, n. 1, p. 29.

<sup>90</sup>Banka Behari Das, n. 21; S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 40(2), 16 March 1960, Col. 6272.

<sup>91</sup>J.A. Naik, "Russia and Bonn's New Policy", *Janata*, 28 April 1968, p. 11.

<sup>92</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 56(2), 16 August 1961, Cols. 2478-9.

<sup>93</sup>Nripendranath Ghosh, "The German Com-Back", *Janata*, 30 May 1965, p. 10.

They urged NATO as well as Warsaw Pact powers to make a "start by releasing both East and West Germany from their respective war pacts".<sup>94</sup> In 1968, they appealed to the Government of India for protesting to the dispatch of East German troops to Czechoslovakia and suggested that, like Sweden and Norway, India should also withdraw from the Leipzig fair to be held in East Germany.<sup>95</sup>

### Yugoslavia

Indo-Yugoslav relations have concerned the PSP from the beginning. As early as in 1947, in its Policy Statement, while describing the rigid features of the Russian system, the party regretted "the excommunication of Tito by the Cominform".<sup>96</sup> The "imperialist and expansionist acts of the USSR" and Tito's revolt against Stalin revealed to the party facts about the Soviet variety of colonialism which appeared to be consisting of "as much exploitation as political and ideological domination".<sup>97</sup> It held that the main cause of the Yugoslav breach with the Soviet Union, as narrated by Tito himself,<sup>98</sup> lay in the aggressive tendencies of the USSR and its economic dominance over the Yugoslav market. The PSP thought that this new Soviet overlordship resulted in the exploitation of the Yugoslav economic system and the breach was only natural<sup>99</sup> and condemned the Soviet policy of economic exploitation and dominance. In 1956, it observed that the Soviet Union was as intolerant of even honest differences as to exclude Yugoslavia from the Comecon and to suspend all its aids promised under an international agreement.<sup>100</sup> Yugoslavia's only crime was not to join the Russian bloc and allow itself to be like other East European countries under Soviet control and domi-

<sup>94</sup>Nripendranath Ghosh, "Berlin Diary-V", *Janata*, 1 March 1959, pp. 9-10.

<sup>95</sup>S.N. Dwivedy, n. 79, *Janata*, 8 September 1968, p. 6.

<sup>96</sup>*Policy Statement*, n. 1, p. 36.

<sup>97</sup>G.S. Bhargava, n. 88.

<sup>98</sup>The official biographer of Marshal Tito, Vladimir Dedijer, has given Tito's own words in "Tito Speaks" (Official Yugoslav Publication), Prem Bhasin, *Socialism in India* (New Delhi, 1968), pp. 222-223.

<sup>99</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>100</sup>*Policy Statement*, n. 11, p. 88.

nance.<sup>101</sup> The PSP pitied the harsh Soviet economic sanctions against Yugoslavia and the withholding of Soviet economic aid to that country.<sup>102</sup> It regretted that the Government of India did not utter a single word against the Soviet attitude towards Yugoslavia.<sup>103</sup> It has been all through impressed by the Yugoslav social experiments and economic order. But the limitations placed on the individual's freedom in that country were disappointing. On his return from the visit to that country in August 1958, the ex-veteran of Indian socialism, Jaya Prakash Narayan, voiced anxiety over such limitations as in the case of Djilas and other Social Democrats.<sup>104</sup> The party urged the Government of Yugoslavia to be liberal in its approach towards individual freedom.

The PSP has been welcoming economic and trade relations between India and Yugoslavia. It admired the Yugoslav experiments in decentralising the economic structure. It viewed the association of the workers with the management and the running of the factories as inspiring<sup>105</sup> and urged the Government to emulate the Yugoslav example. It welcomed the economic assistance offered to India by Yugoslavia following the Chinese invasion.<sup>106</sup> It hoped for better economic cooperation with Yugoslavia after Lal Bahadur Shastri's visit to that country in the middle of 1965.<sup>107</sup> It wanted the Government to make efforts for obtaining industrial aid from Yugoslavia for the Fourth Five-year Plan and promoting trade with that country. It praised Yugoslavia's policy during the undeclared India-Pakistan war of 1965 marking that country as one among the few countries who supported India on that occasion.<sup>108</sup>

<sup>101</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 18(2), 19 August 1958, Col. 1676.

<sup>102</sup>Asoka Mehta, "The Moscow War against Revisionism", *Janata*, August 1958, pp. 5-6.

<sup>103</sup>*Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party*, n. 88.

<sup>104</sup>*Janata*, 24 August 1958, p. 8.

<sup>105</sup>Devendra Prasad Singh's Statement, *Rajya Sabha Debates* 22(1), 26 August 1958, Cols. 535-7.

<sup>106</sup>H V. Kamath's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 28(2), 21 March 1964, Col. 6701.

<sup>107</sup>*Janata*, 1 August 1965, p. 2.

<sup>108</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 47(2), 15 November 1965, Cols. 1979-84.

From time to time, the PSP has shown its concern also over the joint declarations of the Indian Prime Minister and the Yugoslav President on international politics. Their faith in non-alignment and international peace and their efforts to promote the bilateral relations between the two countries have been receiving its endorsement. It has often felt inclined to doubt Yugoslavia's continued adherence to non-alignment<sup>109</sup> because of its close attachment with the Soviet bloc after Khrushchev's exit. It has often feared that, as practised by India and Yugoslavia, non-alignment would continue to have a vague meaning.<sup>110</sup>

### SUMMING UP THE ATTITUDE

The attitude of the PSP towards India's relations with the Soviet bloc appears to have borne effect. Fundamentally, the party believed that the Government of India should, in India's own interest, have the friendliest possible terms with the countries of the Russian bloc. But, at the same time, it has been opposed to what it has viewed as India's excessive attachment with the bloc. The party has been severe in its criticisms of India's dependence on the Soviet Union. On issues of international importance, the docile reactions of the Indian Government to what it has viewed as the wrongs done by the USSR have irked it as essentially not being in consonance with the basic principles of India's foreign policy.

It appears that the PSP has been guided ideologically in being suspicious of the Soviet Union. The suspicion is presumably also a by-product of its past experiences with the communists and, very much so, the result of the observation of the Soviet attitude towards East European countries. The party has, as such, often doubted and questioned the increasing Soviet influence on India more than the influence of the West.

The attitude of the PSP towards India's relations with the Soviet bloc appears to have had some effect on the official

<sup>109</sup>See Editorial comments on joint communique on non-alignment issued after the talks of President Tito, President Nasser and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at New Delhi, *Janata*, 30 October 1966, p. 1.

<sup>110</sup>*Janata*, 17 July 1966, p. 2.

policy. Particularly in relation to the Soviet Union, the alarms raised by the PSP have been often effective. As has also been seen earlier, the party influenced the official policy in matters like Hungarian and Czechoslovak explosions of nationalism against Soviet domination.

## Relations with China

The PSP has been critically vigilant over India's relations with People's Republic of China (PRC) with a sense of deep concern. Disagreeing widely with the Government, it has continued to urge some changes in its China policy for the sake of India's territorial integrity.

### BASES

#### Assessment of Chinese Intentions

From the very coming into existence of the communist government in China, the PSP has felt that the attitude of the Government of India towards it has been fluctuating with the change in situations. The attitude of the PSP, too, towards the China policy of the Indian Government has to be viewed in terms of the phases of that policy—from 1948 to 1958, till 1962 and thereafter.

In the first phase, the PSP broadly supported the policy of the Government. With the Government it welcomed the formation of the new regime in China in 1949 and, with it, expected that the event would greatly help the promotion of peace and goodwill in Asia.<sup>1</sup> It hoped that the new Chinese government would respect the integrity and tradition of independent socialist movements in Asian countries and help in the building up of a third camp in Asia outside the two power blocs.<sup>2</sup> It urged the Government of India to make efforts for keeping Mao Tse-tung away from the influence of

<sup>1</sup>"Editorial", *Janata*, 29 May 1949, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*; Bipin Lal Das, "Will Mao fall in Line with Third Camp?" *Janata*, 25 July 1950, p. 8.



Moscow.<sup>3</sup> It stood for the recognition of the PRC in UN and for its seat in the Security Council in place of the Nationalist Government so that China could play its legitimate part in world affairs.<sup>4</sup> It urged for full moral and diplomatic support to communist China against Formosa.<sup>5</sup> The Socialists would like all Asian governments to maintain correct diplomatic and friendly relations with the Peking Government and to seek its cooperation in the development of peace and progress in Asia.<sup>6</sup> They, however, were critical of the Indian Government inasmuch as they viewed its attitude towards communist China as "policy-less and vague" and suggested strengthening of traditional ties and friendship between the Governments.<sup>7</sup>

After the Chinese military action in Tibet in October 1950, the party pointed out some weaknesses in the China policy of the Government. Underlining the expansionist trend in the Chinese action,<sup>8</sup> it accused the Government for not lodging a protest strong enough to compel the Chinese Government to decide the lot of the Tibetans on the basis of their free votes or plebiscite.<sup>9</sup> It attacked the Government for recognising China's sovereignty over Tibet.

Subsequently, refusing to share the make-believe of the Government about the *Panchshila* principles of the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954,<sup>10</sup> the PSP made its apprehension clear that by merely formally subscribing to those principles China was going neither to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of its neighbours nor to promote Asian anti-imperialism and peace. It doubted communist China's pledge

<sup>3</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, "Foreign Policy : Party v. Government", *Janata*, 9 December 1951, pp. 1-2.

<sup>4</sup>*Report of the Eighth National Conference of the Socialist Party, Madras, July 1950*, p. 112.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, "Concerning our Attitude towards Red China", *Janata*, 2 December 1951, p. 3.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>Nagpur Resolutions of the National Executive, November 1950, *Himalayan Policy for India* (Socialist Party, 1951, Bombay), p. 20.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup>Asoka Mehta's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7(2), 29 September 1954, Col. 3711; Madhu Limaye, "Peaceful Coexistence plus Something", *Janata*, 8 August 1954, p. 15.

in view of its political and military alliance with the Soviet Union.<sup>11</sup> It raised the alarm that communist China might emerge as the sole dominant power in Asia. The Chinese publication of a new map wherein border territories of some other countries were shown as Chinese also led the party to alarm the Government against "the aggressive design of China".<sup>12</sup> In spite of the Sino-Indian cooperation at the Bandung Conference, (1955), the Praja Socialists continued to suspect China's intentions. Its suspicions came true.<sup>13</sup>

In the second phase, from 1959 to 1962, the PSP was extremely critical of the policy of the Indian Government. In 1959, the PSP raised alarm against Chinese expansionism in view of the Tibetan developments. India, as it held, could never "condone, nor remain a passive spectator to efforts to reduce its ancient neighbour Tibet into a colony".<sup>14</sup> Keeping in view China's deliberate plan of action on the northern borders of India from NEFA to Ladakh, it urged the Indian Government to end all vacillations, firmly resist Chinese expansionist strides and be prepared to take "such measures, military and diplomatic, as to compel China to quit Indian territory" in case the Chinese failed to do so within a stipulated period.<sup>15</sup> After China's refusal to recognise the McMahon Line as the traditional Himalayan frontier between India and China, the party warned the Government against the dangers of a "weak-kneed" policy towards China.<sup>16</sup> It held the Government responsible for its failure "to inform the people of Chinese aggression that commenced three months after the signing of the peace treaty".<sup>17</sup> It also charged the

<sup>11</sup>Asoka Mehta's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 6(2), 29 September 1954, Col. 3706.

<sup>12</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 5(2), 15 May 1954, Cols. 7548-49

<sup>13</sup>Mukut Behari Lal, *Communist China's Aggression* (PSP Publication, 1959), p. 34.

<sup>14</sup>Coimbatore Resolution of the National Executive, June 1959, n. 13, p. 42.

<sup>15</sup>*Report of the Fifth National Conference of the PSP, Bombay, November 5-9, 1959*, pp. 244-45.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup>Acharya J.B. Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 35(2), 25 November 1959, Cols. 1732-33.

Government of India for not correctly assessing the role of "the communist dictatorship in China" and leaving its Himalayan frontiers unguarded even after the rape of Tibet.<sup>18</sup> It took a serious note of China's incursions in NEFA and Ladakh and vigorously criticised the Government for showing no firmness in its policy.<sup>19</sup> It completely disapproved of the New Delhi talks with the Chinese delegation in April 1960 and opposed any negotiations. At the same time, it alerted the Government against China's policy towards Burma, Nepal and Pakistan aimed at isolating India from the bordering countries.<sup>20</sup>

Following fresh border incidents of 1961 in Ladakh, the PSP insisted that the Government was solely responsible for the inviolability of the Indian territory and asked for the resignation of the Defence Minister.<sup>21</sup> It voiced a strong opposition to any eventuality of compromise or adjustment with China and wanted a "policy of vigilance and preparedness".<sup>22</sup> In July 1962, at the instance of the Chinese encirclement of the Galwan river valley outpost, it asked the Government to shed its lingering illusions about the real Chinese intentions.<sup>23</sup> In October 1962, in view of the massive Chinese attack, it stood by the Government, urged complete national unity and wanted all steps to be taken for repelling the Chinese.<sup>24</sup> It attacked the Government for the defects in improvisation, division in the army ranks, etc., which, in its opinion, led to reverses, and was against the acceptance of the Chinese

<sup>18</sup>N.G. Goray's Press Statement, *Janata*, 27 March 1960, p. 6.

<sup>19</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 43(2), 29 April 1960, Cols, 14784-85.

<sup>20</sup>Asoka Mehta's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 50(2), 20 February 1961, Cols. 918-19.

<sup>21</sup>Asoka Mehta's Press Statement, *Janata*, 26 November 1961, p. 2; *Janata*, 10 December 1961, p. 7.

<sup>22</sup>Asoka Mehta's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 60(2), 7 December 1961, Col. 3892; Asoka Mehta's Press Statement, *Janata*, 10 December 1961, p. 7.

<sup>23</sup>New Delhi Resolutions of the National Executive, July 1962, *Janata*, 29 July 1962, p. 4.

<sup>24</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Press Statement, *Janata*, 29 July 1962, p. 2; H.V. Kamath's Press Statement, *Janata*, 28 October 1962, p. 2.

offer of cease-fire which was unilateral.<sup>25</sup> It also disapproved the acceptance of the Colombo Proposals of the six non-aligned Asian powers.

Subsequently, the PSP accused the Government of neglecting India's defence with its "unwarranted" dependence on the Sino-Soviet rift. It often questioned Nehru for placing too much emphasis on the possibility of the development of the rift and for deviating from "the path of wisdom, statesmanship and self-respect".<sup>26</sup> It believed that the rift was only a transitory affair and could not be banked on. After the first Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964, it visualised the possibility of the Sino-Soviet rift deepening over India, and as such, urged the Government of India to formulate its policies accordingly as long as the rift paid.<sup>27</sup>

### Norms

The attitude of the PSP has varied towards the norms of India's relations with China. For about a year after the establishment of the communist government in China, the party believed that the Indian Government was seeking to base India's relations with China on the norms of peace and cooperation which, as it viewed, were in conformity with the basic principles of the foreign policy. Accordingly, it supported the Government over recognising the communist government, establishing friendly relations with it and working for its Great Power seat in UN.<sup>28</sup>

By December 1950, in the wake of the Chinese military action in Tibet which it condemned as "invasion", the PSP

<sup>25</sup>Delhi Resolutions of the National Executive, November 1962, *Janata*, 11 November 1962, pp. 7-8.

<sup>26</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 13(2), 2 February 1963, Col. 749; Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 14(3), 18 March 1963, Col. 4503.

<sup>27</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 34(2), 28 September 1964, Col. 4074; J. Bandyopadhyaya, "India and the Sino-Soviet Conflict", *Janata*, 27 December 1964, pp. 2-3.

<sup>28</sup>"Editorial", *Janata*, 13 November 1949, p. 1; *Report of the Eighth National Conference of the Socialist Party, Madras, July 1950*, n. 4, pp. 111-112; Dr. Lohia, "Foreign Policy : Party v. Government", *Janata*, 9 December 1951, pp. 1-2.

worked out a "Himalayan Policy" for the area in consonance with its own objectives of democracy, freedom of all nations, socialism and a third camp in world politics.<sup>29</sup> Under the new formulation, it resented the lukewarmness of the Government towards the Chinese "aggression" in Tibet believing that it was India's duty to take up the cause of Tibet's freedom. Subsequently, it disapproved of the principles of *Panchshila* as the norm.<sup>30</sup> These principles, it pointed out, were not new to China for they had been enumerated and adopted earlier in the programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference of 29 September 1949 as "the guiding principles of Chinese foreign policy".<sup>31</sup> It viewed them as "only the old wine in new bottle with Pandit Nehru as the taster".<sup>32</sup> It raised doubts about their efficacy in the *Lok Sabha*. Commenting on these principles Asoka Mehta stated :

"The principles were undoubtedly welcomed but when it is realised that Tibet...is described in that very treaty as 'the Tibet region of China', the valuable principles lose much of their motive power".<sup>33</sup>

Acharya Kripalani held the *Panchshila* agreement as a "surrender" of Indian rights in Tibet. While discussing its futility in the *Lok Sabha*, he observed :

"This great doctrine was born in sin because it was enunciated to put the seal of an approval upon the destruction of an ancient nation which was associated with us spiritually and culturally".<sup>34</sup>

<sup>29</sup>Suresh Desai, "Himalayan Relations Conference", *Janata*, 31 December 1950, pp. 1-2; Nagpur Resolutions of the National Executive, November 1950, *Himalayan Policy for India* (Socialist Party, 1951, Bombay), p. 20.

<sup>30</sup>Raja Hutheesingh, "India-China Agreement, A Myth, A Miracle", *Janata*, 12 September 1954, pp. 4-10; The Sino-Indian Agreement of April 1954 was based on the principles of (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in other internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 7(2), 29 September 1954, Col. 3711.

<sup>34</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 18(2), 18 August 1958, Col. 1676.

Later following the Tibetan revolt and the Sino-Indian border hostility, the PSP vigorously criticised the *Panchshila* agreement and denounced it as meaningless and impossible, signed by nations at the height of absurdity and devoid of any regard for the liberty and territorial integrity of the co-signatory.<sup>35</sup>

In 1959-60, keeping in view China's deliberate aggression in NEFA and other sectors, the party urged the Government not to rely on China and to refuse to talk until it would make negotiations conditional upon the acceptance of these frontiers and would vacate the aggression and restore unreservedly the *status quo ante bellum*.<sup>36</sup> On the occasion of Chou En Lai's visit to India in April 1960, the party called for an assurance from the Government before the talks started that the vacation of these territories by the aggressor would "precede formal negotiations on minor rectifications of borders".<sup>37</sup> India's insistence on negotiations against China's building up its offensive strength in the entire border area led the PSP to raise the alarm that negotiations for renewing a treaty of any kind with China under those circumstances would be futile.<sup>38</sup> It wanted categorical assurance from the Government that it would not enter into any treaty with China whether it would be friendship treaty, non-aggression treaty, cooperative treaty or whatever good name that it pleases to give to it".<sup>39</sup> Later on, the increasing Chinese border incursions and the deteriorating situation in Ladakh compelled the PSP to insist that no negotiation or talk or discussion with China could be carried

<sup>35</sup>Acharya Kripalani, "Panchsheela", *Janata*, 27 December 1959 and 3 January 1960, respectively, p. 3, pp. 5-6.

<sup>36</sup>Report of the Fifth National Conference of the PSP, November 5-9, 1959, p. 243.

<sup>37</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 40(2), 16 March 1960, Col. 6267; *Janata*, 27 March 1960, p. 6.

<sup>38</sup>Bhubaneshwar Resolution of the National Executive, December 1960-January 1961, *Janata*, 8 January 1961, p. 7; see also Asoka Mehta's Press Statement, *Janata*, 10 December 1961, p. 7.

<sup>39</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 60(2), 7 December 1961, Col. 3892.

on in such humiliating circumstances.<sup>40</sup> Immediately after the Chinese aggression in October 1962, the party clearly and firmly opposed the proposal for negotiations on the basis of the withdrawal of the Chinese forces to the position occupied by them before 8 September 1962 and urged the Government that there "could be no compromise or temporising in recovering every inch of our territory in Ladakh as well as in NEFA".<sup>41</sup> It demanded an honourable condition becoming a self-respecting nation.

After China's declaration of unilateral cease-fire in November 1962, the PSP pointed out that there had been much controversy regarding the neutral nations' efforts for an amicable settlement of the dispute on the basis of the international norms of negotiation. It was not opposed to peaceful negotiations and methods but to the "peaceful surrender in the name of peaceful negotiations".<sup>42</sup> As such, it boldly held that the dispute could not be settled through negotiations. It pointed out that negotiation would carry meaning only if there could be reconciliation between the conflicting interests of the parties. But here in this case there appeared the least possibility of any reconciliation with China who wanted to grab India's territory by naked force.<sup>43</sup> It, therefore, refused to accept the Colombo Proposals and re-insisted on having no negotiations until the last inch of India's "sacred soil" was freed. It reminded the Government that all its talk of negotiation in the past had proved futile because of Chinese intransigence.<sup>44</sup>

Later the explosion of China's first atom bomb, the party noted, shattered all illusions and called for all determination and preparations.<sup>45</sup> It urged the Government to dismiss any

<sup>40</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 6(2), 13 August 1962, Cols. 1495-97.

<sup>41</sup>Delhi Resolution of the National Executive, November 1962, *Janata*, 11 November 1962, pp. 7-8.

<sup>42</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 13(2), 24 January 1963, Col. 6243.

<sup>43</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 13(2), 21 February 1963, Col. 555.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 35(9), 23 November 1964, Cols. 1294-97.

further possibility of negotiations with China. It called for negotiation with other nuclear nations and viewed India's policy of non-alignment as of no relevance in the context of China.<sup>46</sup>

## BILATERAL ISSUES

### Recognition of China in the UN

Following the formation of the communist government in China, the PSP asked the Government of India to make utmost efforts to secure a place for China in the United Nations and extended its cooperation over the issue. It noted the clash of interests between the Super Powers on that account and demanded seating of China in the Council.<sup>47</sup> It was unhappy with the attitude of the United States and other countries of the Atlantic camp inasmuch as they were not permitting the new China to play its legitimate part in the council of nations. But it did not like the Soviet boycott of UN on account of this issue.<sup>48</sup> It, however, believed that in the absence of China the UN could not be competent to act "as a tribune of world conscience".<sup>49</sup> It held that UN prestige in Asia would remain low as long as China continued to be excluded from the organisation.<sup>50</sup>

### Formosa and Offshore Islands

With respect to the problem of Formosa and its offshore Islands, from the beginning the PSP was one with the Government of India in voicing disapproval of the unilateral US intervention. Supporting China's claim over Formosa, it held that "such an intervention is bound to further complicate the international situation and aggravate the tension between the two great powers".<sup>51</sup> Keeping in view the tensions prevailing

<sup>46</sup>N.G. Goray's Statement on China's hydrogen bomb explosion, *Tribune* (Ambala), 20 June 1967.

<sup>47</sup>*Report of the Eighth National Conference of the Socialist Party, Madras, July 1950*, n. 4, p. 112.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup>Dr. Rammanohar Lohia's Statement, *Janata*, 11 February 1951, p. 1.

<sup>50</sup>Madhu Limaye's Statement, *Janata*, 8 August 1954, p. 15.

<sup>51</sup>See n. 4, p. 112.



between China and the USA on the issue of Formosa, it urged the governments concerned "to accept temporarily the existing frontiers and make efforts so that a confederative tendency might well flow out of such a move".<sup>52</sup> In 1958, as the possession of these islands by the Kuomintang intensified the bitterness between the USA and communist China and created an intolerable situation, it envisioned that at least the islands of Quemoy and Matsu would have to be handed over to communist China.<sup>53</sup> It described Formosa as "a giant shadow in the body politics of the world" and held that on the successful solution of the Formosa problem the peace of the world and also the peace of Southeast Asia would depend.<sup>54</sup> It felt that the efforts of India and other well-meaning nations of the world in this direction had proved futile. It was of the opinion that it would be possible for the people of Formosa to settle their own problem through a plebiscite under the auspices of neutral nations as UN agents. The people of Formosa might decide either to become part of the People's Republic of China or to remain independent. As regards Matsu, Quemoy and other offshore islands, the party held that "their problem is intimately connected with the problem of Formosa".<sup>55</sup> Later, with India's embitterment of relations with China, some of the Praja Socialists suggested a shift in the Indian stand on Formosa. They also wanted communist China being kept out of UN. They would like nationalist China to stay in UN, India getting China's permanent seat in the Security Council.<sup>56</sup> They viewed such drastic and strong measures against China as "essential and proper".

### Tibet

The PSP had been warning the Government of India right from early in 1950 against its attitude towards the PRC over Tibet. Following the Chinese military action in Tibet in

<sup>52</sup>Dr. Lohia's Statement, *Janata*, 14 October 1951, pp. 1-2.

<sup>53</sup>*Janata*, 21 September 1958, p. 2.

<sup>54</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 23(2), 8 December 1958, Col. 3825.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup>*Janata*, 2 July 1967, p. 11.

October 1950, the National Executive of the party defined the action as "an act against Asia and the world, the Tibetan people and India", and asserted that "the people of Tibet may decide in a free vote or plebiscite their form of government or of alliance with the outside world" and wanted the Indian Government to press upon the Chinese Government to achieve a settlement with Tibet along these terms".<sup>57</sup> The party alerted all Asian peoples against the danger so demonstrably exhibited in Tibet and urged "the people of India to assist the Tibetan people in maintaining their independence".<sup>58</sup> Later on, when on 23 May 1951 the Sino-Tibetan Agreement was concluded, it entirely disagreed with the Indian Government over its expression of satisfaction with that agreement. It believed that China aimed at smothering "the freedom of the small Kingdom of Tibet which had been virtually independent for centuries".<sup>59</sup> In 1953, Nehru's denunciation of the Praja Socialists' attempt in Delhi to observe "Tibet Day" as "childish" was strongly resented by the party. It redrew the Prime Minister's attention towards the aggressive designs of China over unarmed and peaceful Tibet.<sup>60</sup> In 1954, while discussing the official policy on Tibet in the *Lok Sabha*, Acharya Kripalani stated :

"We feel that China, after it had gone communist, committed an act of aggression in Tibet. The plea is that China has the ancient right of suzerainty. This right is out of date, old and antiquated. It is theoretical; it was never exercised or very rarely exercised and even then in theory. It had lapsed by the flux of time...I consider this as such a colonial aggression on the part of China as any colonial aggression indulged in by Western nations".<sup>61</sup>

<sup>57</sup>Nagpur Resolutions of the National Executive, November 1950, n. 29, p. 20.

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup>Acharya J.B. Kripalani's Statement, *Parliamentary Debates*, 8(1), 17 September 1953, Col. 4009.

<sup>60</sup>*Jarata*, 27 September 1953, p. 3.

<sup>61</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 5(2), 15 May 1954, Cols. 7548-49.

The PSP deemed Tibet a "buffer state" between India and China and held that "in international politics, when a buffer state is destroyed by a powerful nation, that nation is considered to have committed aggression against its neighbours".<sup>62</sup> The party continued to hold China's occupation of Tibet "as a deliberate act of aggression".<sup>63</sup>

The signing of the Sino-Indian Agreement in April 1954 on trade and intercourse between India and Tibet led the PSP further to caution the country against the acts of the Government.<sup>64</sup> It noted that China and India had "mutually agreed for the establishment of Indian Trade Agencies at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok in Tibet and of Chinese Trade Agencies at New Delhi, Calcutta and Kalimpong in India" and that detailed provisions were "made with regard to pilgrims and customary trade".<sup>65</sup> It further noted that the Agreement was accompanied with a Note of 29 April 1954 under which the Government of India promised to withdraw completely within six months their military escorts stationed at Yatung and Gyantse and to hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable price their twelve rest houses in Tibet as well as "the postal, telegraphic and public telephone services together with their equipment operated by the Indian Government in Tibet region of China". This was further supplemented by the trade Agreement of 14 October 1954 under which many other matters concerning Sino-Indian border trade, commercial and non-commercial payments, etc., were settled.<sup>66</sup> While pointing out the weaknesses of the agreement, the PSP suggested that the Indian Government ought to have pressed for a referendum in Tibet before it acquiesced in the lot of the Tibetans.<sup>67</sup> It viewed it as "the first step towards India's surrender to international communism".<sup>68</sup> It pointed out that the agreement

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7(2), 30 September 1954, Col. 3835.

<sup>64</sup>See n. 61.

<sup>65</sup>Mukut Behari Lal, n. 13, p. 17.

<sup>66</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup>*Janata*, 30 May 1954, p. 17.

<sup>68</sup>Madhu Limaye, "India-China and Asia", *Janata*, 11 July 1954 p. 9.

showed "for the first time the possibility that a meeting between the two Prime Ministers could be an advantage to China".<sup>69</sup>

At the instance of the Tibetan revolt of March 1959, the PSP condemned ruthless Chinese efforts to liquidate Tibet's distinctive personality and assured its profound sympathy with the Tibetans. It demanded from the Government of India the grant of asylum to the Dalai Lama and measures for securing Tibet's autonomy.<sup>70</sup> It observed 29 March 1959 throughout the country as "Tibet Day" as a mark of solidarity with the Tibetans. In a press statement N.G. Goray, the General Secretary of the PSP, held it as "a planned annihilation of a simple people and their personality" and compared it with the Hungarian revolt of 1956.<sup>71</sup> He questioned the propriety of India's role and urged his partymen throughout the country to raise the voice of protest.<sup>72</sup> In his address of 29 March in Bombay Asoka Mehta accused the Government for delay in expressing its views in clear terms. He disputed the idea that "Tibet was entirely a matter of internal affairs of China".<sup>73</sup> When Nehru, in his press statement, clarified the Government stand on the question of giving asylum to the Dalai Lama and assured that it would accept hundred per cent responsibility for his security, the party appreciated the attitude.<sup>74</sup> The National Executive of the party voiced "the right of self-determination for the people of Tibet" and asserted that India should not remain passive spectator to the efforts to reduce Tibet, an ancient neighbour, into a colony.<sup>75</sup> The Tezpur statement of the Dalai Lama also led the party to express its concern over the well-being of the Tibetans. It believed that if the Government of India failed to recognise the national

<sup>69</sup>Raja Hutheesingh, n. 30.

<sup>70</sup>Editorial, "Mad and the Dalai Lama", *Janata*, 29 March 1959, pp. 1-2.

<sup>71</sup>*Janata*, 29 March 1959, p. 3.

<sup>72</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup>*Janata*, 5 April 1959, p. 8.

<sup>74</sup>*Janata*, 12 April 1959, p. 11; *Janata*, 24 May 1959, p. 11.

<sup>75</sup>Coimbatore Resolution of the National Executive, June 1959, n. 14, p. 42; New Delhi Resolution of the National Executive, *Janata*, 26 April 1959, pp. 3-5.

character of the Tibetan revolt because of its friendly relations with China, "it would not be only failing in its duty but also appear to the imperial world as partisan".<sup>76</sup> It urged "a firmer attitude" towards China and called for exposing its imperialist, colonial policy in Tibet.<sup>77</sup> It was unhappy with the various "vacillating", "uncertain" and "confusing" utterances of the Indian Government concerning Tibet.<sup>78</sup>

In October 1959, when Ireland and Malaya sponsored the question of the violation of human rights in Tibet in the UN General Assembly and the Indian delegate abstained, the PSP strongly deplored the non-cooperation of the Indian delegation. It maintained that the negative stand taken by the delegation would run "counter to the policy adopted by the Government of India on the issue of the violation of human rights in South Africa and elsewhere".<sup>79</sup> The party viewed the Indian stand on the issue as a betrayal of the Tibetans.<sup>80</sup> Later, when, on 22 September 1960, a fresh resolution on the violation of human rights in Tibet was introduced by Malaya and Thailand and the Tibetan issue was included in the agenda of the General Assembly, the party welcomed it and hoped that India would support the resolution. It expected India to vote on the resolution in a manner consistent with its stand against colonialism.<sup>81</sup> But as the Indian delegation abstained, it denounced the Government and charged it for its indifference.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>76</sup>Summary of J.B. Kripalani's speech, *Janata*, 12 April 1959, pp. 3-4; "Editorial", *Janata*, 26 April 1959, p. 2.

<sup>77</sup>H.V. Kamath's Gangtok Statement of 2 July 1959 and Nagpur Statement of 2 August 1959, H.V. Kamath, *Communist China Colonizes Tibet, Invades India* (Praja Socialist Party, New Delhi), pp. 35, 43.

<sup>78</sup>J.B. Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 34(2), 12 September 1959, Col. 8016; *Lok Sabha Debates*, 35(2), 25 November 1959, Cols. 1732-33.

<sup>79</sup>Bombay Resolution of the National Executive, October 1959, n. 13, p. 44.

<sup>80</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 46(2), 30 August 1960, Cols. 5958-59.

<sup>81</sup>*Janata*, 6 November 1960, p. 3.

<sup>82</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 47(2), 22 November 1960, Cols. 1647-48.

The PSP observed "Tibet Day" on 10 March 1963 to commemorate the anniversary of the Tibetan revolt and urged the Indian government to change its policy, recognise the Dalai Lama as the real ruler of Tibet and support the Khampas in their struggle against the communist rulers.<sup>83</sup> The Note of the Indian Government of 1 October 1965 to Peking calling the Chinese presence in Tibet an "act of aggression" gave a new hope to the party.<sup>84</sup> It saw in this its own impact on the official policy and appreciated India's sharp rejection of the Chinese charges concerning the Tibetan refugees. While discussing the Tibet issue in the *Lok Sabha*, Nath Pai declared that, by "betraying Tibet", the Government of India had not only harmed Tibet but also put "India's security in jeopardy".<sup>85</sup> He observed a change even in Soviet Russia's attitude towards Outer Mongolia and Tibet and expected a similar change in India's stand.

### Border Conflict

In 1958 the PSP found out that while the border violation of India by China "began as far [back] as the latter half of 1950 when units of the Chinese forces entered the Ari area of Tibet from Sikiang through Aksai plateau in Ladakh, its planned incursion into Indian territory started with the construction of a highway of great military importance from Tibet to Sikiang across the plateau".<sup>86</sup> In 1954, the party had pointed to the figuring of some of the border territories of India in the new map of China.<sup>87</sup> It had continued noting the Chinese violations of the Indian territory in Barahoti in Uttar Pradesh in 1954, of Nelang-Jadhange area in April 1956, of Khurnak Fort in eastern Ladakh in October 1957 and February 1958, of Damzan in September 1955, in Kanrik of the Spiti area of Punjab in 1956 and 1957, of Walong in the

<sup>83</sup>*Janata*, 17 March 1963, p. 15.

<sup>84</sup>Gopal Shastri, "New Hope for Tibet", *Janata*, 14 November 1965, p. 7.

<sup>85</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 6(2), 14 July 1967, Cols. 11976-80.

<sup>86</sup>Mukut Behari Lal, n. 13, p. 19.

<sup>87</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 5(2), 15 May 1954, Cols. 7548-49.

Lohit division of NEFA in September 1958 and of Lapthal and Sangcha Malla on the border of Uttar Pradesh in October 1958.<sup>88</sup> Early in January 1959, H.V. Kamath, a member of the National Executive of the PSP, made out that the area occupied by the Chinese in Ladakh itself was actually about 11,000 square miles, and not 6,000 square miles as declared officially by the Indian Government. He counselled the Government "to explore through a conference of Bandung nations the possibilities of a concerted trade boycott of China in Southeast Asian countries".<sup>89</sup> The PSP pointed to the fact that in Ladakh, taking advantage of the inaccessible region, the Chinese had constructed a highway from Gangtok to Yarkand and had sliced away hundreds of square miles of the Indian territory and, in the NEFA area, had resorted to open aggression.<sup>90</sup>

The stand of the Government of India on the McMahon Line as the international frontier between India and Tibet caused the concern of the party. It expressed concern over its White paper revealing that from 1954 China had been showing "scant regard" for the McMahon Line.<sup>91</sup> It underlined the Chinese reply of January 1959 that "the border between India and China had never been formally delimited and that the McMahon Line had never been accepted by the Chinese Government".<sup>92</sup> It upheld the official stand that these boundaries had been defined by long usage, international treaties and considerations of material alignment and the McMahon Line had already been accepted by Chou En Lai in 1956 in course of his discussions with the Indian Prime Minister.<sup>93</sup> It held further that the boundaries now subsisting between India and China followed the natural watershed line

<sup>88</sup>Mukut Behari Lal, n. 13, p. 19.

<sup>89</sup>H.V. Kamath, "New Delhi under-rates Chinese Menace", *Janata*, 10 January 1959, p. 6.

<sup>90</sup>Delhi Resolutions of the National Executive, August 1959, *Janata*, 6 September 1959, pp. 1, 3-6; Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 34(2), 12 September 1959, Col. 8013.

<sup>91</sup>"Editorial", *Janata*, 13 September 1959, p. 1.

<sup>92</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup>"Editorial", *Janata*, 20 September 1959, p. 1.

and there was no reason warranting any change.<sup>94</sup> At its Fifth National Conference in 1959 the party asked the Government to insist upon China's "unequivocal acceptance of the McMahon Line and the traditional Himalayan frontiers" as "a pre-requisite for any negotiation".<sup>95</sup> Welcoming the firm tone of Nehru's letter to Chou En Lai, the PSP insisted that "discussions concerning China's recognition of traditional frontiers should not be confined to minor rectification".<sup>96</sup>

On the occasion of Chou En Lai's visit to India in April 1960 to discuss the border issues, the PSP along with other opposition parties barring the communists, completely dissociated themselves from the invitation extended to him. It appealed to the people to keep away from the public reception and directed its units to hold demonstrations and public meetings on 17 April 1960. It demanded vacation of the aggression in Ladakh and Longju and recognition of the McMahon Line by China.<sup>97</sup> Along with other opposition parties excepting the communists, led by Acharya Kripalani it stated in a letter to Nehru their stand on the proposed talks between the two Prime Ministers. It was hoped that there would be "no dilution of the Indian Government's stand in regard to our boundaries" and that nothing would be done which might be construed as "a surrender of any part of Indian territory".<sup>98</sup>

Drawing the attention of the *Lok Sabha* to China's new Aksai Chin road in Ladakh, the party charged the Government for showing no firmness on the issue.<sup>99</sup> It urged such steps as would enable the people of the affected areas to feel that "they are the architect of their destiny and equal partners in the progress and prosperity of the nation".<sup>100</sup> The unprovoked

<sup>94</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>95</sup>*Report of the Fifth National Conference of the PSP, November 5-9, 1959, n. 15, p. 243.*

<sup>96</sup>*Janata*, 29 November 1959, p. 5.

<sup>97</sup>*Janata*, 27 March 1960, p. 12.

<sup>98</sup>"M.P.'s Caution on Frontier Discussion", *Janata*, 10 April 1960, p. 4.

<sup>99</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 43 (2), 29 April 1960, Cols. 14784-5.

<sup>100</sup>Bhubaneshwar Resolution of the National Executive, December 1960, *Janata*, 8 January 1961, p. 7.



and naked aggression of China in Longju and its continued occupation over there led the party to remind the Government that its urgent task lay not only in strengthening its defence but also in "developing these regions and keeping the people content and satisfied."<sup>101</sup> The increasing activities of the Chinese agents in Sikkim and Bhutan and the presence of well-armed and equipped 50,000 Chinese troops all along the Himalayan frontiers from Ladakh to NEFA led H.V. Kamath to characterise the posture of the Government of India as shameful and pathetic, that of "not yielding an inch but peacefully surrendering thousands of square miles of its territory to China".<sup>102</sup> In July 1962, Nath Pai, Mukut Beharilal, Farid Ansari, all PSP M.P.'s urged in a letter to Prime Minister Nehru to requisition an emergency session of Parliament to discuss the dangerous and deteriorating situation in Ladakh.<sup>103</sup> On 13 August 1962, in a statement in the *Lok Sabha* S.N. Dwivedy offered full cooperation of his party to the Government and declared that "there cannot be any talk, any negotiation, any discussion unless first the Chinese withdraw from our territory".<sup>104</sup> In September, he also urged the Union Government for adequate military preparations to repel Chinese intrusions in NEFA.

### China vis-a-vis Nepal

Ever since the 1950 Chinese military action in Tibet, the PSP has been showing a deep concern over China *vis-a-vis* Nepal. It questioned India's policy of non-intervention, or its indifference to, the events of Nepal and other Himalayan regions.<sup>105</sup> In 1954, it raised alarm against the aggressive design of China as appeared in Nepal's territories being shown Chinese in the new map of China.<sup>106</sup> In 1959, it

<sup>101</sup> *Janata*, 12 March 1961, p. 8.

<sup>102</sup> Bhopal Press Conference Statement of H.V. Kamath, *Janata* 3 December 1961, pp. 9-10.

<sup>103</sup> *Janata*, 29 July 1962, p. 2.

<sup>104</sup> *Lok Sabha Debates*, 6 (2), 13 August 1962, Col. 1495.

<sup>105</sup> Dr. Lohia's Note on A Himalayan Policy, *Himalayan Policy for India*, n. 99, pp. 3-6.

<sup>106</sup> *Lok Sabha Debates*, 5(2), 15 May 1954, Cols. 7548-49.

expressed its concern over the insidious Chinese propaganda and a veiled campaign for the formation of a Himalayan Federation consisting of Nepal and other Himalayan regions under its suzerainty. The party viewed it as the most dangerous secret plan against the security and integrity of India.<sup>107</sup> The mobilization of the Chinese troops, tanks and bulldozers on the borders of Nepal and other Himalayan states led the PSP to point out that unawareness and inactivity of Government towards the peoples of the region had made them doubtful of India's capacity to defend them against eventual Chinese aggression.<sup>108</sup> At the instance of the concentration of the Chinese troops on the other side of the frontiers of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, the PSP drew the attention of the Government to the strategic importance of these territories and asked it to be aware of its duties and responsibilities. The alarm raised by the PSP had a great influence on the official stand, for Nehru himself admitted in the *Rajya Sabha* India's responsibility with respect to the defence of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan.<sup>109</sup>

In 1960, the PSP felt concerned over China's conclusion of treaties with Nepal and Burma viewing them as a plan to isolate India from its immediate neighbours.<sup>110</sup> It also raised alarm against the anti-India Chinese propaganda in Nepal. It hoped that the Government of Nepal would not strengthen the hands of its own and the Chinese communists poised on the Nepal-Tibet frontier. It alerted the Government of Nepal that if India would be one of the countries "to be liberated", Nepal too would be similarly honoured.<sup>111</sup> It urged the Indian

<sup>107</sup> Mukut Behari Lal, n. 13, p. 35; H.V. Kamath, "Chinese Plot to set up Himalayan Federation", *Janata*, 15 August 1959, pp. 9-10.

<sup>108</sup> H.V. Kamath, "Nehru may leave Nation in Lurch", *Janata*, 27 September 1959, p. 3; Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 35(2), 25 November 1959, Col. 1738.

<sup>109</sup> Nehru's *Rajya Sabha* Speech of 8 December 1959, Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy* (Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961, Delhi, 1961), p. 375.

<sup>110</sup> S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 47(2), 22 November 1960, Cols. 1638-39.

<sup>111</sup> H.V. Kamath's press statement, *Janata*, 12 February 1961, p. 4.

Government to make efforts against China's plans. It pointed out that as an independent country between India and China, Nepal was poised in critical circumstances. Viewing India's policy towards Nepal as supine, the party feared the possibility of Nepal gradually gravitating towards China. The building of the Lhasa-Kathmandu highway and the presence of the Chinese technicians and personnel in Nepal further led the PSP to raise alarm against the "sinister ends".<sup>112</sup> It would have liked the Government to strengthen its defence links with Nepal. It condemned the attitude of "touch-me-notism" towards Nepal and some other Southeast Asian countries. It pointed out that "this policy had led to the weakening of the bonds of friendship to the extent that in Nepal, for instance, the Chinese presence is much stronger than the Indian".<sup>113</sup> The PSP held that India's negligence was mainly responsible for China's exploitation of Nepal through the construction of roads and bridges. Keeping in view the Chinese penetration in Nepal, it wanted a constructive Indian policy towards that country. It demanded alertness against the operation of the Chinese agents inside Nepal and urged efforts for the protection of democracy in that country against the potential Chinese threats.

### **The Chinese Aggression**

Following the massive Chinese attack the PSP leaders met Prime Minister Nehru on 21 October 1962 for a joint appraisal of the latest developments in Ladakh and NEFA, and assured him of their "whole-hearted cooperation in the task of psychologically and physically preparing the people for resistance to Chinese aggression".<sup>114</sup> They wanted the task to be pursued with "firmness of will and singleness of purpose". Asoka Mehta declared : "We must sink our differences and make a common cause with the Government in fighting the Chinese menace".<sup>115</sup> The PSP blamed the Government for the

<sup>112</sup>H.V. Kamath's press statement, *Janata*, 3 December 1961, pp. 9-10.

<sup>113</sup>General Secretary's Report of New Delhi National Executive, August 1967, *Janata*, 10 September 1967, p. 3.

<sup>114</sup>H.V. Kamath's press statement, *Janata*, 28 October 1962, p. 2.

<sup>115</sup>*Janata*, 28 October 1962, p. 3.

loss of national frontiers and pointed out that the reverses had resulted from the lack of preparations and failure of foresight on its part. It declared that the aggression "so brutally real, must and will be repulsed...There can be no compromise or temporising in recovering every inch of our territory in Ladakh as well as in NEFA".<sup>116</sup> It opposed the proposal for negotiation on the basis of the withdrawal of the Chinese forces to the position occupied by them before 8 September 1962 and demanded severance of diplomatic relations with China.<sup>117</sup> While assuring warm sympathy and whole-hearted support to the Government, H.V. Kamath, deputy leader of the PSP in the *Lok Sabha*, stated: "The Himalayas are not today a physical barrier...They are ideological frontiers between democracy and communism...And this communist conspiracy, the international communist conspiracy, must be scotched on the heights, not at the foothills of the Himalayas".<sup>118</sup> The PSP stood for "speedy, consolidated action" and opposed "inept vacillation and inept theorisings" about the Chinese attack.<sup>119</sup> It endorsed the Prime Minister's resolution on the proclamation of emergency.

With regard to the unilateral ceasefire by China and its so-called peace proposals, at a public meeting in Bombay on 22 November, Asoka Mehta, the PSP Chairman, wanted the proposals to be viewed with deepest disbelief, as "not just tricky but fraudulent".<sup>120</sup> S.N. Dwivedy requested the Government to reject the Chinese proposals and stick to the "policy of non-alignment".<sup>121</sup> The PSP supported seeking assistance from all friendly countries.

### Colombo Proposals

The PSP outrightly rejected the Colombo proposals. On 23 January 1963, speaking in the *Lok Sabha*, S.N. Dwivedy

<sup>116</sup>Delhi Resolutions of the National Executive, November 1962, *Janata*, 11 November 1962, pp. 7-8.

<sup>117</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>118</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 9(3), 9 November 1962, Cols. 390-9.

<sup>119</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 9(3), 10 November 1962, Col. 727.

<sup>120</sup>*Janata*, 2 December 1962, p. 15.

<sup>121</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 10-11 (3), 10 December 1962, Col. 5134.

declared :

"I feel the Colombo proposals were dangerous in their implications and disastrous in their consequences for this country; politically and militarily they were advantageous and favourable to our enemy...failed to realise the basic issue between India and China. It is war. It is not border conflict".<sup>122</sup>

While rejecting the Prime Minister's resolution calling for the acceptance of the Colombo proposals in the *Lok Sabha*, Nath Pai held the Colombo proposals as "Peking proposals" which, instead of taking the direct route from Peking to New Delhi, chose to take circuitous route of Cambodia, Rangoon and New Delhi.<sup>123</sup> The party also refused to accept them on the ground that it "sought to equate the aggressor with the victim of aggression" and permitted him to enjoy the fruits of aggression".<sup>124</sup> It observed "Anti-compromise day" on 1 February 1963 and opposed what it viewed as a peaceful surrender of the Indian territory in the name of peaceful negotiations. It held that the acceptance of the proposals made "a *de facto* cease-fire line into a *de jure* one" and, as such, betrayed "a psychology of defeat and loss of nerves".<sup>125</sup> It pointed out that "out of six neutral nations that assembled at Colombo, the sympathies of four lay on the other side", for the UAR was virtually "isolated", Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia was already committed to Peking and Ghana, too, offered full support to China.<sup>126</sup> The PSP charged the Government for reinducting "vagueness" in India's China policy<sup>127</sup> and asked the

<sup>122</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 12(3), 23 January 1963, Col. 6046.

<sup>123</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 12(3), 24 January 1963, Col. 6236.

<sup>124</sup>New Delhi Resolutions of the National Executive, January 1963, *Janata*, 10 February 1963, p. 11.

<sup>125</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 13(2), 21 February 1963, Cols. 745-48.

<sup>126</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>127</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 13(2), 21 February 1963, Col. 555.

Government to resign.<sup>128</sup>

### China vis-a-vis Pakistan

The PSP also felt concerned over the growing collusion between China and Pakistan. As early as in 1961, it warned the Government against the probability of the formation of a Sino-Pak axis.<sup>129</sup> In 1963, the Pindi-Peking accord was viewed by the PSP as "a marriage of convenience", "a piece of sheer chauvinistic opportunism" and "an unholy alliance" solemnised on the altar of hostility to India.<sup>130</sup> In course of his thirty-five minutes' talk with Prime Minister Nehru on 27 May 1963, H.V. Kamath tried to alarm the Government against the probable military danger from China and Pakistan and emphasised that it would be wrong to think that Pakistan, because of its close attachment with the West, could not go very far.<sup>131</sup> The party believed that these two countries had over-ruled the ideological considerations and had been suffering from "revolutionary chauvinism" and "important anger".<sup>132</sup> The urgency of the situation arising out of the concentration of Chinese troops on the northern borders and the Pakistan-China collusion to browbeat India led the party to urge "a firming of will and rededication to the cause of defending the country's freedom".<sup>133</sup>

Early in 1965, the PSP alarmed the Government against the eventuality of a Sino-Pak adventurist plot in Kashmir.<sup>134</sup> In August 1965, it saw in Pakistan's raids in Kashmir a Sino-Pakistan design, planned in such a manner that before the

<sup>128</sup> *Report of the Sixth National Conference of the PSP, Bhopal, June 8-10, 1963*, p. 93.

<sup>129</sup> Asoka Mehta's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 50(2), 20 February 1961, Cols. 918-20; *Janata*, 23 July 1961, p. 3.

<sup>130</sup> Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 14(2), 18 March 1963, Col. 4500.

<sup>131</sup> *Janata*, 2 June 1963, p. 11.

<sup>132</sup> Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 21(2), 16 September 1963, Col. 6350.

<sup>133</sup> New Delhi Resolutions of the National Executive, August 1963, *Janata*, 1 September 1963, pp. 5-6; "General Secretary Report", *Janata*, 17 May 1964, p. 1.

<sup>134</sup> Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 40(2), 1 April 1965, Col. 7227

end of December, or even in October, India's frontiers might be raided by both Pakistan and China.<sup>135</sup> Later, China's ultimatum to India led the PSP to point out that "so long as Pakistan's collusion with China continues...the compulsion to launch an offensive against India would persist".<sup>136</sup> It, as such, wanted adequate preparations against the challenge of the two dictators, "whenever and from whichever quarter it might come".<sup>137</sup>

The party held that the Peking-Pindi axis had "a sinister significance" for India in view of China's fast development of nuclear armoury and its continuing build-up in Tibet.<sup>138</sup> The big display of tanks and jet fighters acquired by Pakistan from China and the replenishment by her of her arms also caused concern to the PSP.<sup>139</sup> It would like the attention of the Western powers being drawn to the danger of Sino-Pakistan conspiracy threatening the whole of Southeast Asia. It regretted that the Government of India had taken no purposeful steps against the fraudulent collusion.<sup>140</sup> It asked the Government to face the realities of the situation and mobilise itself.

### **Threat to Bhutan**

In October 1966, the PSP felt seriously concerned with the Chinese threat to Bhutan. It viewed China's design against Bhutan "as a part of its imperialist, expansionist plan for establishing its hegemony over Asia".<sup>141</sup> It wanted India to respond promptly to Bhutan's call with all necessary steps.

<sup>135</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 44(3), 22 August 1965, Col. 1543.

<sup>136</sup>New Delhi Resolutions of the National Executive, November 1965, *Janata*, 21 November 1965, p. 3.

<sup>137</sup>S.N. Dwivedy, "Sino-Pak Conspiracy Against India—An Analysis", *Janata*, 27 March 1966, p. 1.

<sup>138</sup>Editorial, "The Peking-Pindi Axis", *Janata*, 27 March 1966, p. 1.

<sup>139</sup>PSP Ninth National Conference, December 30-31, 1967-January 1968, *Kanpur, General Secretary's Report*, p. 36.

<sup>140</sup>National Executive Resolutions, *Janata*, 7 July 1968, pp. 9-10.

<sup>141</sup>Lucknow Resolutions of the National Executive, October 1966, *Janata*, 16 October 1966, p. 13.

Recalling Nehru's declaration of 1959 that aggression against Bhutan would be regarded as aggression against India, it told the Government that time had come to demonstrate that India really meant it. It warned: "The time is now, delay is dangerous".<sup>142</sup>

### The Chinese Treatment of India's Diplomats

The Chinese treatment of the Indian Embassy staff in Peking in June 1967 caused concern to the PSP. It pointed out that the arrest of the two Indian diplomats for taking photographs of an ancient Chinese architecture was against the prevailing rules of civilized nations. The trial of one of them in absentia, the declaration of another as *persona non grata*, the order against them to leave the country and the treatment meted out to them by the Chinese Red guards on their way back were the point of behaviour which the party viewed as "inhuman and brutal".<sup>143</sup> It approved India's retaliatory measures of stripping a Chinese diplomat of his diplomatic status and declaring another official in the embassy as *persona non grata* as "justifiable". It supported the Indian Government further over curbing the movements of the Chinese diplomats. It wanted the Government to be stiffer by severing diplomatic relations with China for the sake of India's "self-respect and honour".<sup>144</sup>

### Attack on Nathu La (Sikkim)

In September 1967, the PSP raised alarm against the Chinese attack on the Indian position at Nathu La (Sikkim). The party viewed it as another instalment of "Chinese expansionism". Prem Bhasin, General Secretary of the PSP, and S.N. Dwivedy, party leader in the *Lok Sabha*, congratulated Indian troops on having successfully repelled the Chinese onslaught, but "cautioned the Government against com-

<sup>142</sup>*Ibid.*; PSP Ninth National Conference, December 30-31, 1967-January 1, 1968, Kanpur, General Secretary's Report, n. 139, p. 37.

<sup>143</sup>Editorial, "A Challenge", *Janata*, 18 June 1967, p. 1.

<sup>144</sup>"PSP in Parliament", *Janata*, 25 June 1967, p. 13; Hem Barua's Statement, *PSP in Parliament* (Praja Socialist Party, 1967), p. 15.



placency in the matter". Recalling that similar incidents in the crucial September days of 1962 had climaxed in a full scale attack on Ladakh and NEFA, the Praja Socialists pointed out that "the situation called for no lowering of the guard, and for a state of utmost preparedness".<sup>145</sup> Dwivedy expressed surprise over the callousness of the Government which had decided to send its Defence Minister abroad for he feared that the Chinese action in Nathu Lal might be "a prelude to major action" with a conjoint, eventual invasion from Pakistan also.<sup>146</sup> N.G. Goray shared his concern.<sup>147</sup> He held that any dialogue with China appeared "impossible" and characterized it as "a measure of complacency and pain that our Army Chief was touring abroad at this critical hour".<sup>148</sup>

### GLOBAL ISSUES

Major issues of global significance, prominently figuring in the Sino-Indian relations, have been the problems of disarmament, anti-colonialism and anti-racialism.

In 1963, it took a serious view of China's refusal to accept the test ban treaty and raised alarm against the eventuality of China's nuclear adventure.<sup>149</sup> The Chinese explosion of atom bomb in October 1964 added urgency to the issue of disarmament and caused additional anxiety and burdens for India leaving it askance whether it should become a nuclear power or seek nuclear support from the two super powers.<sup>150</sup> Speaking in the *Lok Sabha*, Nath Pai declared :

"The explosion by China in defiance of the treaty at Moscow, in defiance of world opinion, was not a freak,

<sup>145</sup>*Janata*, 17 September 1967, p. 11.

<sup>146</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>147</sup>*The Searchlight* (Patna), 19 September 1967.

<sup>148</sup>PSP Ninth National Conference, December 30-31, 1967-January 1, 1968, Kanpur, General Secretary's Report, n. 139, p. 40.

<sup>149</sup>New Delhi Resolution of the National Executive, August 1963, *Janata*, 1 September 1963, pp. 5-6.

<sup>150</sup>Pradip Bose, "China's Bomb and India's Choice", *Janata*, 18 October 1964, p. 13; Editorial, "This Changing World", *Janata*, 25 October 1964, p. 1.

nor just the blowing of a cracker by an erratic child, it was the culmination of a certain process which she has laid down for herself. We have to think of, judge and evaluate it against the background of the Chinese overall strategy, long-term policy, long-range objective in the whole of Asia and the world".<sup>151</sup>

The primary objective of producing nuclear weapons, the PSP held, had been the fulfilling of the long-term Chinese goals of nationalism, chauvinism and expansionism. It wanted the Government of India to exert itself utmost to create a climate of opinion where serious discussions on disarmament be resumed and efforts be made to bring China within UN.<sup>152</sup> Early in 1965, it apprehended a fresh Chinese nuclear explosion in the near future and held that it added "a sinister dimension to the political situation in Afro-Asia, particularly in [the] South-East Asia".<sup>153</sup> It would like the Government not to give priority to its ideal of *Ahimsa* and to the terms of the Moscow Treaty as higher and nobler than that of preserving the sovereignty and independence of the country. At the same time, it rejected the possibility as well as desirability of a nuclear umbrella to be provided jointly by the USA, the UK and wished that "early steps should be taken to accelerate this development to a level in a shortest possible time so that all the weapons of defence including nuclear ones could be produced by ourselves".<sup>154</sup> As such, it would have liked the Government to reorient its nuclear policy and manufacture atom bombs as a deterrent against the eventuality of the Chinese onslaught on Indian freedom.<sup>155</sup> It resented the proliferation and escalation of nuclear weapons as opposed to the conventional ones and advocated the alternative to have a firm assurance of "nuclear retaliation"

<sup>151</sup>Lok Sabha Debates, 35(2), 23 November 1964, Col. 1296.

<sup>152</sup>Pradip Bose, "India, China and the World, *Janata*, 6 December 1964, p. 3.

<sup>153</sup>National Executive Resolutions, *Janata*, 4 April 1965, p. 7.

<sup>154</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>155</sup>G.S. Bhargava, "Plea for Bomb as a Deterrent", *Janata*, 17 July 1966, p. 5; M.R. Dandavate, "Chinese Nuclear Challenge to Indian Democracy", *Janata*, 29 January 1965, p. 12.

or "a nuclear shield" from any one of the major powers in the event of war with China.<sup>156</sup> Keeping in view China's fast developing nuclear armoury, it urged the Government to develop nuclear weapons at all costs.<sup>157</sup>

The explosion of the hydrogen bomb by China in 1967 led the PSP further to raise alarm. In a press statement N.G. Coray warned the Government that "with every explosion the distance between China and India is widening and the political balance in Asia is getting violently disturbed".<sup>158</sup> The PSP would like India either to develop India's own nuclear armament or to enter into a pact with any nuclear nation which it would consider reliable. It found little relevance in the present nuclear policy of the Indian Government and called for a total revision of the same.

In regard to anti-colonialism and anti-racialism, the PSP had been urging the Government to seek cooperation and support of the PRC. It would like India to have the good will of the PRC in the elimination of foreign domination from Asia.<sup>159</sup> In 1954, Madhu Limaye stated : "The Western dominance in Asia will not end finally unless China, Japan and India pull together".<sup>160</sup> The PSP hailed the Sino-Indian cooperation with regard to the Geneva Agreement on Indo-China and saw in it "a great blow to Western Colonialism".<sup>161</sup> It believed that the Sino-Indian collaboration had proved fruitful also in respect of the liberation of Asian countries. It was of the opinion that the agreement on Vietnam, the liberation of Laos and Cambodia and China's direct conversation with West European countries were mainly the result of

<sup>156</sup>Peter Alvares, "Chinese Blast and India's Defence Problem", *Janata*, 29 January 1965, pp. 15-17; Subhas P. Padhya, "Border and the Bomb", *Janata*, 18 August 1965, pp. 22-23.

<sup>157</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 47(2), 15 November 1965, Cols. 1979-80; "Editorial", *Janata*, 15 May 1966, p. 1; N.G. Goray's Statement, *The Times of India* (Delhi), 27 May 1966.

<sup>158</sup>*Tribune* (Ambala), 20 June 1967.

<sup>159</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, "Concerning Our Attitude Towards Red China", *Janata*, 9 December 1951, p. 3.

<sup>160</sup>*Janata*, 8 August 1954, p. 15.

<sup>161</sup>*Ibid.*

India's efforts to bring China to peace area.<sup>162</sup> It further noted with satisfaction Sino-Indian cooperation at the Bandung Conference (1955).

On the vital question of racial discrimination, the PSP was not satisfied with the more academic Sino-Indian discussions at the Conference table. It welcomed a unity of outlook between the two countries over the issue and believed that together they were successful to a great extent in seeking the cooperation of other Asian and African nations.<sup>163</sup> The Second Asian socialist conference also urged for liberation of the subjected people of Macao.<sup>164</sup> The Praja Socialists wanted from the two Governments positive steps for stopping human exploitation and racial discrimination in the African countries.

Later on, as the gulf between India and China widened owing to the Tibetan issue and the other border conflicts as discussed earlier, the PSP was one with the Government of India in accusing China of having neo-colonial and imperialistic ambitions in Asia and Africa and elsewhere in the world. Its resolutions warned the Government against the Chinese colonial design and urged for an anti-China front with the United States and the USSR.<sup>165</sup>

### Asian Issues

Major Asian issues bearing on Sino-Indian relations have been the Korean War, the Japanese peace treaty, the formation of SEATO, the Bandung Conference and the Vietnam War.

In the context of the Korean War at its commencement, the PSP understood that China did not trust India's neutrality. It appeared to the party that India had annoyed China and had given an impression that it was taking the Anglo-American side as against Russia and China. When India

<sup>162</sup>Madhav Gokhale, "An Asian Policy", *Janata*, 19 December 1954, pp. 3-5.

<sup>163</sup>*Janata*, 1 May 1955, pp. 1, 11-12.

<sup>164</sup>*Janata*, 18 November 1956, p. 11.

<sup>165</sup>H.V. Kamath's Statement at the Fifth National Conference of the PSP, *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 28 December 1965.

tabled its peace resolution at the close of 1952 and China accused India of "hostile actions of having entered the Anglo-American camp",<sup>166</sup> the PSP saw in it the confirmation of its impression. It believed that China's haughtiness and arrogance was the result of the impression that India was acting as "an agent of Anglo-American camp".<sup>167</sup> Later, when India accepted the Chairmanship of Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea, it came with facts and figures to prove that the Chinese and the North Koreans, inspired by Russia, had not been cooperating with India in its task.<sup>168</sup> It would like the Government to ask China not to block Korean unity and sovereignty emerging through free elections under international supervision.<sup>169</sup>

With regard to the Japanese Peace Treaty, the PSP had been suggesting that India and China should make combined efforts for Japan's guaranteed neutrality, the USA having to withdraw its forces.<sup>170</sup> It believed that by agreeing to the American tutelege Japan had ex-communicated itself from the Asian community and could stage a comeback only if it would abrogate the security treaty with the United States and would achieve a peaceful settlement with China.<sup>171</sup> It urged the Government of India to offer its good offices for this purpose and seek cooperation from the PRC.

The formation of SEATO, the PSP noted, was denounced equally by the Governments of India and China. It held that SEATO had perpetuated the intrusions of the West in Asia and had created artificial Asian divisions into communist and anti-communist nations. It would like India and other nations to try removing "weaknesses and fear". The policy which sought to range Japan and China or South Asia on opposite

<sup>166</sup>Madhu Limaye, "India's Mediation in Korea", *Janata*, 14 December 1952, pp. 1-2.

<sup>167</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>168</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 23 December 1953, Cols, 3019-20.

<sup>169</sup>Madhav Gokhale, n. 162.

<sup>170</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, "A Five Point Foreign Policy for India", 23 December 1951, pp. 6-7.

<sup>171</sup>Madhu Limaye's Statement, *Janata*, 8 August 1954, p. 15.

-sides permanently must, in the opinion of the PSP, be deemed to be inimical to the long term interest of Asia".<sup>172</sup> It urged efforts for the building of an Asian Community and India's better understanding and cooperation with Peking on the issue.<sup>173</sup> It held that Sino-Indian record on *Panchshila* in 1954 had given admission to China into the 'Peace area' in Asia and expected that through their joint efforts other free Southeast Asian countries could be kept away from "SEATO deliberations".<sup>174</sup> It would not like the Government of India to depend upon the sweet words of China, but to have China's active cooperation in the matter.

The Bandung Conference was another important Asian issue bringing India and China together. The PSP noted that it was the first Asian-African Conference which brought as many as twenty-nine nations on a common platform. Of particular significance to it were the cooperation between India and China on many issues of international importance and their combined efforts to save the conference from a total wreck. It appreciated China's role in promoting the solidarity among the countries of Asia and Africa.<sup>175</sup> On the whole, for the Praja Socialists, the Bandung Conference had sown the seed of greater cooperation between India, China and other Asian and African nations.

Keeping in view China's subsequent expansionist policy in Asia and its strained relations with India, the PSP questioned the attitude of the Government of India towards the Vietnam War. It urged the Government to take a pre-eminent part in the protection of democracy in Vietnam.<sup>176</sup> The party held that if North Vietnam, supported by communist China, would take over South Vietnam, it would create a serious threat to India and other Southeast Asian countries. It, as such, wanted India to be cautious in its support to Hanoi against the United

<sup>172</sup>Madhu Limaye, "SEATO—An Asian View", *Janata*, 24 October 1954, pp. 3-5.

<sup>173</sup>*Ibid.*; Asoka Mehta's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7(2), 29 September 1954, Cols. 3705-6.

<sup>174</sup>*Ibid.*; Cols. 3711-12; Madhava Gokhale, "An Asian Policy—A Plea II", *Janata*, 19 December 1954, pp. 3-5; Indore Resolutions of National Council, June 1954, *Janata*, 13 June 1954, p. 11.

<sup>175</sup>*Janata*, 1 May 1955, p. 2.

<sup>176</sup>*Janata*, 20 September 1964, p. 3.

States and in its appeal to the United States to prevent an escalation of the conflict.<sup>177</sup> It believed that India had no alternative than to accept the fact that only the United States could "contain" communist China's military expansionism.<sup>178</sup> Though the PSP approved India's efforts for peace in Vietnam it emphasised that by containing China in Vietnam the United States was ensuring India's own defence against China's expansionist policy.<sup>179</sup> As such, the Praja Socialists held that India's support to communist China and North Vietnam would be a policy against those who offered a better alternative than communism to the Vietnamese people.

### SUMMING UP THE ATTITUDE

The attitude of the PSP towards India's relations with the PRC appears to have been that of raising alarm at every critical stage. Fundamentally, the party disagreed with the China policy of the Indian Government which it found weak-kneed and most often wanting. It has viewed the Indian refusal of cooperation to various efforts at international levels against the wrongs done by China as essentially inconsistent with the basic principles of India's foreign policy.

The PSP continued to have premonitions about China and from a very early stage it had been visualising bitterness in Sino-Indian relations and alerting the Government against the expansionist designs of communist China. It has been vigorous and, at the same time, reasonable and constructive in its protest against what it has viewed as the weak and vacillating policies of the Government towards China. It had begun alarming the nation and showing its posture of determined resistance to communist China much ahead of the actual occurrence of the Chinese aggression, maybe, especially because of its ideological antagonism to communism.

The attitude of the PSP towards India's relations with China appears to have had often influenced the official Indian policy. Particularly in relation to Tibet the alarm raised by the

<sup>177</sup> *Janata*, 14 February 1965, p. 2.

<sup>178</sup> Pradip Bose, "India and the Vietnam Crisis", *Janata*, 14 May 1965, pp. 5-9.

<sup>179</sup> Peter Alvares, "Escalation Renders Peace in Vietnam Urgent", *Janata*, 16 July 1967, pp. 5-6; National Executive Resolutions, *Janata*, 17 November 1968, p. 5.

PSP was effective. As has been seen earlier, the party had a considerable influence on the official policy about the steps to uphold the territorial integrity of the country and to defend Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal.



## Relations with Pakistan

The PSP has been keenly concerned over India's relations with Pakistan. Agreeing widely with the basic policies of the Government, it has continued to suggest changes.

### PHASES

#### Partition onwards

To start with, the PSP broadly supported the Pakistan policy of the Government. It advocated close friendly relations with Pakistan and wished that there should be no hostility between the two countries. At Nasik, in March 1948, Purshottam Trikamdas, the chairman at the Sixth Annual Conference of the Socialist Party, declared, "There is no reason why even after partition India and Pakistan should not live in peace".<sup>1</sup> Keeping in view the dispute over Kashmir the party fully supported India's intervention and warmly welcomed the accession of Kashmir to India. It expected that the Government of India would "spare no effort to strengthen their [Kashmiris] hands in their fight against communalism and two-nation theory of Pakistan".<sup>2</sup> It was not ready to accept the partition of Kashmir. It wanted the Government to make efforts for a kind of "federative or confederative solution", or "a foreign policy union", or "a no war pact" between the two countries to settle their problems.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Report of the Sixth Annual Conference of the Socialist Party, Nasik, March 1948*, p. 69.

<sup>2</sup> *Lucknow Resolution of the National Executive, 28-29 December 1948* (Socialist Party, Bombay, 1949), p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Rammanohar Lohia, "Struggle against Communalism within and across the Border", *India and Pakistan* (Socialist Party, 1950), p. 2.

Pointing out the incidents in East Pakistan involving the minorities, the party asked the Indian Government to guarantee jointly with Pakistan in words and in deeds the fullest protection of all minorities in both the countries.<sup>4</sup> Clarifying the stand of the party on minorities in Pakistan, Jaya Prakash Narayan asked for every measure, including the sending of forces to East Pakistan, to protect the minorities there. He rejected the idea of the exchange of populations between the two countries.<sup>5</sup> The party pledged support to the spirit of reconciliation engendered by the Nehru-Liaquat pact. The agreement, in its opinion, would "either be the turning point in India-Pakistan relationship or the prelude to an inescapable conflict".<sup>6</sup>

### Nehru-Liaquat Pact onwards

In the second phase, from April 1950 to September 1958, the PSP viewed India's Pakistan policy full of weaknesses and advocated firmness. Keeping in view the Liaquat-Nehru Agreement, the party stood for India-Pakistan amity<sup>7</sup> and urged the Government to adopt "a realistic policy towards Pakistan which would fully guarantee the frontiers of Pakistan and would in turn compel Pakistan to enter into a bilateral guarantee of common policy on minorities, trade and foreign affairs.<sup>8</sup> Asking for a clearly defined policy, it pointed out that, even on the issue of Kashmir, lack of theoretical insight of international law would involve wider complexity and would present problems of foreign policy between the two countries.<sup>9</sup> It held that weaknesses of India's foreign policy had led Pakistan to become a seat of the economic and political influences

<sup>4</sup>Rewa Resolution of the National Executive, March 1950, n. 3, p. 21.

<sup>5</sup>Jaya Prakash Narayan, "Before Delhi Agreement and after", n. 3, pp. 10-11; *The Hitavada* (Nagpur), 8 March 1950.

<sup>6</sup>Asoka Mehta, "Nehru-Liaquat Pact", *Janata*, 16 April 1950, p. 5.

<sup>7</sup>Jaya Prakash Narayan, "Why Socialist Party Supports the Delhi Pact", *Janata*, 14 May 1950, pp. 5-6.

<sup>8</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, "India and Pakistan: The Supreme Weapon", *Janata*, 12 November 1950, pp. 5-6.

<sup>9</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, "India and Pakistan: The Kashmir Tangle", *Janata*, 5 November 1950, p. 5.

of the Atlantic bloc.<sup>10</sup> Keeping in view such complications, it demanded an early solution of the outstanding problems between India and Pakistan. With regard to the treatment of the minority community in East Pakistan, it asked the Government to take all possible effective steps, not merely by sentiment but by action, like putting pressure on Pakistan including the imposition of economic sanctions and cutting off all trade relations.<sup>11</sup> It held that the failure to solve the Kashmir issue had brought about US-Pakistan military agreement in 1953 and had presented a threat to the whole of Asia.<sup>12</sup> It, as such, felt that it would be very much worthwhile for both the Governments "to sit together determined to find a satisfactory solution."<sup>13</sup> It warned the Government of India against a weak and vacillating policy over the issue of Kashmir in UN.<sup>14</sup> It stood for a clear declaration that plebiscite would not be considered as a means for solving the dispute.<sup>15</sup>

Keeping in view the tensions being built up by Pakistan against India, the incessant firing in Assam borders and the steady squeezing out of the minority people from East Pakistan, the PSP urged the Government to uphold India's position firmly on these and other issues and avoid "miscalculations in all quarters".<sup>16</sup> It demanded from the Government an early solution of the canal water dispute through the arbitration of the World Bank and an immediate repulsion of border raids. What it wanted was a policy of "firmness with friendliness"

<sup>10</sup>Madhu Limaye, "Foreign Policy : Some Points for Discussion", *Special Convention of the Socialist Party, Pachmarhi, May 1952*, pp. 1-4.

<sup>11</sup>Asoka Mehta, "Refugee Problem in Bengal is All-India's Responsibility", *Janata*, 2 November 1952, p. 12; Acharya Kripalani, "The Healing Tough", *Janata*, 9 November 1952, p. 1.

<sup>12</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Parliamentary Debates*, 10(2), 23 December 1953, Col. 3021; *Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party* (Praja Socialist Publication, Bombay, 1954), p. 31.

<sup>13</sup>Patna Resolution of the National Executive, January 1954, *Two Years of the PSP*, n. 12, p. 33.

<sup>14</sup>"Editorial", *Janata*, 17 February 1957, pp. 1-2.

<sup>15</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 1(2), 25 March 1957, Col. 730.

<sup>16</sup>Bombay Resolution of the National Executive, May 1958, *Janata*, 26 May 1958, pp. 11-12; *Report of the Fourth National Conference of the PSP, Poona, 1958*, p. 133.

towards Pakistan.<sup>17</sup> Its persuasions may be viewed to have borne on the signing of the Nehru-Noon Agreement in September 1958.

#### Nehru-Noon Agreement onwards

In the third phase, after the Nehru-Noon pact was signed and a military regime came up subsequently in Pakistan in October 1958, the PSP appreciated the attitude of compromise being pursued by the Government of India and expected better economic and cultural contacts between the two countries and an amicable settlement of their outstanding dispute. General Ayub Khan made a statement on his take-over that he wanted friendly relations with India. The PSP urged the Government to respond to Pakistan's appeal and help in removing mutual suspicions and hostility and create such conditions in which even the difficult problems between them might be satisfactorily solved.<sup>18</sup> At the same time, it raised alarm against the potential danger of the rise of military dictatorships in neighbouring countries and called for a change in India's basic attitude towards Pakistan.<sup>19</sup> It would not like border incidents to be viewed as "insignificant" and would like the Government to have "stringent measures" for the protection of the people in border areas.<sup>20</sup> The gestures of Pakistan's new regime like its constant forays against India's borders, forcible occupation of Indian villages and shooting down of Indian Air Force planes led the party to urge the Government of India to request the United States to discontinue its military aid to Pakistan.<sup>21</sup>

Subsequently, in 1960, Pakistan's desire for a closer relation between the two countries and amicable settlement of boundary disputes and other financial issues was welcomed by the PSP.<sup>22</sup> It regretted that, because of the attitude of the Government of India, financial agreement could not be signed between

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> *Janata*, 9 November 1958, p. 2.

<sup>19</sup> Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 23(2), 8 December 1958, Cols. 3827-28.

<sup>20</sup> Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 23(2), 8 December 1958, Col. 3717.

<sup>21</sup> New Delhi Resolution of the National Executive, April 1959, *Janata*, 26 April 1959, p. 5.

<sup>22</sup> "Editorial", *Janata*, 17 February 1960, p. 2.

the two countries at Peshawar. It, however, appreciated Morarji Desai's statement concerning the India-Pakistan friendship and the solution of all outstanding disputes between the two countries.<sup>23</sup> On the occasion of the Indian Prime Minister's visit to Pakistan for the settlement of the canal water dispute, the PSP urged him to persuade Pakistan for a "no war pact".<sup>24</sup> The party hailed the joint communique issued simultaneously in India and Pakistan at the end of the visit. It welcomed the provisions in the communique regarding the settlement of the Indus water question and the elimination of border disputes. The proposals for a meeting between the Finance Ministers of the two countries to resolve the difference on financial matters and for a ministerial level conference for implementing the border agreement and resolving outstanding differences for the promotion of cooperation between the two countries on scientific and technical matters were also welcomed by it.<sup>25</sup> But some of the Praja Socialists questioned the Government and held the canal water treaty as "one-sided".<sup>26</sup> The party regretted the decision concerning the transfer of Berubari to Pakistan and held that the Government "has no authority whatever to liquidate the very citizenship of any Indian national".<sup>27</sup>

By the middle of 1961, the PSP showed concern with the deterioration in India-Pakistan relations. Despite India's generous efforts for reasonable agreements, President Ayub Khan had stepped up his tirade and had created an impression in the United States that its security had a danger from India in the absence of adequate US military aid. In view of President Ayub's visit to the United States and the mention in the joint communique on his talks with President Kennedy regarding the use of US arms by Pakistan, the PSP raised an

<sup>23</sup>Janata, 3 April 1960, p. 2.

<sup>24</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, Lok Sabha Debates, 46(2), 31 August 1960, Cols. 5956-57.

<sup>25</sup>"Editorial", Janata, 2 October 1960, p. 1.

<sup>26</sup>Asoka Mehta's Statement, Lok Sabha Debates, 48(2), 30 November 1960, Col. 3189.

<sup>27</sup>Bhubaneswar Resolution of the National Executive, Janata, 8 January 1961, p. 7.

alarm against the eventuality of US missiles being supplied to Pakistan.<sup>28</sup> It regretted the "hate India" attitude being developed in Pakistan and appreciated the Indian stand over Kashmir.<sup>29</sup> It further alerted the Government against the anti-India attitude of Pakistan's press and people over the issues of Goa and Ladakh.<sup>30</sup> When, in 1962, the Kashmir issue was going to be debated in the Security Council and India's representative in UN refused to negotiate the issue on the basis of a cease-fire line, it wanted direct negotiations with Pakistan.<sup>31</sup> It urged adequate efforts for the settlement of other problems as had been made in the case of canal water disputes and deprecated "mutual recriminations".<sup>32</sup> It endorsed Nehru's statement that no settlement, provisional or otherwise, between China and Pakistan regarding the territory of the part of Kashmir illegally held in possession by Pakistan would be acceptable to India.<sup>33</sup> It underlined the need for strengthening India's defence potentialities to meet aggression from Pakistan<sup>34</sup> which might ensue after Pakistan failed in the Security Council to secure India's agreement on plebiscite in Kashmir.<sup>35</sup>

### Chinese Attack onwards

In the fourth phase, commencing in the autumn of 1962, in view of the pro-Chinese attitude of Pakistan during the Chinese attack on India, the PSP urged the Government for better relations with Pakistan and, later, welcomed the move-

<sup>28</sup> *Janata*, 23 July 1961, pp. 3-6.

<sup>29</sup> D.P. Singh's Statement, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, 35(1), 22 August 1961, Cols. 1189-90; Nath Pai, "Some Aspects of India's Foreign Policy", *Janata*, 27 August 1961, pp. 11-12.

<sup>30</sup> Asoka Mehta's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 60(2), 4 December 1961, Col. 2963; "Editorial", *Janata*, 17 December 1961, pp. 1-2.

<sup>31</sup> S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 1(2), 27 April 1962, Cols. 1392-93.

<sup>32</sup> Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 2(2), 30 April 1962, Cols. 1664-65.

<sup>33</sup> *Janata*, 13 May 1962, p. 2.

<sup>34</sup> H.V. Kamath's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 4(2), 30 May 1962, Col. 7847; *Janata*, 1 July 1962, pp. 3-4, 8.

<sup>35</sup> "Editorial", *Janata*, 1 July 1962, p. 13; "Editorial", *Janata*, 7 July 1962, p. 1.

for talk between the two countries.<sup>36</sup> It, however, suggested building up "military strength and position to meet the combined challenge of Pakistan and China".<sup>37</sup> As against the subsequent Pindi-Peking accord it urged the Indian Government to warn the two countries and condemn their unholy alliance.<sup>38</sup> It criticised Pakistan's attempt to blackmail India on the issue of Kashmir through the display of antagonism to Western arms aid to the latter, for the display was aimed at taking maximum advantage in the face of the serious Chinese threat.<sup>39</sup> It raised alarm against the dangers of Pakistan's collusion with China.<sup>40</sup> It would like the Government of India not to agree to mediation on Kashmir unless and until it was convinced that Pakistan's attitude "has at least undergone some noticeable change".<sup>41</sup>

The communal frenzy, which arose early in 1964, led the PSP to expose the weaknesses of the official policy. It expressed its dissatisfaction with the "tardy and timid" approach towards the question of minorities and refugees and condemned the Government of India for not being straightforward and realistic in its policy.<sup>42</sup> It urged immediate steps and search for some permanent solution of the problem.

The explosive events in Kashmir and the intransigent attitude of Pakistan, backed by some of the Western nations in the UN Security Council, led the party further to suggest taking a firm stand and warning Pakistan's Western allies.<sup>43</sup> It held the Government wrong for not moving to integrate the whole

<sup>36</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 11(2), 10 December 1962, Col. 5133.

<sup>37</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 13(2), 22 February 1963, Col. 752.

<sup>38</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 14(2), 18 March 1963, Cols. 14496-14500.

<sup>39</sup>*Janata*, 25 May 1963, p. 2.

<sup>40</sup>New Delhi Resolution of the National Executive, August 1963, *Janata*, 25 August-1 September 1963, pp. 5-6; Surendra Mohan, "India and Sino-Pak Challenge", *Janata*, 4 August 1963, p. 3.

<sup>41</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 4(2), 16 September 1963, Col. 6355.

<sup>42</sup>*Janata*, 19 January 1964, p. 11; S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 25(2), 12 February 1964, Col. 329.

<sup>43</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 25(2), 19 February 1964, Col. 1550; New Delhi Resolution of the National Executive, February 1964, *Janata*, 23 February 1964, p. 4.

of Kashmir with Indian Union.<sup>44</sup> At the same time, it urged the Government for a tough deal with regard to the protection of minorities and demanded a firm action against infiltration from Pakistan.<sup>45</sup> On the occasion of Ayub-Shastri meeting and their joint endeavour for India-Pakistan amity, it firmly held that the rapprochement could not be had at the cost of "India's self-respect or legitimate interest" or "of bartering away" India's territory. It warned the Government against its connivance at all sorts of "depredations and daily humiliations in the vain hope of one day being called friends".<sup>46</sup>

Subsequently, in April 1965, the PSP raised alarm against the probable danger of Sino-Pakistan collusion in Kashmir and other areas and urged for strengthening India's defence against Pakistan's military activities across its frontiers.<sup>47</sup> Immediately after Pakistan's attack in the Rann of Kutch, the party charged the Government for complete ignorance of Pakistan's manoeuvrings early in 1965.<sup>48</sup> With regard to the India-Pakistan agreement on the Rann of Kutch, it found the Government of India implicitly exceeding the mandate given to it in conceding to the tribunal the right to determine the whole area of the Rann of Kutch as a "disputed territory". The party lamented the miserable performance of the Government of India, its lack of "determination" and being "evasive in its approach to the country's vital interest".<sup>49</sup> It held that by accepting the terms of the agreement the Prime Minister had "betrayed" the nation and had violated the pledge

<sup>44</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 29(2), 14 April 1964, Col. 10986.

<sup>45</sup>S.N. Joshi's Press Statement, *Janata*, 8 April 1964, p. 24; Hem Barua, "Tough Deal with Pakistan Needed", *Janata*, 19 April 1964, p. 23; Nath Pai's Press Statement, *Janata*, 26 April 1964, p. 3.

<sup>46</sup>*Janata*, 18 October 1964, p. 3; Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 35(2), 23 November 1964, Col. 1272.

<sup>47</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 40(2), 1 April 1965, Cols. 7226-7.

<sup>48</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 42(2), 28 April 1965, Cols. 11651-55.

<sup>49</sup>Prem Bhasin's Statement, *Janata*, 11 July 1965, p. 7.



solemnly given to Parliament.<sup>50</sup> The way the Indian Government reacted to Pakistan's aggression over the Rann of Kutch was, in the opinion of the PSP, a classic instance of its "piecemeal and spineless policy".<sup>51</sup>

### Undeclared War onwards

Satisfied with the performance of the Government in the undeclared India-Pakistan war in September 1965, the party supported the Government over crossing the cease-fire line into Pakistan to push out the infiltrators and prevent further infiltration and urged the Government to liberate the Pakistan-held part of Kashmir.<sup>52</sup> It alerted the Government against the possibility of communist China's involvement in Pakistan's adventure against India and wanted full preparedness to meet the eventuality.<sup>53</sup> In its opinion, the acceptance of the uneasy cease-fire under the Security Council Resolution was no solution of the problem and, as such, wanted the Government never to deflect from the position "that Kashmir is an integral part of India".<sup>54</sup> When the Government accepted the Soviet invitation for a talk at Tashkent on India-Pakistan questions including Kashmir, it urged the Indian team to insist on Pakistan's acceptance of the position that "this dispute should be solved by bilateral negotiations" and wanted that, as a mark of such acceptance, the question be taken out of the UN Security Council".<sup>55</sup>

### Tashkent Agreement onwards

In the last phase, from the signing of the Tashkent Agree-

<sup>50</sup>H.V. Kamath's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 44(2), 17 August 1965, Col. 482.

<sup>51</sup>New Delhi Resolution of the National Executive, *Janata*, 2 August 1965, p. 13.

<sup>52</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 44(2), 24 August 1965, Cols. 1545-46.

<sup>53</sup>*Janata*, 29 August 1965, p. 1.

<sup>54</sup>New Delhi Resolution of the National Executive, November 1965, *Janata*, 21 November 1965, p. 3.

<sup>55</sup>J.A. Naik, "Brief for Tashkent", *Janata*, 12 December 1965, p. 3.

ment of January 1966 onwards, the PSP has felt that India's efforts for amity have proved futile. As such, it has not extended its support to the agreement and has held that the agreement has not only involved withdrawal from Haji Pir, Kargil and Tithwal but has also further complicated the Kashmir issue.<sup>56</sup> The party has been convinced that by signing the Tashkent Declaration the Government violated the pledge, it gave to Parliament earlier, that it would not allow the Kashmir issue to be discussed at Tashkent. In view of the growing pressures by the Big Powers, the party has been warning the Government against retreat from the position that "Kashmir is an integral part of India".<sup>57</sup>

The PSP has held that, despite the Tashkent agreement, the Pakistan-China collusion has continued to pose a threat to India. It has been regretting India's acquiescence in the policy of both the Super Powers to wean Pakistan away from China.<sup>58</sup> It has raised alarm against the military preparation of Pakistan and the military assistance it has received from China viewing them as violations of the Tashkent agreement.<sup>59</sup> The PSP has questioned India's subsequent feelers for discussing the Kashmir issue with Pakistan and has held it as being contrary to its "basic stand".<sup>60</sup> The shift in the Soviet stand on Kashmir and its military assistance to Pakistan has further led the party to press the Government to view the matter "very seriously".<sup>61</sup> It has repeatedly pointed to the fact that at every stage after the Tashkent declaration Pakistan has created hurdles in its implementation.<sup>62</sup> In its opinion, the Soviet arms aid to Pakistan and Pakistan's collaboration with China are posing a threat to India's security. It has, as such, urged readiness to

<sup>56</sup>New Delhi Resolution of the National Executive, February 1966, *Janata*, 27 February 1966, p. 10.

<sup>57</sup>*Ibid.*; S.N. Dwivedy, "Tashkent Breach of Faith with Parliament", *Janata*, 27 February 1966, p. 5.

<sup>58</sup>N.G. Goray's Statement, *Janata*, 20 February 1966, p. 8; Editorial, "The Peking-Pindi Axis", *Janata*, 27 March 1966, p. 1.

<sup>59</sup>"Editorial", *Janata*, 15 May 1966, pp. 1-2.

<sup>60</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, "PSP in Parliament", *Janata*, 18 June 1967, p. 13.

<sup>61</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Press Statement, *Janata*, 21 July 1968, p. 3; "The General Secretary Report", *Janata*, 7 January 1968, p. 6.

<sup>62</sup>Mulka Govind Reddy, "Tashkent and Arms to Pakistan", *Janata*, 4 August 1968, pp. 5-6.

meet the situation and has regretted that the Government has taken no purposeful steps to this end.<sup>63</sup>

The PSP has further pointed out the weaknesses of the policy as apparent in not settling the issue of the replacement of Pakistan's police by the Indian in Dabagram and other enclaves, causing further aggravation of tension between the two countries. It would like efforts being made for an agreement over the enclaves.<sup>64</sup>

## BILATERAL ISSUES

### Minorities

From the beginning, the PSP has been urging the Government of India to make adequate arrangements for the protection of the minority Hindus and Muslims in the two countries.<sup>65</sup> In view of the occurrences in East and West Bengal early in 1950, it wanted both the Governments to join their hands "to guarantee in words and deeds fullest protection and opportunity to all minorities religious, cultural, political and otherwise".<sup>66</sup> "It welcomed Nehru's suggestion for a Joint Enquiry Commission and a joint tour of both the countries by their Prime Ministers and wanted a firm and positive Indian poise towards Pakistan."<sup>67</sup> Jaya Prakash Narayan demanded that all possible avenues for a peaceful settlement be explored. Clarifying the stand of his party taken by its National Executive at Rewa, he suggested various measures for the solution of the problem and wanted Pakistan being told that if it would not be able "to protect the minorities, something could be done

<sup>63</sup>Goregaon Resolution of the National Executive, June 1968, *Janata*, 7 July 1968, p. 10; S.N. Dwivedy, "Arms Supply to Pakistan", *Janata*, 4 August 1968, pp. 3-4.

<sup>64</sup>"Pak High-handedness in Enclaves", *Janata*, 1 September 1968, p. 14.

<sup>65</sup>Purshottam Trikamdas's Presidential Address, n. 1, p. 69.

<sup>66</sup>Rewa Resolution of the National Executive, March 1950, and Lucknow Resolution of the National Executive, March 1950, *India and Pakistan*, n. 3, pp. 21-24.

<sup>67</sup>*Ibid.*

by an international force", and, if it would not agree, the only alternative would be "to send a force to East Bengal".<sup>68</sup> Dr. Lohia wanted the sternest and readiest police action against communal rioters in India as "a part of wider policy towards Pakistan". He urged the socialists to observe March 19 as an "All India Day" to press for a pro-Muslim and anti-Pakistan policy and demanded firm action against Pakistan to check the slaughtering of human rights there.<sup>69</sup> The party welcomed the signing of Nehru-Liaquat Pact in April 1950 and expected that the agreement would stop painful communal tensions and would induce refugees to return to their ancestral homes.<sup>70</sup> It pointed out that there had been a sanction behind every minority agreement and held that the violation of agreements would mean a war or an outbreak of violence in both India and Pakistan.<sup>71</sup> In 1952, it urged the Government to put all possible pressures on Pakistan for protecting its Hindus going, if necessary, even for economic sanctions and severance of trade relations.<sup>72</sup>

Later in 1956-57, the party urged the Government not to hesitate in taking "Strong action" against Pakistan if the flow of refugees was not stopped.<sup>73</sup> In 1964, it once again showed a deep concern over the squeezing out of helpless minorities in West Pakistan. It held that the extermination of Pakistan's minorities posed a challenge to the democratic and secular character of India.<sup>74</sup> It sharply criticised Shri Gulzarilal Nanda, the then Home Minister, for his failure to realise the seriousness of the situation and to go into the root of the problem and found the Government as not being "straight-

<sup>68</sup>Jaya Prakash Narayan, n. 5; *The Hitavada* (Nagpur), 8 March 1950.

<sup>69</sup>See n. 3; Press Statement of Dr. Lohia, *Janata*, 12 March 1950, p. 15.

<sup>70</sup>Asoka Mehta, n. 5, p. 5.

<sup>71</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, "India and Pakistan : Two Nations One ?", *Janata*, 29 October 1950, p. 5.

<sup>72</sup>Asoka Mehta, "The Refugee Problem in Bengal Is All India's Responsibility", *Janata*, 2 November 1952, p. 1.

<sup>73</sup>"The Election Manifesto", *Janata*, 6 January 1957, pp. 1-4.

<sup>74</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 25(2), 12 February 1964, Cols. 328-33.

forward and realistic" in its policy.<sup>75</sup> It urged immediate steps of help for safe and planned transit to persons belonging to the minority community in West Pakistan willing "to cross the border and settle in India."<sup>76</sup> On the occasion of the Home Ministers' Conference, S.M. Joshi, the PSP Chairman, urged India to be firm and positive over finding solution. He wanted the Government to insist on Pakistan agreeing to take back all Muslim immigrants from Pakistan, "failing which they will be pushed out of India, if necessary by force". He charged the Government for its unwillingness and inability "to take any effective step to safeguard the life and liberty of non-Muslim minorities in East Pakistan" and declared that "the Indian Government would be held responsible for the grave consequences".<sup>77</sup> Later on, Nath Pai, Deputy Chairman of the PSP, wanted India to "give wide publicity in the foreign countries through her embassies to the atrocities committed on minorities in East Pakistan".<sup>78</sup>

### Evacuee Properties

The PSP has been urging the Indian Government to come to a permanent arrangement with Pakistan in regard to the wider question of properties left behind by refugees in both the countries. As early as in 1950, while Nehru-Liaquat agreement was being signed, it urged the Indian Government to take up the issue. As the issue was not taken up, it viewed the agreement as "fragile and unstable".<sup>79</sup> It would have liked the Government to set up a Joint Commission of the two countries to help solve the problem.<sup>80</sup> In 1956-57, at the instance of the unending problem of refugees from Pakistan, the PSP wanted a firm dealing with Pakistan in respect of the evacuee properties.<sup>81</sup> In 1964, it wanted to see that the Evacuee Properties Act,

<sup>75</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>76</sup>New Delhi Resolution of the National Executive, February 1964, *Janata*, 23 February 1964, p. 2.

<sup>77</sup>Asoka Mehta, n. 5; *Janata*, 16 April 1950, p. 5.

<sup>78</sup>*Janata*, 26 April 1964, p. 3.

<sup>79</sup>Asoka Mehta, n. 5; *Janata*, 16 April 1950, p. 5.

<sup>80</sup>*We Build for Socialism* (Platform of the Socialist Party, 1951), p. 43.

<sup>81</sup>See n. 91; *Janata*, 6 January 1957, pp. 1-4.

which was applicable to West Pakistan refugees, was made applicable also to the refugees of East Pakistan.<sup>82</sup> It urged the Government to press Pakistan "to pay full and immediate compensation for the properties of refugees who have come to India".<sup>83</sup>

### Kashmir

From the very outset, the PSP had urged the Government of India to help the people of Kashmir against those who wanted to coerce them into joining Pakistan.<sup>84</sup> In December 1948, it welcomed the decision of the Kashmir National Conference in favour of Kashmir's accession to India and expected that the people and the Government of India would be fully conscious of the issues involved in the Kashmir struggle and would make every effort to help and cooperate with the people of Kashmir in their fight against communalism.<sup>85</sup> It opposed the idea of the partition of Kashmir and warned the Government against it.<sup>86</sup> Holding Kashmir as legally a part of India, it condemned Pakistan as "an unashamed aggressor".

The party vigorously attacked the one-sided attitude adopted by the United Nations and regretted that "commensurate action" had not been taken against Pakistan.<sup>87</sup> It supported the Indian Government on its rejection of UN arbitration as well as the steps of the Kashmir National Conference for convening a Constituent Assembly elected by the adult population of Kashmir and believed that "after that stage the issue should be settled between India and Pakistan themselves without any outside intervention".<sup>88</sup> With regard to India's agreement for a plebiscite in Kashmir, the party would like its fulfilment only on the condition that the invading troops would

<sup>82</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 25(2), 12 February 1964, Col. 339.

<sup>83</sup>S.N. Joshi's Press Statement, *Janata*, 8 April 1964, pp. 16, 24.

<sup>84</sup>Purshottam Trikamdas address, n. 1, p. 69.

<sup>85</sup>*Lucknow Resolution of the National Executive*, 28-29 December 1948, n. 2, pp. 3-5.

<sup>86</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, n. 9; *Janata*, 5 November 1950, p. 5.

<sup>88</sup>*We Build for Socialism*, n. 80, p. 52.

be withdrawn from Kashmir and the entire religious propaganda by Pakistan would be stopped.<sup>89</sup> It pointed out, that after the Delhi Agreement on the accession of Kashmir to India, Pakistan had nothing to do with the plebiscite which was a unilateral announcement of the Government and an understanding between the Indians in Kashmir and the rest of India.<sup>90</sup> It further pointed out that the plebiscite was not an original issue before UN, for reference was made by India to it only with regard to the aggression. It was opposed to any third party intervention in Kashmir and asserted that "the accession of Kashmir to India is complete *de jure* and *de facto*".<sup>91</sup> It called upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to sit together and find out a satisfactory "solution without the interposition of any outside agencies."<sup>92</sup> Some of the Praja Socialists believed that the settlement of the Kashmir dispute was necessary for the maintenance of an everlasting peace in Asia. They held that, even if the possibility of a plebiscite in Kashmir would be ruled out, the need for an agreement would remain.<sup>93</sup> So they counselled settling the issue through mutual negotiations.<sup>94</sup>

Pointing out weaknesses of the Indian policy, Ganga Sharan Sinha, Chairman of the party, stated :

"By referring the Kashmir dispute to the UN and then letting Russian leaders comment on the merits of the dispute the Government has allowed the problem to develop into

<sup>89</sup>Lohia's New York Public Statement, *Janata*, 23 September 1951, p.5; Lohia's Madras Press Statement, *Janata*, 18 November 1951, p. 3.

<sup>90</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Parliamentary Debates*, 10(1), 17 September 1953, Cols. 4013-14.

<sup>91</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Parliamentary Debates*, 10(1), 23 December 1953, Col. 3021; Presidential Address by J.B. Kripalani, *Report of the PSP Annual Convention, Allahabad, 29-31 December 1953*, p. 29.

<sup>92</sup>The Patna Resolution of the National Executive, January 1954, *Two Years of the PSP*, n. 12, pp. 22-23.

<sup>93</sup>Resolution of the Second Congress of the Asian Socialist Conference, *Janata*, 18 November 1956, pp. 4-10; Om Prakash Saraf, "Inside Kashmir", *Janata*, 25 November 1956, p. 5.

<sup>94</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 1(2), 25 March 1957, Col. 689; *Lok Sabha Debates*, 1(2), 25 March 1957, Col. 730.

a cold war issue between the East and the West, which is bad for an uncommitted nation like ours".<sup>95</sup>

The PSP wanted it to be known that if Pakistan genuinely wanted to develop friendly relations with India, it would have to accept Kashmir as a part of India.<sup>96</sup> In 1960-61, in view of the increasing sign of friendship between India and Pakistan it expected that the Kashmir dispute would be solved and the old "dark episode of hostility between the two countries would be brought to an end".<sup>97</sup> But when the efforts proved futile, it wanted the decision of the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir regarding the irrevocable accession to be conveyed for good to the Government of Pakistan.<sup>98</sup>

In 1962, when the Kashmir issue was raised in the Security Council, the PSP urged for direct negotiations.<sup>99</sup> Along with other political parties excepting the Swatantra, it supported the stand of the Indian Government that "the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union was irrevocable and no further discussions on the point were permissible".<sup>100</sup> The party deplored the failure of the Security Council to persuade Pakistan to vacate aggression. It again opposed the Western idea of third party mediation and considered it as an attempt to "blackmail" India.<sup>101</sup>

In 1964, the party resented the anti-Indian posture of the British delegate in the Security Council over the development arising out of the Hazratbal affair in Kashmir. It continued asking the Government all through to remove all restrictions in the way of free movement of people from the rest of India in Kashmir and to complete the integration of that State which

<sup>95</sup>Ganga Sharan Sinha, "What the PSP Stand for", *Janata*, 3 March 1957, p. 12.

<sup>96</sup>*Janata*, 9 November 1958, p. 2.

<sup>97</sup>*Janata*, 3 April 1960, p. 2.

<sup>98</sup>D.P. Singh's Statement, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, 35(1), 23 August 1961, Cols. 1190-91.

<sup>99</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 1(2), 27 April 1962, Col. 1393.

<sup>100</sup>*Janata*, 11 July 1962, p. 1.

<sup>101</sup>*Janata*, 28 May 1963, p. 2; Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 21(2), 16 September 1963, Col. 6355.



the Indian Union and influenced to some extent the policy of the Government.<sup>102</sup>

### Border Issues

In regard to border issues with Pakistan, the PSP was fundamentally in agreement with the policy of Government of India. In 1958, it viewed with grave concern the practically incessant firing resorted to by Pakistan on the Assam border for two months resulting in deaths of Indian nationals and heavy damages to Indian properties.<sup>103</sup> It regretted that no effective steps had been taken by India to maintain the inviolability of its border and to resist Pakistan's unwarranted actions. It felt that the Secretarial Level Conference held between the two countries had proved inadequate to cope with the situation.<sup>104</sup> It asked the Government to seek the solution of border issues in accordance with the accepted international practices.<sup>105</sup> Discussing the border incidents, Acharya Kripalani, in one of his statements in the *Lok Sabha* said :

"I agree with the Prime Minister that they are insignificant accidents in our relationship with Pakistan. However, I am afraid they are not so insignificant for the people who suffer from them and lose their lives".<sup>106</sup>

The party objected to Pakistan's claim over Tukegram. Hem Barua, a leading M.P. of the party from Assam, stated in the *Lok Sabha* :

"Tukegram is a part and parcel of the Indian territory. Pakistan never claimed it before. The claim first arose when, in September 1958, Pakistan attacked it and force-

<sup>102</sup>Statement of Lal Bahadur Shastri, Minister without Portfolio, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 25(2), 12 February 1964, Cols. 257-58.

<sup>103</sup>*The Report of the Fourth National Conference of the PSP, Poona, May 25-28, 1958*, n. 16, p. 133.

<sup>104</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>105</sup>*Ibid.*; Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 18(2), 18 August 1958, Col. 1680.

<sup>106</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 23(2), 8 December 1958, Col. 3717.

fully annexed it....I do not want Tukegram to be held as ransom for the Pathoria Reserve forest. That cannot and must not be allowed".<sup>107</sup>

The PSP welcomed the joint defence offer made by President Ayub Khan in 1959. It found nothing very foolish in the suggestion of "joint defence" with Pakistan regarding India's eastern borders.<sup>108</sup>

The party expressed its deep concern over the question of the transfer of Berubari to Pakistan as a part of the Nehru-Noon Agreement. It recorded its protest against the decision and its sympathies for the unfortunate people of the area and felt convinced that "a Government enjoined by the constitution to safeguard the civil liberties of every single citizen in the country has no authority whatever to liquidate the very citizenship of any Indian national".<sup>109</sup> It urged the Government to request Pakistan to leave the territory with India in the interest of peace between the two countries.<sup>110</sup>

The PSP upheld the attitude of the Government of India on border issues as "generous and reasonable"<sup>111</sup> and condemned Pakistan for its aggressive designs.

### Canal Water Dispute

Regarding the canal water dispute, the PSP stood from the beginning for a settlement with the assistance of the International Bank.<sup>112</sup> It shared the willingness of the Indian Government to cooperate with the Bank for the solution of the problem and endorsed its stand concerning the utilisation of the Sutlej water.<sup>113</sup> The Fourth National Conference of the PSP supported the World Bank arbitration and suggested that "its Award already given must have a predetermined time limit

<sup>107</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 23(2), 8 December 1958, Cols. 3829-33.

<sup>108</sup>*Janata*, 13 December 1959, pp. 5-6.

<sup>109</sup>See n. 27.

<sup>110</sup>Presidential Address of Asoka Mehta at the Bhubaneswar National Council meeting, *Janata*, 8 January 1961, p. 3.

<sup>111</sup>*Rajya Sabha Debates*, n. 98, Col. 1189.

<sup>112</sup>Editorial, "Canal Water Dispute", *Janata*, 8 July 1954, pp. 12-13.

<sup>113</sup>*Mussafir*, "Settling Canal Water Dispute", *Janata*, 8 July 1954, pp. 12-13.

beyond which India cannot postpone her development needs".<sup>114</sup> In 1960 it welcomed the Prime Minister's visit to Pakistan for the final settlement of the dispute and the signing of the canal water treaty.

But the party was not fully satisfied with the terms of the treaty. Asoka Mehta viewed them as "not fair". He characterised it as "one-sided treaty", a kind of "second partition" which reopened all the wounds that had started "healing". He remarked that "the country has been let down by those whom the country had been accustomed to trust".<sup>115</sup> The PSP considered that the signing of the treaty, instead of easing the tension in that area, had aggravated the situation. It would have liked the western rivers to go to Pakistan and the eastern ones to India.

### **The Rann of Kutch**

On the issue of India-Pakistan conflict over the Rann of Kutch, the PSP disassociated itself from the official policy which it held responsible for Pakistan's intrusions in that area. It pointed out that the Government had failed to take adequate steps against Pakistan's manoeuvres early in 1965.<sup>116</sup> It disapproved of the subsequent agreement on the Rann of Kutch. Commenting on the agreement, Prof. Mukut Behari Lal, a PSP M.P., urged the people to concentrate their attention on the urgency to build up sufficient will and strength to face valiantly both the Chinese menace and Pakistan's intrusions. He believed that while "this agreement may to some extent ease tension, but is no guarantee against Chinese-Pakistani collusion and aggression".<sup>117</sup> Prem Bhasin, General Secretary of the party viewed the agreement as basically only "a vindication of the resolution of international dispute by peaceful negotiations without recourse to war".<sup>118</sup> The party held that,

<sup>114</sup>*Report of the Fourth National Conference of the PSP, Poona, May 1958*, n. 16, p. 134.

<sup>115</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 48(2), 30 November 1963, Cols. 3184-89.

<sup>116</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 42(2), 28 April 1965, Cols. 11652-4.

<sup>117</sup>*Janata*, 11 July 1965, p. 7.

<sup>118</sup>*Ibid.*

by agreeing to refer that India-Pakistan border dispute to a tribunal, the Government had exceeded its mandate and violated its solemn pledge to Parliament given by the Prime Minister.<sup>119</sup> In course of the *Lok Sabha Debates* on the agreement, two leading PSP members, Hem Barua and H.V. Kamath, drew the attention of the House to an important provision whereby the Government of India was drawn into the acceptance of a *de novo* consideration of that border. They pointed out that there was a basic difference between the word "demarcation" and "determination", the word actually used in the preamble of the agreement, for whereas demarcation meant only the transference on the ground, inconcrete terms of a national line demarcating the boundaries between the two countries, "determination" meant the actual ascertaining of the location of the boundaries.<sup>120</sup>

Along with the Jan Sangh and the SSP, the PSP vigorously opposed the Kutch agreement and considered it as the outcome of pusillanimity towards Pakistan. It held it as a "stupid" and "shameful" pact making it ambiguous as to who committed the aggression against whom.<sup>121</sup> Later the PSP also condemned the arbitration of the Rann of Kutch Tribunal and launched a countrywide agitation against its acceptance.

### The Undeclared War

With regard to the undeclared war between India and Pakistan in September 1965, at the very outset, the PSP raised alarm against the presence of a large number of Pakistan's heavily armed infiltrators inside Kashmir and urged the Government to take immediate steps to push them out and move further to liberate Pakistan-held part of the State.<sup>122</sup>

Following the occurrence of military clashes, the National Executive of the PSP assured the Government of its unstinted

<sup>119</sup>New Delhi Resolutions of the National Executive, 13-15 August 1965, *Janata*, 29 August 1965, p. 13.

<sup>120</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 44(2), 16 August 1965, Cols. 146-47; H.V. Kamath's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 42(2), 17 August 1965, Col. 482.

<sup>121</sup>N.V. Goray, "A Stupid, Shameful Pact", *Janata*, 18 August 1965, pp. 3-4.

<sup>122</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 44(2), 24 August 1965, Cols. 1543-46.

and unconditional support. It underlined the limited objectives of the Government as trying to take all necessary measures to prevent Pakistan's infiltrators from crossing the border and to let Pakistan realise that its policy of "unending harassment does not pay and that Kashmir must be recognised as a part of Indian territory".<sup>123</sup> In course of the *Lok Sabha* discussions of 24 September 1965 on the Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire, Peter Alvares wanted that "ceasefire" must not be unilateral and that there should not be "any withdrawal" from the present position unless guarantees were available to satisfy the military experts that it would never be possible for Pakistan "to either send infiltrators or extend an aggression on India".<sup>124</sup> The party held that India's commitment was only to a simple ceasefire and never to going back to the August 5 Line and urged the Government not to return the position gained under any circumstances by withdrawing from Kargil and Haji Pir pass.<sup>125</sup> It held that the root cause of the conflict lay not in Pakistan's pretended anxiety to safeguard the democratic right of the Kashmiris to self-determination but in its collaboration with China to destroy the bastion of secular democracy and peaceful progress in India.<sup>126</sup> The party warned the Government in all seriousness against sliding back from its pledged words and its firm decision to hold Kashmir "as an integral part of India".

### Tashkent Agreement

On the Tashkent agreement, the PSP did not support the Government of India. It reacted sharply against what it viewed as India's surrender at Tashkent. N.G. Goray, S.N. Dwivedy and Shishir Kumar, PSP leaders in Parliament, voiced opposition.<sup>127</sup> On 15 January 1966, Prem Bhasin, the General Secretary of the party welcomed Mahabir Tyagi's protest resignation.

<sup>123</sup>New Delhi Resolutions of the National Executive, September 1965, *Janata*, 19 September 1965, p. 3.

<sup>124</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 46(2), 24 September 1965, Cols. 7628-30.

<sup>125</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 47(2), 15 November 1965, Cols. 1980-84.

<sup>126</sup>New Delhi Resolution of the National Executive, November 1965, *Janata*, 21 November 1965, p. 3.

<sup>127</sup>"The Secretary Report", *Janata*, 6 February 1965, p. 4.

from the Government and observed :

"If the only consequence of Mr. Kosygin's mediation at Tashkent was to establish parity between the aggressor and the aggressed and to clear the hurdles in the way of a discussion on Kashmir, in terms of the Security Council resolution, then Indian people will have to reassess the gains and losses at Tashkent".<sup>128</sup>

The party "would have been extremely happy to welcome the Tashkent Declaration, if it were to pave the way for a genuine and lasting peace without jeopardising the security and integrity of India".<sup>129</sup> It felt that by signing the agreement the Government had not only deviated from its earlier assurances that it would not withdraw from Haji Pir, Kargil and Tithwal, but had also complicated the Kashmir issue by allowing it to be discussed at Tashkent. It pointed out that the Declaration contained no reference to a "no-war pact" and stated that the spokesmen of Pakistan had made it clear that the infiltrators in Kashmir had the right under the UN Charter to fight with arms in defence of the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir, an interpretation not challenged by the Indian spokesmen.<sup>130</sup>

The PSP warned the Government against considering the Tashkent Declaration as "an isolated event". It held that it would give rise to demands for the settlement of the dispute with the Chinese aggressor in the "spirit of Tashkent".<sup>131</sup>

### Bangla Desh (East Pakistan)

From the beginning, i.e. March 1971, the PSP was alert in regard to the political development in East Pakistan.<sup>131a</sup> It joined the Government in supporting Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the Awami League, over his demand

<sup>128</sup>PSP Ninth National Conference, December 30-31, 1967-January 1, 1968, *General Secretary Report*, p. 35.

<sup>129</sup>New Delhi Resolutions of the National Executive, February 1965, *Janata*, 27 February 1965, p. 10.

<sup>130</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>131</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>131a</sup> Editorial, "Pakistan in Melting Pot", *Janata*, 14 March 1971, p. 2.

for liberation of the people of Bangla Desh. The party joined the unanimous resolution passed by both the Houses of Indian Parliament condemning "actrocities on an unprecedented scale upon an unarmed and innocent people" and expressing "sympathy and solidarity with the people of East Bengal in their struggle for a democratic way of life". It also supported the resolution which called upon "all peoples and Governments of the world to take urgent and constructive steps to prevail upon the Government of Pakistan to put an end immediately to the systematic decimation of people which amounted genocide".<sup>131b</sup> It asked the Government of India to take a firm decision in giving an immediate recognition to the sovereign State of Bangla Desh. It held that "Bangla Desh having declared its independence is no longer a part of Pakistan".<sup>131c</sup> As far back as 31 March and 1 April 1971 Samar Guha, a PSP M.P., visited the border areas and met several important leaders of Swadhin Bangla Desh and urged the Government of India to help the people and the Government of Bangla Desh for the benefit and success of their battle of liberation.<sup>131d</sup>

Condemning in unequivocal terms the reign of terror unleashed by the Government of Yahya Khan against the people of Bangla Desh, the Standing Committee of the PSP called upon "the Indian Government to recognise Bangla Desh *de facto* and extend to its people every possible help to preserve their identity and freedom". It deplored the attitude of reluctance shown by the Super Powers and the UN Secretary-General.<sup>131e</sup> As far back as in April 1971, the party strongly urged the Governments of India, Russia and other countries to enter into pact with the Government and people of Bangla Desh and provide them all possible help in driving out Pakistan's army of occupation and in securing its membership of the United Nations.<sup>131f</sup> It deplored China's sinister cons-

<sup>131b</sup> Editorial, "Recognise Bangla Desh" *Janata*, 4 April 1971, pp. 1-2,

<sup>131c</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>131d</sup> Samar Guha, "Let's Help Bangla Desh", *Janata*, 4 April 1971, pp. 5-6. See "Now is the time for Aid—Guha", *Janata*, 11 April 1971, p. 4.

<sup>131e</sup> Recognition of Bangla Desh Appeal PSP", *Janata*, 11 April 1971, p. 4.

<sup>131f</sup> *Janata*, 18 April 1971, p. 7

piracy in supporting Pakistan's militarists in their efforts to suppress brutally the liberation struggle of Bangla Desh.<sup>131g</sup> S.N. Dwivedy in a radio broadcast talk urged the Government to shake off all hesitations and to extend all-out support—money, men and armaments to the liberation movement of Bangla Desh.<sup>131h</sup>

On 7 May, Samar Guha urged the Government to take the following steps without delay: (1) immediate *de facto* recognition to the independant democratic Government of Bangla Desh; (2) all-out assistance to the Bangla Desh Government; (3) mobilisation of international opinion for the personal safety and release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman; (4) offer of all training facilities for the army of Bangla Desh; (5) move the U.N.O. for reprimanding censuring Pakistan for violation of the charter of Human Rights in Bangla Desh; (6) ask for the U.N. help for giving relief to shelter to citizens of Bangla Desh; (7) arrange deiivry of all Bangla Desh funds deposited with the Government of Bangla Desh as also for exchange of their money with Indian currency; (8) offer adequate financial help; (9) convene an international confrence in India for mobilising world opinion in support of Bangla Desh.<sup>131i</sup>

In view of the mounting problem of the refugees from Bangla Desh, the party became more critical of the vexed and confused policy pursued by the Government. It felt that the Government had missed the opportunity to recognise and liberate Bangla Desh and, as such, the return of refugees had become a "myth".<sup>131j</sup> Some of the Socialists strongly criticised the attitude adopted by the Unitd States with regard to supply of arms and economic assistance to Pakistan.<sup>131k</sup> They thought that such assistance would hamper the solution of the problem of refugees and the Bangla Desh.

In August 1971, the party charged the Government for its policy of drift and dodgery with regard to the issue of the

<sup>131g</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>131h</sup> *Janata*, 18 April 1971, p. 7.

<sup>131i</sup> *Janata*, 30 May 1971, pp. 8-9.

<sup>131j</sup> Samarendra Kundu, "Erosion of Policy on Bangla Desh", *Janata*, 18 July 1971, pp. 11-12.

<sup>131k</sup> Rabati Nath Sarkar, "America and Bangla Desh", *Janata*, 18 July 1971, p. 13.



recognition of Bangla Desh. It feared that by inordinately pursuing such policy India might commit a Himalayan blunder.<sup>131l</sup>

The Socialist Party resulting from the latest merger in August, showed their dis-satisfaction with the signing of the Indo-Soviet Peace Friendship and Co-operation Treaty on 9 August 1971.<sup>131m</sup> Indira Gandhi's subsequent visit to Moscow in September and the Indian Defence Minister's statement that Bangla Desh would certainly emerge as a free country gave some hopes to the party members. The Soviet assurance of massive help to India, and Kosygin's statement in emphatic terms that Pakistan's aggression against India would not be countenanced, enhanced their hope for the desired solution of the problem of Bangla Desh.<sup>131n</sup> Samar Guha, convener, National Co-ordination Committee on Bangla Desh, regretted at the India's External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh's derogatory remarks at the Simla meeting of the Congress High Command that there is possibility of a political solution of Bangla Desh problem within the framework of Pakistan. He held that "the Government of India had no business or right to make such suggestion". He raised the hue and cry that "if the issue of independent Bangla Desh goes down India will have a volcanic situation within its territory more terrible than that of pre-partition days". He further reminded that India should not forget that "the issue of survival of secular nationalism will be finally settled in the soil of Bangla Desh."<sup>131o</sup> Prem Bhasin also warned the Government that the incalculable sufferings and the legitimate aspirations of the people of Bangla Desh should not become a plaything of international politics at the hand of Big Powers.<sup>131p</sup> Surender Mohan, Joint Secretary of the Socialist Party, said that the two Governments were "seeking to impose an unnecessary and indecisive war

<sup>131l</sup> Samar Guha, "Why Recognition of Bangla Desh Right Now", *Janata*, 8 August 1971, pp. 3-11.

<sup>131m</sup> See Chapter Seven.

<sup>131n</sup> *Janata*, 3 October 1971, p. 5.

<sup>131o</sup> *Janata*, 17 October 1971, p. 10.

<sup>131p</sup> Prem Bhasin, "Bangla Desh—Communalists & Communists", *Janata*, 24 October 1971, pp. 1-3.

on the Indo-Pak sub-continent and to follow it up by imposing a prolonged frustrating and tense peace through UN intervention". He added : "India will have to pledge itself to taking determined action which will brook no interference from friends or foes and no inhibition from the machinations of Big Powers or the United Nations"<sup>131q</sup>

After the return of Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi in November from her successful European and American tours, Peter Alvares, member of the National Ad-hoc Committee of Socialist Party issued a statement in urging that there should now be no hesitation on the part of the Prime Minister to accord recognition to Bangla Desh". He felt that the recognition to Bangla Desh and the assurance of India's non-alignment between Russia and China should be linked together.<sup>131r</sup> When by the middle of November 1971, India's diplomatic efforts to pressurise the Yahya Khan regime failed and the Mukti Bahini decided to give a final assault on Pakistan's army occupation, the Socialists urged the Government of India to give an immediate recognition, and enter into a long term treaty with Bangla Desh and, on the basis of such a treaty, to extend to that country political, military and economic assistance. They pledged to defend India's national honour, maintain internal security and actively co-operate with all national efforts to meet any probable Pakistani aggression.<sup>131s</sup>

Along with the Government of India, the Socialist Party strongly resented the fact that the Communist China made a blistering attack on India in the third Committee of the United Nations alleging that the crisis in the Southeast Asian region had been caused by India's policy of interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan and arguing that the instance of a similar Indian intervention of 1959 in Tibet. The Socialists held these charges as "venomous", as "the bite of a Krait" and as untruthful as "the stories of Baron Munchausen".<sup>131t</sup> When

<sup>131q</sup> *Janata*, 14 November 1971, p. 3.

<sup>131r</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>131s</sup> Samar Guha, "Bangla Desh : The Final Phase", *Janata*, 21 November, p. 4.

<sup>131t</sup> "Editorial", *Janata*, 28 November 1971, p. 1.

India was accused in the UN Security Council for an attack on East Pakistan and countries like Belgium appeared equating the West Pakistani military Junta and the Mukti Bahini, the party strongly objected to such trends. It also felt concerned over the fact that China and Western Powers deliberately ignored the refugee problem and the issue of East Bengal autonomy and merely prescribed for "an immediate" stop of hostilities.<sup>131u</sup> After Pakistan attacked India's western border on 3 December 1971 and a stage of emergency was proclaimed in India, along with other Indian political parties the Socialists themselves pledged to defend India's territorial integrity. They thanked the Soviet Union for the three uses of their Veto in the UN Security Council and hailed the recognition of Bangla Desh by the Government of India declared on 6 December 1971. After the West Pakistani army surrendered in Dacca and the Government of Bangla Desh began to function more effectively as a sovereign nation, the Indian Socialists were the first to welcome the reality of a Socialist State in Asia.

At the close of December, the national 'Ad-hoc' Committee of the Socialist Party urged the Indian Government to work for a long term settlement with Pakistan in terms of a non-aggression pact, repatriation of prisoners of war, common defence and foreign policy and abolition of visas and establishment of open frontiers and pending that kind of settlement, for an interim measure of truce on the basis of immediate release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, recognition of Bangla Desh by Pakistan, some token compensation to the people of Bangla Desh and consolidation of the cease-fire.<sup>131v</sup>

## ISSUES INVOLVING BIG POWERS

### US Military Aid to Pakistan

In the opinion of the PSP the United States has been vitally involved in India-Pakistan relations. It has linked troubles between India and Pakistan from 1953 onwards with the US-

<sup>131u</sup> Prem Bhasin, "Untying the Chinese Knot", *Janata*, 5 December 1971, p. 10

<sup>131v</sup> *The Times of India*, 30 December 1971.

Pakistan military agreement<sup>132</sup> which, in its opinion, has been a blow to Asian solidarity and has been having its "inevitable repercussions on Asia"<sup>133</sup>, not only of disturbing the existing balance among Asian nations, but also of endangering the peace and security of India.<sup>134</sup>

In 1959, the party held that while India would welcome any increase in US economic aid to Pakistan, it could not acquiesce in US military assistance to Pakistan, "particularly when the military regime there threatens India".<sup>135</sup> It felt that the US-Pakistan pact would serve neither the cause of peace nor the vital interests of either Pakistan or the United States. It would merely sow dissensions in Asia and threaten peace in the Indian sub-continent.<sup>136</sup> It urged the United States to discontinue the aid and appealed for giving a serious thought against its supply of missiles to Pakistan.<sup>137</sup> Keeping in view the strength of Pakistan's Air Force resulting from the pact, it asked the Indian Government to start a campaign against it and to look for assistance from other countries.<sup>138</sup>

At the same time, the PSP believed that the US attitude towards the Kashmir issue had worsened India-Pakistan relations. It held that US support to Pakistan in the UN Security Council had encouraged developments in Kashmir. It blamed the United States for ignoring the question of Pakistan's aggression and, instead, adopting pressures for 'plebiscite' <sup>139</sup>

<sup>132</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Parliamentary Debates*, 10(1), 23 December 1953, Col. 3021.

<sup>133</sup>Allahabad Resolutions of the National Executive, December 1953, *Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party*, n. 13. p. 30.

<sup>134</sup>J.B. Kripalani's Presidential Address, n. 91, p. 29.

<sup>135</sup>New Delhi Resolutions of the National Council, April 1959, *Janata*, 26 April 1959, p. 5.

<sup>136</sup>*Ibid.*: Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 13(2), 14 March 1958, Col. 4985.

<sup>137</sup>H.V. Kamath's Bhopal Press Statement of 19 July 1959, *Janata*, 2 August 1959, pp. 3-10; Asoka Mehta's Statement, *Janata*, 23 July 1961, p. 3.

<sup>138</sup>*Rajya Sabha Debates*, n. 98, Col. 1190; H.V. Kamath's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 4(2), 30 May 1962, Col. 7834.

<sup>139</sup>See n. 98; *Janata*, 1 July 1962, p. 1.

In relation to the issue of the Rann of Kutch, it blamed the United States for its direct support to Pakistan.<sup>140</sup> With regard to the undeclared war of 1965, the PSP was with the Government in deploring US threats for cutting the supply of arms to India.<sup>141</sup>

### **Soviet Supply of Arms to Pakistan**

The PSP noted that the Soviet Union had been playing a crucial role in the India-Pakistan relations continuing to support for long India's stand on Kashmir in the United Nations as against Pakistan and, of late, by supplying arms to Pakistan.

Recalling that ever since the origin of the Kashmir dispute the Soviet Union had held Kashmir as an integral part of India,<sup>142</sup> the party viewed it as a shift in the Soviet stand with regard to Pakistan in 1965, when, during the undeclared war, the Soviet Union appeared trying to save Pakistan from an "ignominious defeat". It held that the reasons for the Soviet manoeuvres at Tashkent lay in the Soviet intention to wean Pakistan away from the Western alliance and the Chinese entanglement.<sup>143</sup>

The PSP viewed the Soviet supply of arms to Pakistan in 1968 as constituting a threat to the peace and security of the sub-continent and endangering the relations between two countries. The party was unhappy with the docility of the Indian Government towards the Soviet Union and called for India's self-reliance in the matter of defence against further dependence on the Soviets.<sup>144</sup>

### **Britain's Attitude**

The PSP has shared the concern of the Government over Britain's continued support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Britain, in its opinion, had always misrepresented the issue for siding with Pakistan. It pointed out that at the SEATO con-

<sup>140</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 42(2), 28 April 1965, Col. 11656.

<sup>141</sup>Peter Alvares's Statement, n. 124.

<sup>142</sup>Chapter 7, n. 41, n. 45 and n. 47.

<sup>143</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>144</sup>Chapter 7, n. 57, n. 59, n. 62 and n. 63.

ferences, Britain and other Commonwealth countries did not hesitate to express their opinion in favour of Pakistan.<sup>145</sup> In 1964, it shared the furious resentment of the Indian Government against the British delegate's misrepresentation of facts and open support to Pakistan. It deplored the British stand and demanded severance of the Commonwealth link.<sup>146</sup>

In the context of the undeclared Kashmir war of 1965, the PSP found Britain's attitude at its worst. It made out that Britain was expecting that the Chinese threat would cause a diversion to India's military forces and Pakistan would be saved from a defeat and had exposed its "partiality" towards Pakistan.<sup>147</sup>

### China-Pakistan Collusion

In the opinion of the PSP, ever from 1960-61 Peking had been making efforts for the formation of some sort of "axis" with Rawalpindi. The party held that China mainly aimed at isolating India from the neighbouring countries.<sup>148</sup> It was apprehending Pakistan's rapprochement with China, had raised alarms against their "sinister designs" and had urged adequate military preparations to meet the challenge of "the two dictatorships".<sup>149</sup> It raised its voice against Peking-Pindi border agreement involving the transfer of some parts of "Azad Kashmir" to China.<sup>150</sup>

During the undeclared India-Pakistan War of 1965, the PSP pointed out that the Chinese ultimatum to India was intended to help Pakistan and had precipitated the Security Council ceasefire resolution which came before the three day period of the Chinese ultimatum had expired.<sup>151</sup> It held that

<sup>145</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 3(2), 28 March 1956, Col. 3606; Gangi Sharan Sinha, n. 95; *Janata*, 23 February 1964, p. 4.

<sup>146</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 25(2), 19 February 1964, Cols. 1549-53; New Delhi Resolution of the National Executive, February 1964, *Janata*, 23 February 1964, p. 4.

<sup>147</sup>Chapter 6, n. 101.

<sup>148</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 50(2), 20 February 1961, Cols. 918-19.

<sup>149</sup>Chapter 8, n. 135, n. 136 and n. 137.

<sup>150</sup>Chapter 8, n. 130.

<sup>151</sup>Peter Ahares's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, n. 124, Cols. 7432-35.

China's fast developing armoury and its military assistance to Pakistan had created danger not only to India but to the whole of South-East Asia. It urged the Government to take purposeful steps against the "fraudulent" China-Pakistan collusion.<sup>152</sup>

## CERTAIN ASIAN ISSUES

### Muslim Nations

Among the Asian issues, Pakistan's manoeuvres against India among the Muslim nations had been causing concern to the PSP. Early in 1953, it expressed its apprehensions over Pakistan's attempt to form a Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) consisting of Islamic nations such as Iran, Jordan, Syria and Turkey. The party held that such an organisation would be a threat to India's relations with these countries.<sup>153</sup> It feared that MEDO would weaken India's position in its Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. The PSP condemned the formation of the Baghdad pact as it included Pakistan and believed further that it would intensify the growing international tension in West Asia.<sup>154</sup> It also noted that India's support to Egypt during the Suez crisis and its growing closeness with the UAR led Pakistan to revive the Baghdad pact with the assistance from Britain and the USA. It urged the Indian Government to leave the Islamic nations of the Baghdad pact and their friends to work in their own way and to make efforts for peace and understanding with the majority of Muslim nations.<sup>155</sup> The PSP was with the Government in supporting Afghanistan's claim for Pakhtoonistan and retorted with the logic that Pakistan had been using in the case of Kashmir.<sup>156</sup>

During the undeclared war of 1965, the PSP pointed out that none of the Islamic nations except Malaysia had explicitly

<sup>152</sup>See Chapter 8, n. 139 and n. 140.

<sup>153</sup>G.B.S. Chaudhari, "The Middle East Defence Organisation", *Janata*, 15 February 1953, p. 12.

<sup>154</sup>*Policy Statement* (Adopted by the Second National Conference of the PSP held at Gaya, 26-30 December 1955, New Delhi, 1956), p. 91.

<sup>155</sup>S. Natrajan, "Cross-current in West Asia", *Janata*, 15 August 1958, pp. 20-22.

<sup>156</sup>Asoka Mehta, "Changing Face of Asia", *Janata*, 16 May 1963, pp. 3-4, 14.

supported India. It noted that Indonesia and Jordan advocated open support to Pakistan despite their close relations with India.<sup>157</sup> The party was inclined to doubt generally the attitude of Muslim nations towards India.

Later in 1969, the PSP felt concerned over the Rabat Conference of the Islamic nations. It held that Pakistan, in manipulation with other Islamic nations, created a very uncomfortable diplomatic situation at that summit by compelling the Indian delegation to withdraw. It viewed the insult as a severe blow to India's honour and self-respect.<sup>158</sup> It held that the decision to send India's representative to the conference ran counter to secularism and believed that the Government had brought the nation shame and humiliation.<sup>159</sup> It mobilised effective public opinion against the recurrence of such a fiasco in future.<sup>160</sup>

### Regional Security

Apart from the considerations of Muslim nations, the PSP has also shared the concern of the Indian Government over Pakistan's efforts for getting into Asian regional security arrangements with the Western Powers with its designs against India. It condemned the formation of SEATO and the Baghdad pact. The party regretted that the Indian Government had failed to stop the formation of such regional security pacts which, by including Pakistan, had endangered the peace of India and also Asia as a whole.<sup>161</sup> At the same time, it held that Britain's support to Pakistan on issues like Kashmir owed mainly to Pakistan's membership of those pacts.<sup>162</sup> The PSP, as seen earlier, urged the Government of India not to be much bothered with the countries of the Baghdad pact and to leave them to work in their own way.<sup>163</sup>

<sup>157</sup>Peter Alvares's Statement, n. 151.

<sup>158</sup>New Delhi Resolution of the National Executive, November 1969, *Janata*, 23 November 1969, p. 3.

<sup>159</sup>H.V. Kamath's Press Statement, *Janata*, 2 November 1969, p. 6.

<sup>160</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Lok Sabha Statement, *Janata*, 23 November 1969, p. 4.

<sup>161</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7(2), 30 September 1954, Col. 3835; *Report of the Second National Conference of the PSP, Gaya, 26-30 December 1955*, p. 226.

<sup>162</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 3(2), 28 March 1956, Col. 3606.

<sup>163</sup>See n. 155.



### SUMMING UP THE ATTITUDE

The attitude of the PSP towards India's relations with Pakistan appears to have been expediency-oriented. Fundamentally, the party has been agreeing with the Government for a close cooperation with Pakistan. But on occasions it has been of the view that the Government has sought to appease Pakistan and has failed to defend India's borders when it ought to have been firm. Its criticisms of the Government have often proved effective and fruitful, particularly in relation to the Kashmir issue. Its anti-Pakistan posture on some of the occasions might be viewed as having been conditioned by its ardent nationalism or by its worry to do well at polls.

## Other Important Regional Issues and Relations

The chapter aims at dealing with some such important regional issues and relations of India's foreign policy as have involved the concern of the PSP from the point of view of its attitude but have not been covered specifically and adequately in the previous chapters.

### THE ARABS AND ISRAEL

Ever since the coming into existence of a Jewish State of Israel, the PSP has been questioning the Government of India for not having diplomatic relations with it. It has been consistently urging the Government to accept Israel's proper place in the community of nations and to make efforts for removing the frictions between the Arabs and Israel. As early as in 1948-49, it wanted the Government to recognise Israel as a State and give it full diplomatic status in relation with India.<sup>1</sup> It would like India to make moves for a "collective settlement" of the Arab-Israel conflict.<sup>2</sup> In 1950, Dr. Lohia put forward his idea of "federative approaches" between the two sides. He underlined the need for amity and peace between them and urged the Indian Government to expedite the grant of recognition to Israel.<sup>3</sup>

The PSP continued objecting to India's Israel policy. In

<sup>1</sup>H.V. Kamath's Statement and the reference of his questions of August 1948 and March 1949 concerning Israel, *The Constituent Assembly Debates*, 4(1), 6 December 1949, Cols. 233-34.

<sup>2</sup>*Reports of the Eighth National Conference of Socialist Party, Madras, 3-12 July 1950*, p. 225.

<sup>3</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, *Third Camp in World Affairs* (Bombay, 1950), p. 13.

1955, it raised hue and cry over the fact that India did not act to prevent Israel's exclusion from the Bandung Conference. Instead of ignoring Israel, India should have made efforts for mutual accommodation between the Arabs and Israel. If the Arabs would reconcile themselves to Israel's existence as a fact and the Jews would accept the Arab viewpoint on the question of taking back the Arab refugees halfway, it might "not be beyond the persons of human ingenuity to evolve a formula on the basis of which a permanent peace treaty could be concluded".<sup>4</sup> The PSP apprehended that the aggravation of the Arab-Israel conflict might lead to a widespread conflagration.<sup>5</sup>

In view of the Suez Crisis, in 1956 the party was strongly critical of the encroachment and occupation by Israeli troops of Egyptian territories and appealed to Israel for withdrawing their troops within their borders and restore the *status quo ante bellum*.<sup>6</sup> It expected the United States to exert its influence and authority for achieving a lasting peace settlement following the question of all hostilities for the sake of peace in West Asia.<sup>7</sup> The party charged the Government of India for its "inaction" reminding it of its responsibility for establishing peace in the region. While sharing the censoring attitude of the Indian Government towards Israel, it would have liked something being done by the former to reduce the tension between the latter and the Arab States in view of the fact that India recognised Israel as a State.<sup>8</sup> The PSP praised Israel's socialism and urged the Arabs to take a lesson.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>4</sup>Prem Bhasin, "Afro-Asian Conference and Israel", *Janata*, 26 January 1955, p. 13.

<sup>5</sup>*Report of the Second National Conference of the PSP, Gaya, December 26-30, 1955*, p. 142.

<sup>6</sup>*Bangalore Resolution* (Delhi, 1956), p. 13.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>Asoka Mehta's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 9(2), 19 November 1956, Cols. 406-7; Acharya Kripalani also declared: "There is no doubt that the way Israel was established in Palestine was a great injustice done to the Arabs...But now the Israel State is a fact which cannot be ignored". *Lok Sabha Debates*, 10(2), 25 March 1957, Col. 727.

<sup>9</sup>Acharya Kripalani, "Socialists Alone Can Heal the Wound of War", *The New Socialist* (Special Number, June 1958), p. 46; Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 18(2), 19 August 1958, Cols. 1674-75.

In 1963, the party questioned the Government with regard to not giving *de jure* recognition to Israel. The party viewed Deputy External Affairs Minister Mrs. Lakshmi Menon's statement to that effect made in Jordan as a challenge to the fundamental policy adopted by the Government vis-a-vis Israel.<sup>10</sup> It wanted the Arabs to adjust themselves to the development and look for a settlement of all the issues on "an international basis".<sup>11</sup> It also expected a re-orientation of Israel's attitude towards Arab minorities in reciprocity to Arab guarantees for the security of its borders.

Subsequently, when India granted *de jure* recognition, the PSP strongly demanded the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel. It wanted the Indian Government to review its Israel policy and wondered why, having accorded recognition to Israel and permitted the establishment of its consulate in Bombay, the Government fought shy of exchanging ambassadors with it. It disliked Indian interests in Israel being looked after by the British Embassy in that country. It urged the Indian Government to give up appeasing the Arabs and to open a consulate in Israel.<sup>12</sup> The party disapproved of the Indian condemnation of Israel at the Cairo Non-align Conference of 1964.<sup>13</sup> It felt disappointed at the 'double logic' of refusing to support Israel as it was established on the basis of religion.<sup>14</sup> It would like India's relationships with the Arabs to be based on certain criteria, not on an "unilateral" and "timid friendship" but on a "reciprocal basis".<sup>15</sup> It believed that "friendly relations with Arab countries are compatible with similar

<sup>10</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 21(2), 16 September 1963, Col. 6553.

<sup>11</sup>Surendra Mohan, "Israel and the Arabs", *Janata*, 8 April 1964, p. 7.

<sup>12</sup>H.V. Kamath Bombay Press Statement, *Janata*, 2 August 1964, p. 14.

<sup>13</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 35(2), 23 November 1964, Col. 1287.

<sup>14</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 40(2), 1 April 1965, Col. 7226.

<sup>15</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 47(2), <sup>1</sup>/<sub>5</sub> November 1965, Cols. 1978-89.

relations with Israel".<sup>16</sup>

As the Arab-Israel conflict occurred in May 1967, the PSP wanted the Government to declare India's neutrality. It recalled that in the war forced on India by China and Pakistan the Arab States were neutral and some of them even sympathised with Pakistan and regretted that the Indian Government had learnt no lesson and continued "to kow-tow to the Arab States and particularly to President Nasser".<sup>17</sup> The PSP suggested that the Government of India "should collaborate with other nations in striving for the return of peace in West Asia and not worsen the situation by blindly supporting the UAR".<sup>18</sup> Nath Pai, a top PSP leader, described M.C. Chagla's *Lok Sabha* statement on the developments in West Asia as "a wretched document drafted by some section officer" failing even to reflect the concern of India for the prevention of the outbreak of hostilities and for the preservation of peace.<sup>19</sup> The PSP also deplored the fact that nine members of the Indian personnel of the United Nations Emergency Force were killed and many others injured by Israel's attacks. It appreciated India's protest lodged with Israel. But it saw in India's policy "double talk", a tendency to put "Arab interests before Indian self-interest".<sup>20</sup> Keeping in view the Arab intention to destroy Israel, the least that India could have done, according to the PSP, was "to adopt a posture of strict neutrality side by side with its efforts to restore peace in West Asia".<sup>21</sup> But with its unreserved support to the Arabs, it exposed itself and became a laughing stock of the world. It also saw no reason behind abandoning the resolution in the Security Council insisting on the withdrawal of belligerent forces "to the positions held by them on 4 June [1967] after

<sup>16</sup>The Resolutions adopted by the General Council of PSP at its meeting at Lucknow from October 7-9, 1966, *A Socialist Alternative—PSP Election Manifesto*, 1967, p. 16; Nath Pai's interview to the "Hindustan Times", *Janata*, 25 December 1966, p. 2.

<sup>17</sup>H.V. Kamath's Bangalore Statement, *The Times of India* (Delhi), 25 May 1967.

<sup>18</sup>*Janata*, 28 May 1967, p. 2.

<sup>19</sup>*Janata*, 18 May 1967, p. 4.

<sup>20</sup>Editorial, "Strange Posture", *Janata*, 11 June 1967, p. 1.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*

having so gallantly advocated it earlier.<sup>22</sup> H.V. Kamath wrote a letter of appreciation to the *Times of India* on its editorial condemning New Delhi's West Asian policy as "shameful". He held the editorial as "pointed and vigorous" and remarkable for its "balanced approach and refreshing realism."<sup>23</sup> The party pointed out that by taking side in the war India had lost the chance of playing a useful role in UN towards restoring normalcy in West Asia and had suffered a major defeat in the Asian crisis "without firing a single shot".<sup>24</sup>

The PSP welcomed the Prime Minister's unequivocal declaration in the *Lok Sabha* that India could not be a party to the aim of destroying Israel as a nation. It also welcomed India's initiative in the Security Council and declared its unreserved support for the resolution India moved.<sup>25</sup> But on the whole the PSP was critical. Its Chairman, N.G. Goray stated :

"The attitude of the Government of India during this episode was a pitiable spectacle of injustice compounded with imprudence. The Arab support to India was at no time unconditional, but India's support to President Nasser always was. It will be our standing shame that India's support remained unconditional even when Mr. Nasser openly declared that his objective was the destruction of Israel".<sup>26</sup>

While criticising the attitude of the Government towards the conflict the PSP wanted it to work for the establishment of an everlasting peace. It held that Israel's "astounding military success did not eliminate the need for coming to terms with its immediate neighbours."<sup>27</sup> The party felt that it would be better if India would help the Arabs in restoring peace and arriving at an honourable solution.<sup>28</sup> In its opinion "a speedy

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup>*Janata*, 18 June 1967, p. 9.

<sup>24</sup>PSP in Parliament (PSP, 1967), p. 14.

<sup>25</sup>Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National Executive which met under the Chairmanship of Triloki Singh, M.P., *Janata*, 18 June 1967, p. 7.

<sup>26</sup>*Janata*, 25 June 1967, p. 3.

<sup>27</sup>Editorial, "Israel and the Arabs", *Janata*, 16 July 1967, p. 1.

<sup>28</sup>Sruta Kriti, "India's Role in West Asia", *Janata*, 12 May 1968, pp. 11-13.

and just solution" lay in restoring the lost territories "to the Arabs together with the provision of the meaningful and workable guarantee for the security of Israel".<sup>29</sup>

Along with the PSP, the Jan Sangh and the Swatantra Party, the PSP wanted India's friendly relations with Israel as well as with the Arabs.

### POLICY FOR SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Ever since India's independence, the PSP has been asking the Indian Government to formulate a separate policy for South and Southeast Asia. At the very start, it wanted the Government to take a lead in organising a regional alliance of the Southeast Asian countries in furtherance of the objective of having a Third Force.<sup>30</sup> It stood for close economic and political relations being developed with Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and other countries of the region.<sup>31</sup> It pointed out the ineffectiveness of the existing policy for the region which appeared to have no means of filling up of the vacuum caused by the withdrawal of the French, the Dutch and the British.<sup>32</sup> It believed that only with the collaboration of some of the governments of the region could India help secure the region from the dangers of armed communist groups.<sup>33</sup> It deplored the fact that India neglected the region by not taking the lead for bringing together its neutral countries and shaping them into a positive Third Force of Peace and Socialism.<sup>34</sup>

The PSP continued focussing the strategic importance of the region. It was unhappy over the fact that Asian coun-

<sup>29</sup>Goregaon Resolution of the National Executive, June 1968, *Janata*, 7, July 1968, p. 10.

<sup>30</sup>*Policy Statement*, (Socialist Party, First Published in 1947, Second Revised Edition 1949, Reprinted in 1951), p. 37, *Resolutions*: National Executive, Lucknow, December 29-30 (Socialist Party, 1949), pp. 1-2.

<sup>31</sup>Dr. Lohia's Statement, Chapter 2, n. 33.

<sup>32</sup>Asoka Mehta, *Foreign Policy—A Socialist View*, (Socialist Party, 1950), pp. 5-7.

<sup>33</sup>*Report of the Eighth National Conference of the Socialist Party, Madras, 8-12 July 1950*, n. 2, p. 81.

<sup>34</sup>Suresh Desai, "For a Third Force of Peace and Socialism", *Janata*, 13 August 1950, p. 16, Chapter 2, n. 36.

tries were not looking for a new course of defence treaties and arrangements outside either power bloc.<sup>35</sup> Taking into its consideration the five-power Colombo proposals of April 1954 over the crisis in Indo-China, the party disagreed with the six-point Nehru Plan and would have liked the cease-fire in Indo-China to be linked with the idea of a Constituent Assembly to be elected under an international supervision followed by the withdrawal of foreign armies of the two contending forces. That, in its opinion, would stabilise peace in Southeast Asia.<sup>36</sup> The Colombo plans for regional economic and political arrangements put forward by Burma, Ceylon and others were hailed by the Praja Socialists. But they were disappointed with the reactions of the Indian Government that "such an arrangement might drive China to suspicion".<sup>37</sup>

The PSP condemned the manoeuvres of the Atlantic camp resulting in the formation of the Southeast Asian Treaty (Defence) Organisation (SEATO) in 1954 which drew the South Asian governments in its war orbit. It, as such, urged upon "such states of South Asia as want to pursue the policy of independence from either camp closer together and devise measures of mutual assistance".<sup>38</sup>

The PSP held that in South and Southeast Asia India carried a special responsibility. It believed that India "has to be the bastion of strength to the neighbouring countries in maintaining their independence against varied threats".<sup>39</sup> But not even "elementary economic and cultural cooperation" was being attempted.<sup>40</sup> The region, the party further believed, could not be isolated from China's global war strategy. In

<sup>35</sup>Allahabad Resolution of the National Council, December 1953, *Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party*, (Praja Socialist Publications, 1954), pp. 29-30.

<sup>36</sup>Editorial, "Result of the Colombo Conference", *Janata*, 9 May 1954, p. 2.

<sup>37</sup>G.S. Bhargava, "The Colombo Conference—A Summing up", *Janata*, 16 May 1954, pp. 19-20.

<sup>38</sup>Indore Resolution of the General Council, June 1954, *Two Years of the Praja Socialist Party*, n. 35, p. 31; *Policy Statement* (Adopted by the Second National Conference of the PSP held at Gaya, 26-30 December 1955), New Delhi, 1956—p. 91.

<sup>39</sup>*Election Manifesto—Praja Socialist Party*, (New Delhi, 1962), p. 14.

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*



1964-65, it held both Jakarta and Peking responsible for creating dissensions and disorder in this region. It would like the Government not to follow "a policy of Micawberism".<sup>41</sup> It felt that India's image in the region was being steadily eroded and almost destroyed. The Chinese explosion of the atom bomb in 1964 led the party to fear that China might use atom bombs for blackmailing India and other South and Southeast Asian countries. The fact that no Asian country condemned China for going nuclear disappointed the PSP.<sup>42</sup>

In view of the prospects of US naval bases being built in the Indian Ocean, the British military presence in the South Asia rimland and the Chinese potential threat in Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries, the PSP believed that only "a strong and determined India could ask the Chinese to hold back, the Americans to quit, and the others to stay away".<sup>43</sup> The party was mainly worried over the danger of Chinese expansionism in Southeast Asia and urged the Government of India for a reappraisal of its policy. It strongly held that a clear way to meet the danger would be not in the shape of "an American-based alliance" but through well-coordinated efforts by Asian countries themselves to move towards a close defence alliance and a vibrant ideological programme which would solve their "economic and social problems and demonstrate the superiority of the democratic methods over the Chinese".<sup>44</sup> There being no move of that kind, the PSP held that the "barren policy of India becomes an invitation to Chinese expansionism and a justification for American intervention".<sup>45</sup> It feared that a "sterile and timid" course could only lead to the subversion of the integrity of one nation after another and that, failing to help build Asia's collective ramparts against the Chinese menace and American intervention, the

<sup>41</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 35(2), 23 November 1964, Col. 4073.

<sup>42</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 35(2), 23 November 1964, Col. 1299.

<sup>43</sup>Surendra Mohan, "India Must Decide on Her South Asia Role", *Janata*, 29 December 1965, pp. 107-110.

<sup>44</sup>Surendra Mohan, "Towards Peace and Freedom in South Asia", *Janata*, 5 June 1966, p. 7.

<sup>45</sup>Delhi Resolution of the National Executive, August 1967, *Janata*, 27 August 1967, p. 6.

Government of India was betraying "the call of history and the cause of democracy and human freedom".<sup>45</sup> It pointed to India's attitude of "touch-me-notism" towards all those who joined SEATO and to its passive role with regard to other countries of Southeast Asia as having led to the weakening of the bonds of friendship to a great extent. It cited Nepal's example, the Chinese presence in that country being much stronger than the Indian. The party noted the increasing Chinese subversive activities in Thailand.<sup>47</sup> Keeping all these in view, it had begun doubting if the Indian Government had any awareness of the radical changes in Asia's power relations following the withdrawal of the European powers from the area. It would like India to go in for a fresh initiative in seeking closer collaboration and cooperation with Southeast Asian nations to own "her share of responsibility in the Indian ocean which has become an area of crucial importance".<sup>48</sup>

The PSP held that India's sporadic efforts could not be the substitute for "a cohesive and a long-term policy". It felt that an early termination of the brutal conflict in Vietnam could create the necessary atmosphere for a new alignment of nations. It pointed out that only with faith, determination and humility could India awaken the region "to face the challenges and the opportunities" that awaited them.<sup>49</sup>

The views of the PSP appeared to have impact on India's official stand on "the area of peace"<sup>50</sup> and on its subsequent economic and political ties with the countries of the region.

### Indian Settlers in Ceylon

The PSP has been deeply concerned with the policy in regard to the persons of Indian origin in Ceylon. From the beginning, it had characterised the policy as perverse as it had failed to secure them full and equal citizenship rights<sup>51</sup> and had practically nothing to secure recognition for them as Ceylon's

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup>"The Secretary's Report", *Janata*, 10 September 1967, pp. 3-4.

<sup>47</sup>Goregaon Resolutions of the National Executive, June 1968, *Janata*, 7 July 1968, p. 9.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup>Chapter 2, n. 42.

<sup>50</sup>*Report of the Second National Conference of the PSP, Gaya, December 25-30, 1955*, n. 5, p. 225.

citizens.<sup>52</sup> It urged taking firm and intelligent steps with regard to the matter and would like Ceylon being compelled to accept all descendants of the Indian labourers born in that country before its independence as its citizens. It hoped that a civilised government like the Ceylonese would recognise the obvious fact and settle the problem to the satisfaction of all concerned. The party, however, stood for mutual goodwill and a spirit of accommodation on all sides.<sup>53</sup> It desired cordial relations between the two countries with a just and equitable solution of the problem.

In 1960, on the occasion of the visit of Ceylon's Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandaranaike to India, the PSP demanded settlement of the issue.<sup>54</sup> In 1961, the PSP appealed to the Government of Ceylon to consider sympathetically the difficulties of the Tamil-speaking people and "to restore to these people the assurance of being free and equal citizens in the democratic state of Ceylon".<sup>55</sup> With respect to settlers it urged specification of a time-limit in which they would choose either India's or Ceylon's citizenship.<sup>56</sup> As Hem Barua stated in the *Lok Sabha*: "The so-called stateless millions in Ceylon are morally and legally Ceylonese citizens and the Ceylonese Prime Minister by her various overtures is simply trying to beguile India."<sup>57</sup>

In 1964, the PSP welcomed the Indo-Ceylon agreement signed by Mrs. Srimavo Bandaranaike and Lal Bahadur Shastri. But the interpretation of these proposals by the Prime Minister of Ceylon was disappointing to it, for that reduced the Indians in Ceylon to the status of second class citizens.

<sup>52</sup>Vivek, "The Indian-Descended Ceylonese", *Janata*, 31st July 1960, p. 14.

<sup>53</sup>*Ibid.*; *Janata*, 28 August 1960, p. 2.

<sup>54</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 46(2), 31 August 1960, Col. 5957.

<sup>55</sup>Madras Resolution of the National Executive, June 1961, *Janata*, 25 June 1961, p. 8.

<sup>56</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 56(2), 16 August 1961, Cols. 2476-77.

<sup>57</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, 34(2), 28 September 1964, Col. 4068.

M. Surendram, party Chairman in Tamilnadu, vigorously condemned the agreement as "harming the interests of the Ceylon Indians generally and particularly the Tamilians".<sup>58</sup> The PSP held that by the agreement the whole process of integration and assimilation of Indians would be gravely jeopardised if the Ceylon Government would go on with its threat to keep them on a different list.<sup>59</sup> It pleaded with Ceylon not to have a policy like the one of the apartheid in South Africa.<sup>60</sup>

With the formation of Dudley Senanayake's Government in Ceylon in 1965, the PSP urged it to accept its full responsibility for the Indian Ceylonese and "strongly deprecated attempts from India to perpetuate a most unjust arrangement".<sup>61</sup> It asked the Indian Government to make efforts for ensuring proper security of the lives and properties of the Indians in Ceylon and wanted the two countries to develop not only political relationships but also close economic ties. It hoped for India's favourable trade relations with Ceylon during the new Senanayake regime following the final settlement of the question of the people of Indian origin in that country.<sup>62</sup>

## Nepal

From the very beginning, the PSP has been urging for a clearly defined policy towards Nepal. It has persistently wished for a representative, responsible and democratic government in that country regretting that the policy of the Government of India in this matter was neither clear-cut nor vigorously pursued.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>58</sup> *Janata*, 22 November 1964, p. 9.

<sup>59</sup> Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 35(2), 23 November 1964, Col. 1290.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>61</sup> Editorial, "Ceylon and its Indians", *Janata*, 28 March 1965, p. 1.

<sup>62</sup> S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 47(2), 15 November 1965, Col. 1983; Muslaiuddin Ahmad, "Indo-Ceylonese Relations", *Janata*, 11 November 1967, pp. 36-37.

<sup>63</sup> *Patna Resolutions of the Seventh Annual Conference of the Socialist Party, March 6, 7, 8 and 10, 1949* (Bombay, 1949), p. 24; Patna Resolution of the National Executive of the Socialist Party, June 1949, *Janata*, 26 June 1949 p. 12; *Report of the Eighth National Conference of the Socialist Party, Madras, 8-12 July 1950*, n. 2, pp. 229-30; D.P. Singh's Statement, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, 35(1), 22 August 1961, Col. 1191.

In March 1949, the Seventh Annual Conference of the Socialist Party regretted the continuance of an obligarchic and hierarchical rule in Nepal which restricted the civil liberties of its people and obstructed members of the Nepal National Congress in their struggle for a representative government.<sup>61</sup> The Conference expressed its solidarity with that party in Nepal, sent its greetings to its President, Bisheshwar Prasad Koirala, and his six hundred supporters in prisons and urged the Government of Nepal to revise its policies and immediately release them.<sup>65</sup> The party also requested the Government of Nepal for a better treatment of its political prisoners and hunger strikers and appealed to the people and the Government of India for sympathising with Nepal's brave freedom fighters in their struggle against tyranny.<sup>66</sup> It pointed out that the tyranny of a small clique in Nepal had caused a vacuum and, unless its people were "actively helped to self-rule, Atlantic or Soviet powers would inevitably rush in".<sup>67</sup> The party wanted the people of Nepal being helped in filling up the vacuum with their own self-rule and urged the Indian Government "to give up its policy of doing nothing".<sup>68</sup>

It warmly greeted the "brethren" in Nepal who bravely asserted the claims of democracy against the Rana Tyranny. The Ranas, who derived all their powers from the King and were never supported by the people in any elections, had set up a new "usurper Government". It strongly urged the Government of India "to withdraw recognition from the Kathmandu usurpers and open conversation with the leaders of the Nepali Congress".<sup>69</sup> It expected the leaders of the Nepali Congress to pull down the usurpers' authority and form a Committee of People's Power and abolish all vestiges of

<sup>61</sup>Patna Resolution of the Socialist Party, March 1949, n. 63.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid.

<sup>66</sup>Jaya Prakash Narayan's Statement on the treatment of political prisoners in Nepal, *Janata*, 22 May 1949, p. 8; Patna Resolutions of the National Executive, June 1949, n. 63.

<sup>67</sup>Report of the Eighth National Conference of the Socialist Party, Madras, 1950, n. 63.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid.

<sup>69</sup>Dr. Lohia's Statement, *Janata*, 12 November 1950, pp. 1, 16; Nagpur Resolution of the National Executive, November 1950, *Himalayan Policy for India* (Socialist Party, Bombay, 1951), p. 19.

feudalism and serfdom.<sup>70</sup> It was dissatisfied with India's policy of non-intervention, believing that would mean a support to the *status quo* and tyranny and would give a chance to the Atlantic and the Soviet camps to fill up the vacuum.<sup>71</sup> It urged the Government for a genuine policy of a third camp having its application also to Nepal.

The PSP was not satisfied with the state of affairs in Nepal even after the end of the century-old Rana obligarchy. It regretted the non-emergence of a stable self-government. It was sad over the split in the Nepali Congress in 1952 which brought about a paralysis in the organised political forces, neither elder nor younger Koirala succeeding to build up mass consciousness. Bhim Dutt and others, in its opinion, only sabotaged the very working of the democratic faith. As early as in 1953, it feared that, if the chaotic situation persisted, China might take advantage.<sup>72</sup>

When, in 1954, the Indian parliamentary delegation faced anti-Indian demonstrations at the Kathmandu airport, the PSP viewed it as an omen in India-Nepal relations deteriorating further with King Tribhuvan's address to the Advisory Assembly. His charges of India's interference in Nepal's affairs were viewed by it as a "betrayal" of "indefensible malicious ignorance and perverted sense".<sup>73</sup> It wanted the reasons for Nepal's hostile feelings for India to be found out. It was unhappy over the delay in Nepal's entry in UN and deplored the fact that India did nothing to get the Prime Minister of Nepal invited to the Colombo deliberations of April 1954.<sup>74</sup> A few years later, it welcomed efforts at restating and reaffirming unbroken relationship between the two countries.<sup>75</sup> It suggested special precaution being taken in appointing India's ambassadors to Nepal, for they had not only to be able but informed,

<sup>70</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup>Dr. Lohia's Note on a Himalayan Policy, n. 69, pp. 3 4.

<sup>72</sup>N.G. Goray, "Troubled Nepal", *Janata*, 16 August 1953, p. 17.

<sup>73</sup>Mussafir, "Incident in Kathmandu", *Janata*, 13 June 1954, p. 13.

<sup>74</sup>Madhu Limaye, "Peaceful Coexistence plus Something", *Janata*, 13 June 1954, p. 15; Asoka Mehta's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7(2), 29 September, 1954, Col. 3709.

<sup>75</sup>N.G. Goray, "Nepal and India", *Janata*, 13 April 1958, p. 5.

sympathetic and understanding.<sup>76</sup>

The PSP was very happy with the results of Nepal's general election in 1959. It congratulated the Nepali Congress on its most convincing victory against heavy odds. It hoped that the Nepali Congress would lead the country to economic and social reconstruction.<sup>77</sup> Asoka Mehta welcomed Nehru's declaration, occasioned in 1959 by the Chinese aggression against India, on the immemorial ties between the two countries. He prided in joint India-Nepal patrolling of Nepal's outer borders particularly in view of the fact that the Chinese forces had crossed in Nepal in August that year and had refused "to recognise the traditional border between Nepal and Tibet".<sup>78</sup> The PSP also welcomed the endorsement by the Seventh General Conference of the Nepali Congress of Nepal's policy of positive neutrality and non-alignment.<sup>79</sup>

Following the dismissal of the B.P. Koirala Ministry by King Mahendra in December 1960, N.G. Goray declared : "The sudden throttling of democracy in Nepal by the king must come as a rude shock to the Indian people ... one thing is clear : he has not acted wisely".<sup>80</sup> The National Executive of the party drew the attention of the Indians to "*the coup de etat*" spelling "a threat both to the progress and stability of Nepal and to the security of both Nepal and India".<sup>81</sup> It believed that the urges of the Nepali people could not be thwarted for long and that B.P. Koirala's party would occupy its rightful position. On 15 January 1961, the Bombay branch of the PSP observed "Nepal day". On that occasion Asoka Mehta deplored the wanton destruction of democracy in Nepal.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>76</sup>Davendra Prasad Singh's Statement, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, 22(1), 26 August 1958, Cols. 533-35.

<sup>77</sup>New Delhi Resolution of the National Executive, April 1959, *Janata*, 26 April 1959, pp. 3-5.

<sup>78</sup>Asoka Mehta's New Delhi public meeting address on the occasion of the observance of "Vacate Aggression Day", *Janata*, 13 December 1959, p. 3.

<sup>79</sup>Editorial, "Nepal's Wise Leadership", *Janata*, 15 May 1960, p. 1.

<sup>80</sup>*Janata*, 25 December 1960, p. 3.

<sup>81</sup>Bhubaneshwar Resolution of the National Executive, 28-29 December 1960-1 January 1961, *Janata*, 9 January 1961, pp. 6-7.

<sup>82</sup>*Janata*, (Republic Day Number), 26 January 1961, p. 31.

The party, however, had not the least intention that India should interfere in Nepal's internal affairs.<sup>83</sup> It hoped that King Mahendra would not allow Nepal's own and "Chinese communists poised on the Nepal-Tibet frontier" to grow stronger.<sup>84</sup> The PSP also hoped that the new Prime Minister, Dr. Tulsī Giri, would continue to be a democratic socialist and would help to prevent "the communist avalanche in Nepal". It wished for an early restoration of a form of government in Nepal which would reflect the will and the wishes of its people.<sup>85</sup>

The PSP had always stood for India's developmental economic assistance being given to Nepal. In 1961, it appreciated India's decision to continue aid. But it feared that the aid being given could not be properly utilised in the deteriorating political situation with the great discontent on account of the continued detention of the popular leaders and the dissolution of elected Parliament. It also feared Nepal's unsatisfactory defence position resulting from that kind of situation.<sup>86</sup> It was, therefore, in the interest of India's security that efforts were made by India towards the establishment of a responsible, representative and popular government in Nepal.

In 1961-62, apprehending a fresh Chinese aggression against India, the PSP urged a change in the Indian attitude towards Nepal. Attacking its "supine policy", it drew the attention of the Government towards the sinister design behind the Lhasa-Kathmandu road.<sup>87</sup> It warned Nepal also against the Chinese plan to suck it into its own orbit along with other neighbouring states.

The removal of Rishikēsh Shah from Nepal's Foreign Minister's post on his return from Delhi further caused concern to the PSP in 1962. It was surprised over the re-instatement

<sup>83</sup>H.V. Kamath's Bhopal Press Statement of 31 January 1961, *Janata*, 12 February 1961, p. 4.

<sup>84</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 53(2), 3 April 1961, Col. 8845; Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 56(2), 16 August 1961, Cols. 2476-77.

<sup>86</sup>D.P. Singh's Statement, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, n. 63, Col. 1191.

<sup>87</sup>H.V. Kamath's Bhopal Press Statement, *Janata*, 3 December 1961, pp. 9-10.



of Giri as the Foreign Minister and hoped for pro-India swing in Nepal's attitude.<sup>88</sup> Keeping in view Nepal's strategic importance, the PSP wanted economic ties being developed further with that country. It was satisfied with the new joint Indo-Nepalese projects, for instance, the river training and power-production undertakings.<sup>89</sup>

The PSP expressed grave concern at the continued incarceration of a large number of Nepal's socialist leaders including B.P. Koirala.<sup>90</sup> In December 1967 some important PSP leaders expressed their grave concern over the fast-unto-death decision of the Nepali Congress leader, Girija Prasad Koirala, as his demands for the release of political detenus were not being met. They strongly urged the king of Nepal "to take immediate action to save the situation".<sup>91</sup> In 1968, the party was joyous over the release of B.P. Koirala, Ganesh Man Singh and others after more than eight years' continued incarceration and expected that the remaining political detenus would be released soon.<sup>92</sup>

## Burma

The PSP has also been seized with India-Burma relations. From the beginning it has been critical of the Indian policy in relation to the Indians in Burma and has been pressing for their full and equal citizenship rights.<sup>93</sup>

Ever since India's independence the PSP has stood for close economic and political relations with Burma. It wanted close association of Burma's socialist movement as well as Government to strengthen the "Third Force" of Socialism and

<sup>88</sup> *Janata*, 7 October 1962, p. 5.

<sup>89</sup> Asoka Mehta, "Changing Face of Asia", *Janata*, 26 May 1963, pp. 4-5; S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 47(2), 15 November 1965, Col. 1983.

<sup>90</sup> New Delhi Resolutions of the National Executive, February 1966, *PSP Ninth National Conference, December 30-31, 1967-January 1, 1968, General Secretary Report*, pp. 41-42.

<sup>91</sup> *Janata*, 14 January 1968, p. 2.

<sup>92</sup> New Delhi Resolution of the National Executive, 1968, *Janata*, 17 November 1968, pp. 3-15.

<sup>93</sup> *Report of the Eighth National Conference of the Socialist Party, Madras, July 1950*, n. 2, pp. 81, 232.

Peace.<sup>91</sup> The party had all admiration for socialist Burma and its relations with the rest of the world.<sup>95</sup> The only point causing its regret was the lot of the Indians in the country who, it felt, had themselves caused suspicion and hatred in the minds of the Burmese with their behaviour.<sup>96</sup> It appreciated Burma's approach to the problem of communist threat. It noted Defence Minister U Ba Swa's repeated proposal at the Colombo Conference of 1954 for closer economic relations as "a nucleus of an ultimate defence arrangement".<sup>97</sup> It was unhappy over the posture of indifference maintained by the Government of India.

In 1956, the PSP felt concerned with the developments on the Sino-Burmese frontier. It pointed out that the *Panchshila*, to which India, Burma and China were committed, made it an imperative for the big countries to "disarm fears and apprehensions" of their small neighbours".<sup>98</sup> It wanted India's ties of friendship with China and Burma being maintained and strengthened and fraternal peace being preserved in the area.<sup>99</sup> In 1960-61, noticing the Burmese rapprochement with China, it asked the Indian Government to make it clear to the Burmese Government that China's intentions were malicious and to work out an agreement with that Government.<sup>100</sup>

In 1963, the arrests of U Ba Swe, U Kyow Nyein and other socialist pioneers of all-Asia stature shocked the PSP. It expressed "its solidarity with them for their faith in the value of Democracy and Socialism".<sup>101</sup>

<sup>91</sup>*Ibid.*; Asoka Mehta, *Foreign Policy—A Socialist View* (Bombay, 1950), p. 6.

<sup>95</sup>*Janata*, 15 February 1953, p. 13.

<sup>96</sup>Madhu Limaye, "India and Her Neighbours", *Janata*, 13 September 1953, p. 18.

<sup>97</sup>G.S. Bhargava, "The Colombo Conference: A Summing Up", *Janata*, 16 May 1954, pp. 19-20.

<sup>98</sup>*New Delhi Resolutions of the National Executive, August 1956, Janata*, 15 August 1956, p. 9.

<sup>99</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>100</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 43(2), 29 April 1960, Col. 1478; *Lok Sabha Debates*, 47(2), 22 November 1960, Col. 1639; Asoka Mehta's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 50(2), 20 February 1961, Cols. 918-919.

<sup>101</sup>*New Delhi Resolutions of the National Executive, August 1963, Janata*, 25 August-1 September 1963, p. 8.

In consistency with its stand on the issue, in 1964 the PSP regretted Burma's new policy of confiscating the property of the people of Indian origin and reducing them virtually to a state of nakedness.<sup>102</sup> It vigorously criticised the Indian Government for what it viewed as a "tragic spectacle of ruthlessness with the splendid indifference and unconcern of a dead mummy".<sup>103</sup> It was not satisfied with the Indian Foreign Minister's talks with the Burmese Government. It urged the Government to seek UN help.

### Malaysia

Ever since India's independence, the PSP has been persuading the Indian Government to promote effective relations with Malaya and Singapore. As early as 1947, it attacked the Government for not placing a demand in UN for the withdrawal of foreign authority and armies from Malaya.<sup>104</sup> In 1950, it urged the Government to support the Malaysians in their freedom struggle against the Britishers.<sup>105</sup> The Indian appeal to the Malaysians for a non-violent resistance against the imperialist rulers was, in its opinion, futile, for the rulers were making no positive efforts to encourage peaceful resistance.<sup>106</sup> The PSP found the Indian Government wanting in vigour of its protest against the colonial rule in Malaya and demanded its atonement.<sup>107</sup> Following the grant of independence to Malaya and the subsequent formation of Malaysia, it urged the Indian Government to develop political and economic ties with that neighbour. The party voiced India's obligation for the sympathies and help it had given along with other Commonwealth countries against the Chinese attack of 1962.<sup>108</sup>

<sup>102</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 34(2), 28 September 1964, Cols. 4066-69.

<sup>103</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>104</sup>*Policy Statement*, n. 30, pp. 36-37.

<sup>105</sup>*Report of the Eighth National Conference of the Socialist Party, Madras, 8-12 July 1950*, n. 2, p. 81.

<sup>106</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, *Third Camp In World Affairs* (Socialist Party, 1950), p. 17.

<sup>107</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Parliamentary Debates*, 18(1), 17 September 1953, Col. 4011; *Allahabad Resolutions of the National Executive, December 1953*, n. 35, p. 29; Asoka Mehta's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7(2), 29 September 1954, Col. 3709; *Janata*, 15 July 1956, p. 9.

<sup>108</sup>*Report of the Sixth National Conference of the PSP, Bhopal, June 8-10, 1963*, p. 93.

In 1965, it took the Indian Government to task for not protesting to Indonesia's dispatch of troops against Malaysia,<sup>109</sup> and was unhappy that not even unqualified support was shown to the latter.

The PSP appreciated the Malaysian stand during the undeclared India-Pakistan war of 1965. It welcomed Malaysia's direct support to India and wanted India to develop closer relations.<sup>110</sup> It would like the Indian Government to express gratitude and support it directly against the confrontation posed by Indonesia.<sup>111</sup>

### Indonesia

For a pretty long time from the beginning, the PSP had been all admiration for India's relations with Indonesia. It appreciated India's role in the Indonesian freedom struggle against Dutch imperialism, supported the Indian Government in its condemnation of the Netherlands and urged positive steps in UN regarding the withdrawal of foreign authority and armies from Indonesia.<sup>112</sup> It wanted diplomatic relations with the Netherlands being severed and economic blockade being imposed against the Dutch vessels.<sup>113</sup>

Following Indonesia's independence, the PSP urged developing India's friendly relations with it especially to strengthen the area of the Third Camp of Socialism and Peace.<sup>114</sup> It suggested a regional defence pact with Indonesia along with other Southeast Asian countries and pleaded for an Indian Ocean Pact with them.<sup>115</sup> It appreciated Indonesia's policy of

<sup>109</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 40(2), 13 April 1965, Col. 7226.

<sup>110</sup>Peter Alvares's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 46(2), 24 September 1965, Col. 7435.

<sup>111</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 47(2), 15 November 1965, Cols. 1981-82.

<sup>112</sup>*Policy Statement*, n. 30, pp. 36-37.

<sup>113</sup>*National Executive*, Lucknow, December 29-31, 1948, *Resolutions* (Socialist Party, 1949, Bombay), pp. 5-6

<sup>114</sup>*Report of the Eighth National Conference of the Socialist Party*, Madras, 1950, n. 2, p. 81; Asoka Mehta, *Foreign Policy—A Socialist View*, n. 94.

<sup>115</sup>Dr. Balkrishna Gokhale, "Third Force in International Policies", *Janata*, 1 April 1951, pp. 2-6; Dr. Balkrishna Gokhale, "US Unfriendly Attitude has driven China in the Arms of Kremlin", *Janata*, 6 May 1951 p. 7.

neutrality. But it feared that lack of positive policy might subject Indonesia to American influence<sup>116</sup> and cautioned the Government of India that unless it made efforts for consolidating a third area of peaceful nations, Indonesia and other Southeast Asian nations might not remain as neutral as they appeared.<sup>117</sup>

In 1954, the PSP welcomed the Indonesian Prime Minister's visit to India and appreciated his enlightened statesmanship.<sup>118</sup> It showed awareness of the internal communist danger looming over Indonesia and of the counter forces in that country which rallied round the cry of Islam<sup>119</sup> and underlined the need for the policy of guaranteed neutrality enjoyed by Indonesia along with India and Burma which, it believed, would also provide an excellent opportunity to them for furthering their independent policy.<sup>120</sup> It had all appreciation for Indonesia condemning SEATO and other cold war alliances jointly with India and others at the Bandung Conference of 1955.

Later on, the PSP noted the changes occurring in India's relations with Indonesia. Particularly, with the deterioration in Sino-India relations, it found that process of change reaching its climax. The PSP, as has been seen earlier, regretted over the complacency of the Government of India in relation to the Indonesian confrontation of Malaysia.<sup>121</sup> During the undeclared India-Pakistan war in 1965 it raised a voice of protest against India's relations with Indonesia being continued.<sup>122</sup> It asked the Government to find reasons for such apathy, indifference and callousness from Indonesia and was so to believe that

<sup>116</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, "Foreign Policy Vs. Government", *Janata*, 9 December 1951, pp. 1-2.

<sup>117</sup>J.B. Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 5(2), 15 May 1954, Col. 7552.

<sup>118</sup>Asoka Mehta's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7(2), 29 September 1954. Cols. 3711-12.

<sup>119</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>120</sup>Madhav Gokhale, "An Asian Policy—A Plea II", *Janata*, 19 December 1954, pp. 3-5.

<sup>121</sup>Hem Barua's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 40(2), 1 April 1965, Col. 7226.

<sup>122</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 47(2), 15 November 1965, Col. 1982.

India's image in that country was eroding. In the post-Sukarno period, when the new regime decided to re-enter UN and re-establish friendly relations with all Asian nations including India, the PSP appreciated the change<sup>123</sup> and stood for strengthening cordial and friendly relations with Indonesia.

## RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

The PSP has been deeply concerned over India's relations with Japan. In the early post-war phase, it urged the Indian Government to place a demand in UN for the withdrawal of foreign authority and armies from Japan.<sup>124</sup> It advocated a policy of guaranteed neutrality for Japan and held that it might make the withdrawal of American forces from Japan easier and enable Japan to keep an army of its liking. It found India's Japan policy merely "formalistic and procedural" with no positive content.<sup>125</sup> Dr. Lohia attacked Nehru for not evolving a positive policy and pleaded for an all-Asian guarantee for Japan as a defeated nation. Such a guarantee of neutrality had "a juristic precedent in the Act as passed by America for the perpetual neutralisation of the Philippines".<sup>126</sup> The party pointed out that even Stalin wanted that kind of policy for Japan. It criticised US policy in Japan and the establishment of US military and naval bases in that country.<sup>127</sup>

The PSP viewed the Colombo Conference of April 1954 as incomplete without Japan's participation<sup>128</sup> and regretted that by accepting US tutelage Japan had practically excommunicated itself from the Asian community.<sup>129</sup> It would like India to persuade Japan to abrogate the security treaty with the US. It made out that the prestige of UN in Asia would remain low as

<sup>123</sup>Subodh Roy, "Indonesia's New Role in South East Asia", *Janata*, 7 July 1968, p. 13.

<sup>124</sup>*Policy Statement*, n. 30, pp. 36-37.

<sup>125</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, n. 116, pp. 1-3.

<sup>126</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>127</sup>*Allahabad Resolution of the National Executive, December 1953*, n. 35, p. 29.

<sup>128</sup>Acharya Kripalani's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 5(2), 15 May 1954, Col. 7552.

<sup>129</sup>Madhu Limaye, n. 79, p. 15.

long as it would continue to exclude Japan and other Asian States from its membership.<sup>130</sup> The Indian Government, it contended, had "failed to support Japan's claim for a proper position in the comity of nations and to work for a closer understanding and economic coordination between Japan and free countries of Asia".<sup>131</sup> India, according to the PSP, ought not to act as China's partisan against Japan, for its legitimate role was that of a "reconciler".<sup>132</sup> It pointed out that Japan's socialist forces had a clearer appreciation of India's foreign policy and, as such, it would not be difficult to get Japan closer to India.<sup>133</sup> It would like Japan to participate actively in the economic development of Asia and join in mutually beneficial trade with other Asian countries.<sup>134</sup>

In 1961, the PSP welcomed the visit of Japan's Prime Minister to India. It was happy to see India's relations with Japan getting closer and the basic outlines of India's Japan policy changing.<sup>135</sup> It wanted the Government to develop not only political but also close economic ties with Japan.<sup>136</sup>

## AFRICAN ISSUES

### Freedom and Colonialism

The PSP had been urging the Government of India to make efforts for the colonial emancipation of the African peoples. In 1947, the policy statement of the Socialist Party was :

"Vast areas of Africa...are still under foreign domination. Therefore, the struggle for freedom has to continue until the last vestige of imperialist domination has been destroyed. The Socialist Party will support all popular movements aimed at achieving this end".<sup>137</sup>

<sup>130</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>131</sup>Asoka Mehta's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 7(2), 29 September 1954, Cols. 3706-7.

<sup>132</sup>*Policy Statement*, n. 30, p. 32.

<sup>133</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>134</sup>Madhav Gokhale, n. 120, pp. 3-5.

<sup>135</sup>Asoka Mehta's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 60(2), December 1961, Col. 2962.

<sup>136</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 47(2), 15 November 1965, Col. 1983.

<sup>137</sup>*Policy Statement*, n. 30, p. 32.

The party felt that the Indian Government was not playing a positive role in UN with regard to the freedom of African peoples, demanded its positive drive for the withdrawal of foreign authorities and armies from the territories of the African countries and urged it to make international efforts for the reconstitution of national authorities in these territories.<sup>138</sup>

In 1950, the party viewed with a great concern the fact that the peoples of North Africa were still under the domination of European powers. They had the inherent and inalienable right "to manage their own affairs in a manner that would enable them to become equal partners in the society of free nations".<sup>139</sup> The party sent its greetings to the people of African countries like Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and others who were struggling for freedom and assured them of solidarity and full support in their struggle for emancipation.<sup>140</sup> Dr. Lohia wanted the Indian Government to invite freedom fighters like Emir Abdul Karim, Taib Salim, George Padmore and Dr. Azikiwe of North Africa as its guests for bringing about a spontaneous, unfettered and powerful anti-imperialist force.<sup>141</sup> The party would be happy with a situation which would permit "to keep them away from alliances with either camp".<sup>142</sup>

In 1953, the PSP felt deeply concerned over the mounting reign of repression and violence in Kenya, Tunisia and other colonies of French North Africa. It was unhappy with the moves "such as the contemplated creation of a Central African Federation, the banning of the Kenya African Union, the insistence upon the continued occupation of the Suez canal area and the policy of divide and rule in Nigeria".<sup>143</sup> The party wanted the Indian Government to take up their issues in world councils and support them in their struggle against colonial rule. It also noted the rapid rise of the sentiment for a free

<sup>138</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

<sup>139</sup>*The Report of the Eighth National Socialist Party Conference, 1950, Madras*, n. 2, p. 83.

<sup>140</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>141</sup>Rammanohar Lohia, n. 106, pp. 17-18.

<sup>142</sup>*We Build for Socialism* (Platform of the Socialist Party, 1951), p. 51.

<sup>143</sup>Betul Resolution of Special Convention, June 1953, *Two Years of the PSP*, n. 35, pp. 26-27.



and united Africa and underlined the urgent need for summoning an All-Africa Conference of freedom fighters to keep Africa disentangled from either power bloc and to combat tyranny and injustice through mass civil resistance.<sup>144</sup>

The PSP deplored the Indian policy towards Britain in Africa, its mere verbal protest against the French rule in Tunisia and its general slackening with regard to the African struggle against imperialism.<sup>145</sup> In 1955, the party welcomed friendship between India and the countries of Africa and held that for the nations of Africa the future lay in steering clear of the rival blocs, in combining to resist colonial tyranny and in forging links of mutual cooperation for their economic development.<sup>146</sup>

At the Asian Socialist Conference of 1956, the PSP welcomed the emergence of Sudan, Tunisia and Morocco as sovereign nations and welcomed Gold Coast's impending independence. It looked forward to the early resumption of the movement towards independence in Nigeria, extended its support to the freedom movements in Algeria and Kenya and felt deeply concerned over "the severe repression faced by the peoples in these countries".<sup>147</sup> The party also deplored the denial of political and educational facilities to the people of Congo and Central Africa.

In 1958, the PSP viewed with deep concern and alarm the mounting aggression of colonial powers in North, South, East and West Africa where the peoples' wishes were being repressed in a way "repugnant to any civilised nation".<sup>148</sup> It deplored the arrests, persecution and banning of political organisations in Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Mauritius and Algeria. It declared its solidarity with all African organisations leading the freedom struggles and pledged its support "to the valiant peoples of Algeria, Kenya, Cameroons and other States of

<sup>144</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>145</sup>*Allahabad Resolutions of the National Executive, December 1953, n. 35, pp. 28-29.*

<sup>146</sup>*Report of the Second National Conference of the PSP, Gaya, December 26-30, 1955, n. 5, p. 142.*

<sup>147</sup>*Janata*, 18 November 1956, pp. 9-10.

<sup>148</sup>*Report of the Fourth National Conference of the PSP, Poona, May 25-28, 1958, p. 134.*

Africa looked in the fight for freedom".<sup>149</sup> It held that the creation of free and resurgent Africa would be "an act of redemption that would save world freedom".<sup>150</sup>

The PSP further took note of the popular uprisings in Belgian Congo, Kenya and Central Africa. It condemned Portugal's determination not to part with power and Britain's resorting to constitutional subterfuges like the formation of the Central African Federation. It also condemned the policy and tactics of the European settlers in Africa and called upon the colonial powers "to respect the African's urge to freedom."<sup>151</sup> It urged that the liberal policies adopted by certain European powers in West and North Africa should be extended to other regions and no opportunities should be left to European settlers to maintain their overlordship. The PSP called upon the Indians settled in the various parts of Africa "to appreciate the Africans' sentiment and identify themselves with the Africans in their struggle for national emancipation".<sup>152</sup>

In 1961, the PSP drew the attention of the Government of India towards the newly liberated states of Africa. It underlined the growing tendency of integration in Africa as in the formation of a union of Ghana, Mali and Guinea. It expected the Indian Government to seek inspiration from them and help them in their greater and closer cooperation. It deplored developments in Angola and Mozambique where repressive measures were being stepped up. It urged the Government to give *de jure* recognition to the provisional Government of Algeria.<sup>153</sup>

In 1964, the PSP rejoiced over the emergence of Africa as a free continent, but felt deeply concerned over the meek protest from the Government of India regarding the freedom of Indian patriots being subjected to humiliation in that conti-

<sup>149</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>150</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 135.

<sup>151</sup>New Delhi Resolutions of the National Executive, April 1959, *Janata*, 26 April 1959, p. 5.

<sup>152</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>153</sup>D.P. Singh's Statement, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, 35(1), 22 August 1961 Cols. 1193-99; Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 59(2), 23 November 1961, Col. 1138.

nent.<sup>154</sup> It held that the Rhodesian development would prove a threat to the freedom and development of its neighbouring countries.<sup>155</sup> In 1966, it welcomed the rise of a new African State of Botswana as "a star of freedom for yet another African people".<sup>156</sup>

The PSP is, of late, happy over India's full moral and material support to the freedom fighters in South Africa, Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia and believes that it is India's duty "to see that freedom thrives in Africa whose peoples are being put to slavery".<sup>157</sup>

### Upsurge for Racial Equality

The PSP has also continued to deplore racial inequality being practised in some African States. From the beginning, it has been questioning various South African legislations denying liberty and equality to the Indian settlers.<sup>158</sup> It opposed the participation of the Government of India in the Cape Town Round Table Conference (1950) with regard to such legislations and executive actions and urged the Government to warn South Africa against its policy of the apartheid.<sup>159</sup> At a press conference in 1951, Dr. Lohia urged the Indian Government to take up in UN the question of racial discrimination not only against the Indians in South Africa but also other coloured peoples who had been denied equal rights in the other parts of Africa.<sup>160</sup>

The PSP also pointed to the denial of racial equality in Kenya and Central Africa. It deplored the atrocities in Kenya over the native people by the white settlers.<sup>161</sup> It felt concerned also over the "veritable reign of terror" against the Indians in

<sup>154</sup>Nath Pai's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 35(2), 23 November 1964, Col. 1289.

<sup>155</sup>S.N. Dwivedy's Statement, *Lok Sabha Debates*, 47(2), 15 November 1965, Cols. 1984-90.

<sup>156</sup>Muslaibuddin Ahmad, "Botswana : New African State", *Janata*, 20 October 1966, p. 5.

<sup>157</sup>Mulka Govind Reddy, "Africa Must be Liberated", *Janata*, 23 November 1969, p. 5.

<sup>158</sup>*Janata*, 24 July 1949, p. 17.

<sup>159</sup>*Report of the Eighth National Conference of the PSP, Madras, 1950*, n. 2, p. 220.

<sup>160</sup>*Janata*, 9 December, 1951, pp. 1-2.

<sup>161</sup>*Betul Resolution of Special Convention, June 1953*, n. 143.

that country.<sup>162</sup> It held that such terroristic acts in other states of Africa amounted practically to a total war against the African people.<sup>163</sup> At the second Asian Socialist Conference in 1956, it deplored the racist policy pursued by Central Africa, Kenyan authorities, and Belgium in Congo and called upon all colonial powers "to stop the massacre and accept the struggle as an inevitable historical process to secure fundamental rights and to achieve self-determination."<sup>164</sup>

At the Poona Conference in 1968, the PSP viewed with a deep concern the policy of apartheid rampage in South Africa, treason trials and terrorisation staged in Kenya and the Cameroons and constitutionally imposed racial discriminations in Rhodesia and Nyasaland.<sup>165</sup> In 1960, it drew the attention of the Indian Government to the mass killing of the demonstrators in South Africa and supported protest against such naked violation of human rights and dignity.<sup>166</sup> It viewed the revolt against Portuguese domination over Angola in 1962 and the resistance to the imposition of a racist and undemocratic constitution of Central African Federation as "the expressions of a yearning for elementary human rights".<sup>167</sup> It greeted brave African peoples and pledged its support to them in their struggle against these injustices.

In 1964, the PSP further supported the upsurge of the coloured people for racial equality in South Africa and Rhodesia. It appealed for the release of South African political prisoners and strongly deprecated the imposition of a ban by the Government of South Rhodesia on the national democratic parties of that country.<sup>168</sup> It held the imperialist, racialist white minority Government in Rhodesia as a "threat to the freedom and development of the neighbouring countries like Malawi, Tanganyika and Congo".<sup>169</sup> Some of the Praja Socialists stood for the solution of the Rhodesian issue through partition and

<sup>162</sup>*Parliamentary Debates*, 18(1), 17 September 1953, Col. 4011.

<sup>163</sup>*Policy Statement* (PSP, 1956, November), p. 81.

<sup>164</sup>*Janata*, 18 November 1956, p. 11.

<sup>165</sup>See n. 148.

<sup>166</sup>*Janata*, 3 April 1960, p. 3.

<sup>167</sup>Bombay Resolutions of the National Executive, July 1962, *Janata*, 29 July 1962, p. 4.

<sup>168</sup>*Janata*, 6 September 1964, p. 15.

<sup>169</sup>*Lok Sabha Debates*, n. 111, Cols. 1984-86.

urged the liberation of African majority area from the tyrannical racist regime of Ian Smith.<sup>170</sup> The PSP called for a positive action on Rhodesia and held that mere condemnation of racial discrimination would not be enough.<sup>171</sup>

<sup>170</sup>Chapter 3, n. 119; Mulka Govind Reddy, n. 157, p. 5.

<sup>171</sup>Hem Barua's *Lok Sabha* Statement of 8 April 1970, *The Statesman* (New Delhi), 9 April 1970.

## Summary and Conclusions

### SUMMING UP THE ATTITUDE

The attitude of the PSP towards India's regional relations and issues discussed above appears to have been essentially in consonance with its basic foreign policy objectives. Fundamentally, it has been agreeing with the Government. But on some of the issues and relations it has been demanding improvements from time to time.

The PSP favours equal friendly relations with Israel as well as with the Arabs against the nation's pre-independence view of the history of the Palestine question which it had shared with other parties. The fact that Israel subscribes to democratic socialism has been presumably the main consideration behind the post-independence change in its outlook. Its attitude towards the Indian policy for South and Southeast Asia has been guided by its notion of India pioneering and piloting regional cohesiveness, political, economic and military, for their collective assertion as an independent force in world politics and as a bulwark against communism. On the issues concerning the people of Indian origin, the party has been reacting vigorously and demanding from the Indian Government steps for just settlement of such issues with the other governments concerned.

The PSP stands on the issues and relations discussed in this chapter have been effective and valuable. As has been seen earlier also, they have often galvanised India's policies and actions.

As a radical wing of the Indian National Congress, with its distinct identity in it as the Congress Socialist Party, the PSP had shared the foreign policy concern of the Indian national movement in a major way from May 1934 to March 1948.

The last eighteen months of the period were those of the foreign policy of India's first national Government. In course of the fourteen years of that phase of its career it had developed its own foreign policy *perceptions, behavioural traits* and *dispositions* and had left its *impact* on the nation's pre-independence foreign policy outlook.

For the first four years of the period, the Socialists raised alarm against the eventuality of the Second World War and voiced the desirability of Indians having no truck with the British concerns over it. They condemned and opposed Imperialism, Fascism, Nazism, and Japanese Militarism, sought to promote the solidarity of Asian and African countries and their national movements for freedom, admired Soviet socialism and wanted the latter two classes of forces to work together against those of the first. While doing these, they considerably influenced the INC in its sympathies communicated from time to time to Abyssinia, Spain, China and Palestine as the victims of the forces of imperialism and fascism.

From May 1938, the Socialists started perceiving that communists all over the world including those at home were identifying Russia's national expansionism with the progressive strifes for just world order. They rejected that kind of identification, shed the illusion they had earlier and mooted the idea of a *third camp*.

Though not altogether defiant, they attacked the inclination in top Congress leaders like Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru to "collaborate" with Britain and its allies in their war efforts. The hue and cry raised by them was an important factor behind the final "Quit India" demand put to the Britishers.

By March 1948, when the CSP emerged as an independent political party known as the Socialist Party of India, some of its significant *dispositions* were already formed in its resentment over the partition of the country, the caution that it wanted for India against Russian expansionism, its stand that the Arab cause in Palestine was just and its advocacy for a third camp of nations which would act independently of the two power blocs of the post-war world and would strive for an egalitarian

international order based on national freedom and socio-economic justice among nations.

2. To the extent non-alignment, pursued by the Indian Government as the key principle of India's foreign policy, signified functioning in international politics independently of the two existing rival power blocs, the PSP agreed. But its basic disagreement over the matter lay in that the official policy was devoid of the primacy which, in its opinion, should have been necessarily attached to the genuine freedom of all nations, their equality and the progressive reduction of economic disparities between one and the other among them in terms of the living standards of their various peoples. It, as such, viewed the efforts of the Indian Government for preserving peace as directed merely towards a mechanical preservation of the existing power equilibrium and conspicuous with its privileged status of the Great Powers. India's role in the Korean, Hungarian and Czechoslovak crises confirmed that basic objection of the PSP which disapproved of what it viewed as the tendency of the Government, in the first of these cases, to side sometimes with the Atlantic bloc and sometimes with the Soviet camp and, in the other two, with the latter.

The party would have liked the Government to act clearly independently of either power bloc and make efforts for the emergence of a *third force* or *third bloc* of nations which, despite the reverse drives of great power blocs, would help preserve world peace and promote freedom of nations and socio-economic justice among them. With that kind of concept the PSP *did influence* the Government towards seeking the emergence of an *area of peace* or a *third area*. The two ideas, however, were not identical in the sense that the latter, unlike the former, did not shelter any bloc spirit.

The PSP would have liked India to give a drive for coordinating the foreign policies of uncommitted nations, preferably, at least, of those of the countries of South, South-east and West Asia. It attacked the tendency of the Indian Government to take for granted the rival regional collective defence arrangements of the Great Powers without making any well-pursued positive efforts to undo them in the interest of universalist collective security. It was unhappy over the fact that India made no endeavours at the non-aligned summits



towards the emergence of the *third bloc*.

3. The PSP was one with the Government over the principles of anti-colonialism and anti-racialism to the extent the latter worked with them for championing the rights and claims of dependent peoples in Asia and Africa irrespective of the race or group to which they belonged. But it was *sore* over India's "feeble" protest against the exploitation by Britain, France and Portugal respectively of the subjected peoples in Malaya, Kenya, Aden and the Central African Federation, Tunisia, Morocco, Indo-China and Algeria, and Goa and Angola. It *joined hands with the Government* in condemning Dutch imperialism in relation to the Indonesian struggle for freedom and for the liberation of West Irian, but would have liked it also to condemn the imperialist behaviour of the United States in Lebanon and Vietnam. It attacked what it viewed as "Russian neo-imperialism" and "Chinese neo-colonialism." The party was agitative over the "passivity" of the Indian Government in relation to the Dutch, Chinese, Russian and American interventions respectively in Indonesia, Tibet, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and Lebanon and, with its gestures, had its *impact* on the conduct of the Government towards modulating some of its initial postures and stands over them.

It viewed the official pursuit of anti-racialism as inhabited and lacking in vigour on account of India's membership of the Commonwealth which also included racist South Africa and Rhodesia. In 1950, it asked the Government to withdraw from the Round Table Conference on the question of Indians in South Africa and to take a lead in organising democratic nations against the practice of a pernicious doctrine like the one on which the policy of the apartheid was based. In fact, the party appeared becoming *emotional* inasmuch as it asked the Government to lead a demand for Rhodesia's partition between the African-majority and the white-inhabited regions.

4. The PSP upheld the desirability of receiving foreign aid with a view to bringing India economically and industrially at par with developed nations and had no basic objection to government technical and financial assistance coming from various foreign powers. But it was *emphatic* about not having any policy strings, political or economic, attached with the aid. It *feared* that excessive economic aid like that from the United States

and other Western powers might undermine the independence of foreign policy. It would like aid being preferred through UN and other international agencies. It valued economic collaboration among the underdeveloped nations particularly in South, Southeast and West Asia. Such a regionalist angle more particularly in relation to South and Southeast Asia was guided largely by its considerations for *preventing the spread of communism*. Its drives along such lines influenced the official policy slowly, yet increasingly.

The party continued emphasising the need for basing the nation's economic development on its own resources. It demanded governmental take over of big plantations and trade for accelerating the formation of capital. Viewing the growth of private sector as being incompatible with planned economy, it spelled the fear that that might lead to one-sided foreign trade. It looked at foreign loans as dangerous, for paying them back might involve the export of steel and agricultural products and India's trade might be adversely affected. Its assessment of US private capital as "pernicious" and its suggestions for utilising the PL-480 funds for promotion of education through the University Grants Commission had an *impact* on the policy of the Government.

5. The PSP *accepted* the fundamentals of India's defence policy. But it *perceived* a number of *defects* in it. The policy was rather too much disassociated from the people, was based on extreme secrecy and lacked a proper drive for organising and training the personnel satisfactorily. There were several other defects like unwarranted ministerial interference, excessive groupism, rampant casteism, unusual transfers and retrenchments of the civil employees of the Defence services, and subordination of the requirements of the defence of the country to political prejudices and foreign policy dogmas. There were deficiencies also in staffing military intelligence and effecting coordination of work and policies among the ministries of Defence, Defence Production and Finance.

The party was at the forefront of the opposition in *charging* the Government for its military failures and drawbacks of political leadership in relation to the Chinese invasion of 1962 and its pointers bore a *good deal of influence* on the subsequent improvements that the Government brought about

in its defence policy. It asked the Government to strive for self-sufficiency in every branch of weaponry including the production of nuclear weapons. Unlike some other opposition parties, it opposed the idea of seeking a nuclear umbrella which, in its opinion, might do way with the independence of foreign policy.

The PSP had a constructive defence programme of its own. It would like the defence organisation to be democratised through the widest association of the people with defence efforts. It stood for the co-existence of defence and socialism and would have liked the former being organised not only for the sake of a geographical entity but also for defending a new egalitarian society. It wanted a Defence Council to be set up with members drawn from the ruling as well as opposition parties. It suggested agricultural communities and labour cooperatives being formed in border areas with the armed forces to supplement their efforts.

The party *was unhappy* over the fact that the Government had done nothing to explore the possibilities of regional defence cooperation and had, in fact, stubbornly refused to move for associating like-minded Asian countries in a collective defence arrangement independent of the super powers. On its own part it would have such links forged among countries from Japan to Afghanistan which, however, under the official stand, would cut across the spirit of non-alignment. It would have very much liked a coordination of the defence policies of all the States in the Himalayan region with India's.

6. Beside the basic principles and aspects of India's foreign policy, covered above, its relations with the two great power blocs, the two hostile neighbours and the various regions of world politics were also of keen concern to the PSP.

The PSP *shared* the attitude of the Government towards the Western bloc over general issues like world peace, disarmament, Suez crisis, Lebanese crisis, Vietnam War and Arab-Israeli conflicts. In respect of the Vietnam War, however, the attitude of the party reflected *a deflection* in the wake of China's assault on India in 1962. It began justifying US involvement in that war as being against China's expansionist designs. Its continued pressure on the Government for adopting a strong attitude towards Western imperialism *influenced* the

the official policy and was considerably a factor of India's military action against the Portuguese colonial authority in Goa, Daman and Diu. It also continued pressing the Government for countering actively the military, political and economic manoeuvrings of the West for its domination in Asia.

With respect to the United States, the PSP *disapproved* of India's excessive dependence on American money. It wanted funds like those of PL-480 to be so used as not to cause any interference in India's own way of life and, as such, disfavoured the abortive scheme of Indo-US Educational Foundation. It *was unhappy* over the developments like the devaluation of the rupee under US pressure and the fertiliser deal with the United States. Insofar as US attitude in relation to the Kashmir question was concerned, it agreed with the reactions of the Government.

As regards Britain, the PSP *continued to attack* India's membership of the Commonwealth viewing it as inconsistent with non-alignment, for it impelled a passive linking of the country with the Anglo-American bloc, and inconsistent also with the principles of anti-colonialism and anti-racialism. It found the membership undesirable on economic grounds as well and went once to the extent of observing an anti-Commonwealth day. It *fully shared* the resentment of the Indian Government over the British role in the Suez crisis and the partisan British behaviour showing an unconcealed partiality for Pakistan in course of the undeclared war of 1965.

The party would like the Government to improve its policy for the West as well as the Soviet bloc by making efforts for a demilitarised, neutralist, independent and unified Germany.

In relation to the Soviet bloc, the PSP *was happy* that its countries gave India economic, technical and military assistance and supported it over the Kashmir issue. But it *continued disapproving* vehemently the acquiescence of the Indian Government in what it viewed to be the undesirable phenomenon of the Soviet "sphere of influence" in the Balkans and Central Europe. It *went on accusing* the Government from time to time for an excessive leaning towards, and dependence on, the USSR. As in the case of the Indo-US Educational Foundation, so also in relation to the Institute of

Russian Studies it showed a strong disapproval and attacked the operation of the Soviet news agency, Novosti, in India likening it to the American CIA. It *censored* the Indian Government as strongly as it could for its initial stands on both the Soviet military intervention of 1956 in Hungary and the military intervention of the Warsaw Powers in Czechoslovakia about twelve years later and, at least in relation to the Hungarian crisis, *succeeded in compelling the Government to modulate its initial stands*. During 1958-63 the party continued to fear that the Soviets were dubious over the Sino-Indian border conflict, believing that they would favour China and let India down, and continued questioning the trust that the Indian Government seemed to be placing with them. It as well continued pressing its thesis that the Soviet support to India over the Kashmir issue was aimed at compelling Pakistan to look to the USSR rather than to China and the United States. It *disapproved* of India's response to the Soviet offer of good offices leading to the Tashkent deal which, along with the subsequent Soviet supply of arms to Pakistan, it viewed as only confirming its own thesis. But, when India signed a Treaty with the USSR, the party in its new form as the Socialist Party took a strongly critical view of it.

As far as China was concerned, the *disagreement* of the PSP with the Government was far wider than its *agreement* with it. Only at the beginning of India's relations with new China it supported the Government over recognising the communist regime and seeking its cooperation for world peace, anti-colonialism, anti-racialism and Asian solidarity and harmony. Following the Chinese military action of October 1950 in Tibet, it started *noting and pointing out defects* in the China policy of the Government. Over the *Panchshila* principles dovetailed to the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet in 1954 it refused to nurse any optimism and took them as a make-believe rather than as any real basis for attaining either peaceful co-existence between the two countries or a general harmony in Asian relations. A new map that was published in China subsequently in 1954 only confirmed its premonitions and led it to *warn* the Government against the Chinese design. At the instance of the Khampa rebellion of 1959 in Tibet, it *accused the Government* for leaving India's Himalayan

frontiers unguarded and asked it to treat the Chinese repression in that buffer State as an aggression against India. It attacked the Government subsequently for its abstention from voting in the UN General Assembly on the question of the violation of human rights in Tibet. Later, it appeared drawing the satisfaction that its stands had resulted in influencing India's Tibet policy to some extent.

Following the Chinese attack on India in 1959, *some, though not all, Praja Socialists* asked for introducing a change in India's stand on Formosa by establishing relations with the KMT Government and for thus seeking to keep China out of UN. The party as a whole wanted the Government to ensure the defence of Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal for the sake of India's own territorial integrity. It *disassociated itself* from the Government in relation to the visit to New Delhi of the high-power Chinese delegation headed by Chou En Lai in April 1960, asked the countrymen to keep away from public receptions for the Chinese and directed its units to hold demonstrations against the talks. What it apprehended was peaceful surrender by the Government in the guise of peaceful negotiations. Following the massive Chinese attack on India in 1962, it *disapproved* of the acceptance of the Colombo Proposals. It *raised an alarm* over the Pindi-Peking accord of 1963 viewing it as "a piece of sheer chauvinistic opportunism" and demanded adequate preparations against the joint challenge from the two neighbouring dictatorships. At the instance of the first Chinese nuclear explosion it *demande*d a re-orientation of India's nuclear policy towards the manufacture of nuclear weapons as a deterrent against any nuclear onslaught likely from China. The *shift in its attitude* towards the Indian stand on the Vietnam War, noted earlier, was the result of its fear of Chinese expansionism *vis-a-vis* the interests of democracy in the region.

The PSP gave a broad support to India's Pakistan policy over various issues. But it *continued offering its own suggestion* from time to time. On the question of minorities in East Pakistan, the party appeared to be flambouyant inasmuch as it asked for the imposition of economic sanctions against Pakistan, cutting off trade relations, dispatching armed forces and forcing Pakistan to take back all its Muslims who had emigrated

to India. It continued to keep the Government tight over maintaining that Kashmir was an integral part of India. Whereas *some of its members welcomed* the provisions of the Indus Water Treaty, *others viewed it as unfair* for India and even as the "second partition" of the country. The party questioned the transfer of Berubari to Pakistan more particularly with respect to the legal propriety of the termination of citizenship of the Indian nationals inhabiting it. As regards the Rann of Kutch issue the party *charged* the Government as having exceeded the parliamentary mandate in agreeing for arbitration, *condemned the arbitration award* and *launched a countrywide agitation* against the same being accepted. The Tashkent agreement met with its *disapproval* as it involved India's withdrawal from the territorial gains, strategically important, made during the undeclared war through the occupation of Kargil and the Haji Pir Pass. The party *continued to be sore* over several Muslim nations showing pro-Pakistan attitude from time to time in various India-Pakistan disputes and bitterly opposed India's abortive bid to participate in the Rabat summit of Muslim nations as something silly which went against its self-respect. In the wake of Bangla Desh movement, the party gave consistently all-out support to the Indian Government towards the liberation of the new State.

Notable among the trends of the attitude of the PSP towards some other important aspects of India's foreign policy and external relations was *the post-independence shift in its outlook on the persistent Arab-Israel tangle* presumably because Israel subscribed to democratic socialism. As soon as Israel emerged as a State, the party started pressing for the establishment of diplomatic relations with it and continued to ask for a properly friendly spirit being maintained towards it instead of the indifference in order to keep the Arab countries appeased. It continued pointing out that a number of Arab countries often acted against India's interest and none of them took its side against Pakistan. With that kind of attitude towards Israel *vis-a-vis* the Arabs, it would have liked the Indian Government, in 1955, to secure to Israel its right to participate in the Bandung Conference and, in 1967, to keep strictly neutral in relation to the military conflict between the two sides.

The other notable trend of the attitude of the PSP lay in its regionalist angle for South and Southeast Asia. It would like the Government to pursue a specific policy of rallying the countries of the region around itself as a political, economic, military and cultural nucleus of a regional force acting independently of the two existing blocs, filling in the vacuum caused by the exit of colonial powers and forging a bastion of democracy against the spread of communism and the rise of Chinese expansionism. It would have liked Indonesia being restrained from confronting Malaysia and being dealt with strongly for its open partiality towards Pakistan in 1965. Early in the sixties it would have liked Burma being dissuaded from seeking rapprochement with China. It wanted a meticulously careful handling of relations with Nepal for keeping it under India's influence as against China's and also inducing the preservation of democracy in that country. With a broader point of view for an Asia policy, from the very early fifties it continued urging for friendly relations based on mutual respect and commonality of interests with Japan which it would like to see free from US domination.

Another trend, not developed elaborately, lay in the concern of the PSP over India's Africa policy. It would have liked India to be active in promoting its own solidarity with the African freedom movements and to pursue consistently a well-laid policy of encouraging the emergence of a powerful, uncommitted, anti-imperialist and anti-racist force of the African States.

7. The attitude of the PSP towards India's foreign policy could be observed primarily in the quality of its *perception* of the environmental factors bearing on the policy, its basic principles and major aspects, the issues that it faced from time to time and the pros and cons of the lines of action pursued by the Government. The perception appeared generally to be clear, intelligent, reasonable and considerably unprejudiced. But certain spots of prejudice in it like a deep endearment of democratic socialism, an aversion for communist expansionism and a fervent patriotism affected from time to time its qualities in relation to some specific points of the foreign policy.

The *disposition* of the PSP, as a parliamentary-democratic party of the opposition, to react to the foreign policy of the



Government was conditioned by that type of perception. The area of its *agreement* with the Government was rather wide. Though the spirit of agreement was candid, it was unreserved only in relation to critical and emergent external situations for the nation. Normally, even while agreeing on official principles, policies and stands, it pointed to their defects and put forward its own suggestions for improvements which were often constructive, generally charged with ideological and patriotic fervour and, as such, often oblivious of practical difficulties besetting their implementation and, at times, emotional. But whenever a situation called for it, the party readily volunteered its sincere support and active cooperation to the Government.

As has been seen above, there were only a few points of the foreign policy in relation to which the party almost persistently disagreed with the Government. The *disagreement* was mostly derived from the spots of prejudice in its perception. The party was generally censorial, but constructive, in projecting its disagreement. Nevertheless, there were occasions, though not many, when it sought to show the Government down, indulged in rhetorics to play on public sentiments and aimed at propaganda for itself. It was led generally by the consideration of effecting changes in the stands of the Government and, for that, it depended on the pressure that it brought to bear on the latter with the force of arguments and analysis, hue and cry and agitation. On the whole, its *behaviour* was more rational than emotional.

Though not very often, the party did, at times, reflect *divisions in its ranks* over foreign policy issues. Such divisions, though not major and not alien to a democratic party, betrayed incohesiveness of approach as and when they appeared. *Shifts* in its attitude towards certain issues could also be observed from time to time. But the attitude was *consistent* to a remarkable degree. Nonetheless, on the whole, it was *flexible rather than rigid*.

As would appear from this resume, with the given attitude the PSP had a good deal of *impact* on the Government in shaping principles, assessing situations, adopting policies, taking stands on international issues and conducting the foreign policy generally. That was a matter of credit in view particularly of the fact that the party was never formidably strong and

continued to lose its strength due to frequent splits and truncation as well as the nature of politics and circumstances in the country with which its middling ideological position and sober ways failed to fit favourably.

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